Wireless Security with Beamforming Technique by Zhang, Yuanrui
Wireless Security with Beamforming
Technique
 
 
 
 
Memory-Centric System Level Design of 
Heterogeneous Embedded DSP Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scott Johan Fischaber, BSc (Hon) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the 
Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences in Queen’s University Belfast 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
October 2007
Yuanru Zha g M.Sc.
School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Queen’s University Belfast
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
June 2016
ar
X
iv
:1
60
9.
03
62
9v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
2 S
ep
 20
16
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the wireless security in the physical layer with beamforming
technique. As the wireless communications grow more important, a higher level of
security is more demanding as well. New techniques have been proposed in complement
to the existing encryption-based methods in the communications protocols. One of the
emerging areas is the security enhancement in the physical layer, which exploits the
intrinsic properties of the wireless medium. Beamforming, which has been proved to
have many advantages, such as increasing data rates and reducing interference, can also
be applied to enhance the wireless security.
One of the most common threats, i.e., passive eavesdropping, is addressed in this
thesis. Passive eavesdroppers bring significant challenges to the system design, because
the knowledge of their locations and channel condition is generally difficult to acquire.
To reduce the risk of leaking information to the eavesdroppers, the physical region
where the transmission is exposed to eavesdropping has been studied. In this thesis, the
exposure region based beamforming technique is proposed to combat the threat from
the randomly located eavesdroppers in a fading channel.
A stochastic geometry tool is used to model the distribution of the passive eaves-
droppers. In this system model, the large-scale path loss and a general Rician fading
channel model are considered. The exposure region is established to describe the
secrecy performance of the system, based on which the probability that the secrecy
outage event occurs is defined to evaluate the security level of the exposure region.
The antenna array is one of the most important factors that affect the secrecy
performance of the exposure region based beamforming technique. The potential of
using different array geometry and array configuration to improve security is explored.
iii
In this thesis, two common arrays, i.e., linear and circular arrays, are considered.
Analytic expressions for general array geometry as well as for the linear and circular
arrays are derived. In addition, numerical results are used to analyze the behaviors of the
antenna array towards security. Based on the empirical results, numerical optimization
algorithms are developed to exploit the array configuration to enhance the system
security level.
In complement to the theoretical analysis, experiments are carried out to study the
performance of the beamformer with linear and circular arrays in practice. Especially,
the impact of the mutual coupling on the security performance is investigated. To this
end, numerical simulation results as well experimental results are used to study the
behaviors of the linear and circular arrays towards security.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
As wireless technologies become more reliable, more efficient and more convenient,
wireless communications have gradually become an integral part of human activities
over the past few decades, from everyday life to industrial productions. New concepts
and ideas have revolutionized the way of communication, e.g., from single-antenna
system to massive multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) system; and the frontier of
their applications has been extended to the latest technologies, e.g., ‘Internet of things’,
which is core for both 5G and ‘Industry 4.0’.
According to one of Cisco’s latest reports [1], there will be an eightfold increase of
the mobile data traffic globally in the next five years. With the evidently increasing data
traffic, the need of the wireless security grows more demanding. Opposite to the benefits
that the wireless transmission brings, the broadcast nature makes it more vulnerable
to adversarial behaviors than wired transmission. Shannon’s perfect secrecy was first
established in 1949 [2] and later in 1975, Wyner conceived the wiretap channel which
in theory makes the perfect secrecy achievable [3]. However, due to the lack of practical
codes for the wiretap channel and the assumption that an adversary should suffer more
noise than the legitimate user, the information-theoretic security was soon overtaken by
encryption techniques [4] in practice. Since then, most standard security solutions rely
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on the authentication and encryption schemes in the communications protocols, e.g.,
the IEEE 802.11.
Encryption techniques essentially rely on the computational complexity and have not
been proved strictly secure from the information-theoretic perspective [5]. Furthermore,
there are many limitations when they are used to cope with various threats that exist
in wireless networks [6] [7]. For example, the techniques used in the 802.11 protocols,
such as wireless encryption protocol (WEP) and Wi-Fi protected access (WPA), are
vulnerable to practical attacks [8] [9].
Because of the limitations of the encryption techniques in the high layers above
the physical layer, different solutions from the physical layer have been proposed.
The primary difference between the information-theoretic security and the encryption
techniques is that the former limits the amount of information that can be obtained at
the bit level by the adversarial receiver, whereas the latter makes it computationally hard
to decipher [10]. Various physical layer techniques that exploit the inherent randomness
of noise and wireless channels are developed towards the security aspect in order to
meet the challenges that are raised by the boom of wireless communications [10–13].
Security methods from the physical layer can co-exist with the existing encryption
based schemes. The security enhancement from the physical layer can provide many
advantages compared to the conventional encryption techniques [14]. The amount of
information that can be obtained by the adversary can be precisely measured based
on the channel quality; it is not subject to the growing computational resources that
constantly threaten the computational models based on the encryption techniques, e.g.,
via brute force attack. In theory, it is possible to approach perfect secrecy using suitably
long codes; it is realized for quantum key distribution in practice.In addition, it does not
need complex protocols for key distribution and management. Thus, not much change
to the existing system architecture for communication is required to achieve security in
the physical layer.
Beamforming has been proved to exploit the wireless channel to achieve better
quality-of-service in terms of bit rate and error performance in the physical layer [15]
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and has a wide range of applications in wireless communications, e.g., MIMO relay
networks [16]. To approach Shannon’s perfect secrecy in the wiretap channel, the
legitimate user’s channel should have some kind of advantage over the adversary’s
channel. While the omni-directional antenna cannot provide such an advantage, beam-
forming, one of the prominent multiple-antenna techniques, has the ability to create
better channel for the legitimate user [17, 18].
There has been work that exploits beamforming to achieve security from the
information-theoretic perspective. For example, the simplest case would be to use beam-
forming to increase the signal power at the legitimate user’s direction while suppressing
the signal power at other directions. There are also examples to use beamforming to
generate interference specifically towards adversary users [19, 20]. Therefore, it is
desirable to achieve reliability, efficiency and security from the beamforming techniques
which have the potential to provide an all-in-one solution.
1.2 Motivation
The broadcast nature of wireless transmission makes it vulnerable to many attacks,
e.g., eavesdropping. Beamforming technique has the ability to control the direction of
transmission. In fact, beamforming is essentially a spatial filter that focuses energy at
a certain direction while suppresses energy at some other directions [21]. It exploits
the spatial domain other than the time and frequency domains compared to the single-
antenna techniques (e.g., channel coding).
This thesis mainly investigates the problem caused by a particular adversarial
behavior, i.e., passive eavesdropping, which already existed before the time of wireless
communications and threatens the secrecy and privacy of wireless transmissions [22].
The classical model consists of Alice, Bob and Eve, where Alice is the transmitter, Bob
is the legitimate user and Eve is the eavesdropper. Alice sends a message to Bob in the
presence of Eve(s). However, Eve can easily intercept the message sent to Bob, if she
is within the coverage range. Thus, it is suitable to use beamforming to provide the
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advantage that is required for Bob over Eve in Wyner’s wiretap channel model, in order
to achieve the information-theoretic security.
Besides the intentionally imposed difference between Bob’s and Eve’s channels,
e.g., via beamforming, users’ locations provide a certain level of distinction of the
related channels. Thus, in this thesis, the geometric locations of Bob and Eve are also
considered. Generally speaking, the closer a user to the transmitter is, the stronger
the received signal is, thus the better the user’s channel is. Location was ignored
in the beginning of information-theoretic security research, partly attributed to the
fact that the Eve’s location is often random and unknown to Alice. With the aid
of stochastic geometry theory, the distribution of the random users’ locations can
be modeled, e.g., via a Poisson point process (PPP) [23, 24]. In addition, the fact
that the localization granularity keeps improving drives the related research in many
contexts [25–27]. Therefore, the awareness of user’s location promotes the utilization
of location towards wireless security. For example, ‘ArrayTrack’ [28] that improves the
granularity is also studied in the context of enhancing security [29].
The spatial-filtering ability of beamforming is suitable for distinguishing the loca-
tions that are secure or insecure for the transmission to Bob. In this thesis, beamforming
is used to form physical region in terms of information-theoretic security. There has
been related work that attempts to create physical region to combat the randomness of
both Eves’ location and the wireless channel, however, one important factor, i.e., the
antenna array itself, is overlooked.
Since beamforming is performed via antenna arrays, its security performance relies
on the array configuration. Naturally, the physical region created by using beamforming
is highly related to the array and can be altered via changing the array configuration.
However, the impact of the array configuration is rarely studied. One related work that
explores the security performance for the geometric distribution of Eve [30] overlooked
the importance of the array configuration. In another work [31], the array pattern is syn-
thesized towards the security performance metric, but not related to the physical region.
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Therefore, this thesis investigates the possibility of leveraging the array configuration to
improve the wireless security.
1.3 Contributions
The objective of this thesis is to enhance the security level of the wireless transmission
from Alice to Bob in the presence of the PPP distributed Eves from the spatial aspect via
beamforming technique. The major challenge is that Eves’ channel state information
(CSI) and locations are random and unknown to Alice. Thus, the randomness comes
both from the PPP distribution and the small-scale fading. The key contribution of
this thesis is to propose an exposure region (ER) based beamforming technique with
both information-theoretic and numerical analysis to meet the previous challenge
from a new angle, i.e., the antenna array that shapes the ER, which serves as the
bridge between the information-theoretic security and a more controllable security-
related physical region. In this thesis, to the author’s best knowledge, the existing
work related to wireless security based on the physical region is summarized for
the first time. Moreover, to examine the practicality of the ER-based beamforming
technique, a transmit beamformer is built on a hardware platform to investigate its
secrecy performance. In the following, a summary of key contributions is provided.
• The concept of the ER is established based on information-theoretic secrecy
parameter, i.e., the secrecy outage, based on which the spatial secrecy outage
probability (SSOP) is defined the performance metric and its accurate expression
is derived for a general fading channel and an arbitrary antenna array.
• The upper bound of the SSOP is derived to facilitate analytical analysis. Par-
ticularly, the analytic expressions for the uniform linear array (ULA) and the
uniform circular array (UCA) are obtained and analyzed to show how the upper
bound changes with different array configurations, which is used to predict the
properties of the SSOP.
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• With analytical and numerical analysis, the properties of the SSOP for the ULA
and the UCA are compared with respect to various parameters. As the conclusion,
the UCA is more suitable to develop optimization algorithms that minimize the
SSOP.
• Based on the empirical results, two numerical optimization algorithms are devel-
oped for the adjustable and fixed transmit power scenarios to minimize the SSOP.
One algorithm produces the optimum radius of the UCA. The other one called the
configurable beamforming technique leverages different array configurations to
achieve the minimum SSOP according to Bob’s dynamic location. The algorithms
can be generalized and thus are applicable to a wide range of parameters.
• A practical issue, i.e., the mutual coupling, is examined with the aid of the wireless
open access research platform (WARP) and the numerical electromagnetics code
(NEC). A practical beamformer is built on WARP. The impact of the mutual
coupling to ULA and UCA is compared and the implication to the ER-based
beamforming technique and the numerical optimization algorithms is investigated.
Part of the contributions regarding to the study of security behaviors with respect to
the array parameters and the numerical optimization algorithms on the ULA is published
in [32]. Part of the contributions regarding to building a practical beamformer on WARP
and the study of the mutual coupling for the ULA is published in [33]. Part of the
contributions regarding to the derivation of the analytic expression of the SSOP on
the UCA is under view in [34]. Part of the contributions regarding to the concept of
the ER and the SSOP and the analysis on the ULA is under view in [35]. Part of the
contributions regarding to the optimization algorithm on the UCA is in preparation
in [36].
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a collection of several
topics are presented as research background and preliminaries for the thesis. First, an
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overview of the wireless security in the physical layer is given and some fundamental
concepts in the area of information-theoretic security are introduced. Subsequently,
the key literature review about the security methods related to the physical region is
provided with a short summary in the end. Afterwards, the fundamental concepts, i.e.,
the array steering vector and the array factor, are introduced and the impact of the
mutual coupling is briefly explained. Next, the wireless channel used in the thesis is
given. In the end, an introduction for WARP and NEC is provided.
In Chapter 3, the system model that incorporates the geometric locations for the
generalized Rician channel is introduced, and the ULA is chosen as an example to
develop the concept of the ER, based on which the SSOP is then derived. The analytic
upper bound of the SSOP is obtained. Then the SSOP and its upper bound are analyzed
via analytic and numerical methods. The analysis of the security performance regarding
to the array parameters is first made for the deterministic channel, then generalized for
the Rician fading channel. In addition, the tightness of the upper bound is examined.
In Chapter 4, with the aid of the general expressions in Chapter 3, the SSOP and
its upper bound for UCA are derived. Then the security performance regarding to the
array parameters for the UCA is studied and compared in parallel with the ULA for the
deterministic channel. Subsequently, the conclusions are extended to the Rician fading
channel, including the comparison for the tightness of the upper bound for the ULA
and the UCA. The mutual coupling is investigated for both ULA and UCA via WARP
experiments and NEC simulations.
In Chapter 5, the system model for the UCA with adjustable array configuration
is established with some basic concepts, e.g, the array mode and the coverage zone.
The optimization problem is formulated and the key parameters of the SSOP are jointly
analyzed. Based on the empirical results, two numerical optimization algorithms, which
are applicable to the generalized Rician channel, are developed for the dynamic and fixed
transmit power constraints. The deterministic channel is used as an example to illustrate
the numerical implementation of the algorithms. The error analysis for the configurable
beamforming technique is conducted. Next, the analysis of the mutual coupling on the
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UCA with adjustable array configuration is conducted via NEC simulations, and the
impact of the mutual coupling on the two optimization algorithms is investigated.
In Chapter 6, the summary of this thesis is provided and suggestions on this topic
for future work are given.
Chapter 2
Literature Review and Research
Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter contains a collection of four topics that will be involved in this thesis.
Each section covers one topic. For each topic, the fundamentals are introduced as
preliminaries for this thesis. A literature review is carried out for these topics and the
key findings of the related work are presented.
The wireless security in the physical layer is a broad area. Without distracting from
the main topic of this thesis, a comprehensive overview with a few selected fields, such
as fading channels and multiple-antenna techniques, is given to reveal the development
of these fields. To facilitate further understanding, some basic concepts are presented.
Then, the related work to the wireless security from the physical region perspective
is surveyed. To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first time that this area is
comprehensively reviewed from two aspects, i.e., the information-theoretical aspect and
the physical space security aspect.
The antenna array and the wireless channels are studied, which serves as the pre-
liminaries for the system models in this thesis. Then, some entry-level introduction is
2.2 Wireless Security in the Physical Layer 10
provided for the experiment and simulation tools that are used in this thesis, in order to
help readers understand the set-ups and results in this thesis.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, an overview for the wireless
security in the physical layer is provided and some basic concepts are introduced; the
related work to the physical region is surveyed with a brief summary in the end. In
Section 2.3, the fundamental concepts used in the field of antenna array are presented
and the mutual coupling is introduced. In Section 2.4, the background of the wireless
channel is given and the channel model used in this thesis is explained. In Section 2.5,
an introduction for the experiment and simulation tools is provided. In Section 2.6, the
conclusions of this chapter are given.
2.2 Wireless Security in the Physical Layer
2.2.1 Overview
When the wireless security is discussed for the physical layer, what most people
refer to is the information-theoretic security. The beginning is when the concept of
Shannon’s perfect secrecy was conceived in 1949 [2]. After some initial developments,
Wyner established the wiretap channel model and showed the possibility to approach
Shannon’s perfect secrecy on the condition that Eve’s channel must be weaker than
Bob’s channel [3].
Wyner’s wiretap channel model has laid the foundation for much follow-up work.
A few years later, the wiretap channel model was extended to non-degraded discrete
memoryless broadcast channels [37]. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap
channel is characterized in [38], based on which a substantial body of work is developed.
In this work, both Bob’s and Eve’s channels are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels. The secrecy capacity, which is the maximum transmission rate at which Eve
cannot decode any information, is calculated by the difference between Bob’s and Eve’s
channel capacities.
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Several fading channels are considered based on the Gaussian wiretap channel,
which leads to the usage of outage probability in the security performance metrics.
In [14, 39], quasi-static fading is studied under the assumption that Eve’s CSI is not
available at Alice. In the absence of Eve’s CSI, the outage formulation is adopted to
evaluate the secrecy performance and the secrecy outage probability (SOP) is defined
by the probability that the secrecy capacity is below a target secrecy rate. The SOP is
a useful measure for delay-limited applications. On the other hand, for delay-tolerant
applications, the ergodic secrecy capacity can be used to measure the performance
of the secure communications. In such cases, opportunistic exploitation of the time
intervals that Bob has a better channel even allows secure transmission when Eve’s
channel is on average better [40]. In [41–44], the secrecy capacity for ergodic fading
models provided with different levels of CSI are studied for optimal power and rate
allocation. In addition, the secrecy capacity for block fading channels is studied in [43].
Various types of systems that exploit multiple antennas leverage the available spatial
dimension to enhance the secrecy capabilities. In [45], the achievable secrecy rate for
MIMO system is studied and the analytic solution to the optimal input structure is
derived for a degraded system, i.e., the multiple-input-single-output (MISO) system.
In [46], the achievable secrecy rate is considered for MISO system with Gaussian
channel inputs and it shows that the optimal transmission strategy is beamforming.
The work is extended to the MISO system with multiple Eves, i.e., multi-input, multi-
output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) channel and beamforming is proved to the
capacity-achieving solution [47]. Furthermore, the work is extended to other multiple-
antenna systems [17, 48–50], where single-input-multiple-output (SIMO), MIMOME
and multi-user MIMO are investigated, respectively.
The study of the wiretap channel goes further in a wider range as the wireless
communications techniques evolve. After some pioneering work of the relay channel
model [51, 52], cooperative systems regained much attention as distributed antenna
array in the wireless network [53]. An explicit inner bound of the capacity region for the
confidential message transmission is derived in [54]. In [55], an achievable secrecy rate
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is studied for the general untrusted relay channel under two different scenarios. In [56],
the secrecy performance of the full-duplex relay network is investigated. Further on,
the distributed network secrecy is conceived in the multilevel network that contains
scattered sensors and monitors in hierarchical architecture [57]; and in [58] a framework
with interference engineering strategies is designed and analyzed for the cognitive
networks with secrecy.
As a promising technique for 5G, massive MIMO is already being considered for
security. As the number of antenna elements increases towards infinity, the spectrum
and power efficiency grows rapidly [59] and it produces very sharp beams and low
sidelobes [60]. The advantages provided by the massive MIMO could potentially
benefit the security performance. In [61], a low-complexity physical-layer cryptography
based on the massive MIMO channel is developed, where digital signatures based on
location or time is created. In [62], explicit expressions of secrecy outage capacities for
the massive MIMO channel are derived for different relay strategies.
Based on the aforementioned results in different systems with the wiretap channel
model, there are two ways to increase the secrecy capacity, i.e., either by improv-
ing Bob’s channel or deteriorating Eve’s channel. Motivated by the results from the
information-theoretic security, signal processing techniques are developed to enlarge the
difference between Bob’s and Eve’s channels [40]. Previously, the literature review does
not differentiate the signal processing and information-theoretic treatments [10]. In the
following, it will be focused on the techniques from the signal processing perspective,
which helps construct effective wiretap channels that allow the adoption of high-rate
wiretap codes [40].
Secrecy beamforming and precoding schemes are exploited to enhance the Bob’s
channel, e.g., [47, 49, 63, 64]. Generally speaking, beamforming refers to the trans-
missions where only one data stream is sent via multiple antennas, while precoding
generally means the simultaneous transmission of multiple data streams via multiple
antennas. The key idea of both schemes is to transmit signal at directions in the spatial
dimension that generates the best quality of reception for Bob while reduce the quality
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of reception for Eve if possible. This thesis focuses on the beamforming techniques for
the single data stream transmission as a starting point, which is also reasonable in certain
scenarios, e.g., securing a transmission from an access point (AP) with an antenna array
to a user with a single antenna. In [46], it has been shown that beamforming is the
optimum transmission strategy. With beamforming, it often yields simpler designs. For
example, the MISO channel can be simplified into a single-input-single-output (SISO)
channel. It can also be extended into multicast scenario [64].
Artificial noise (AN) or jamming can be used on top of beamforming to further
deteriorate Eve’s channel [18–20, 65]. It is especially useful when Eve’s CSI is not
known or partial known, in which case it is difficult to exploit beamforming to suppress
Eve’s signal quality. The key idea is to superimpose AN to the information-bearing
signal to increase the inference at Eve while Bob’s reception is not or little affected,
because the AN is added in the null space of Bob’s channel [20]. The concepts of
beamforming and AN are also carried over to relay systems [66–68].
So far, the reviewed work mostly refers to the information-theoretic security based
on Wyner’s work with a focus on the fading channel and multiple-antenna systems.
There is, however, another branch of information-theoretic security based on the secret
key that is extracted from the physical channels and is defined as the key-based security.
The key-based security is different from the encryption techniques in the way that the
key is generated and shared by Alice and Bob in the physical layer and its security
performance can be measured precisely by the secrecy capacity [11]. For convenience,
the work based on Wyner’s wiretap channel model is often referred to as the ‘keyless’
security.
The key-based security originated in Maurer’s work in 1993 [69] which guarantees
secrecy even when Eve observes a better channel than Bob. The key lies in the joint
development of a secret key by Alice and Bob over public channel. The advantage of the
key-based security over Wyner’s wiretap model is that there is no restrictions on Eve’s
channel and it is simpler to design. However, the key generation is often limited by the
physical channel between Alice and Bob. The discussion of the key-based security is
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beyond the scope of this thesis and more details are referred to in [10, 70–73] and the
references therein.
In addition to the information-theoretic security, there are other techniques employed
in the physical layer for the purpose of achieving security for the systems with randomly
located Eves. The key idea is to exploit the spatial domain to isolate a physical region
via directional antenna or smart antenna, i.e., beamforming, to limit Eve’s access to the
transmission between Alice and Bob. In this chapter, these work is uniformly referred
to as ‘physical space security’ that is first mentioned in [74].
To help better understand the relationships between the aforementioned concepts
and also give a high-level overview for the rest of this section, a structured diagram is
presented in Fig. 2.1. In Section 1.1, wireless security is discussed from two aspects,
the encryption techniques in the higher layer and the emerging area of the information-
theoretic security in the physical layer, the latter of which is the starting point of this
thesis. In this subsection, the overview of the information-theoretic security is presented
with the focus on the keyless security based on Wyner’s wiretap channel model, for
which the information-theoretic and the signal processing aspects are both discussed. In
Section 2.2.5 and 2.2.6, the physical region related work is discussed from two different
aspects, one based on the information-theoretic parameters and the other based on the
conventional performance metrics. The work in this thesis is based on the physical
region related work and provides the information-theoretic analysis for the created
physical region, especially from the array configuration perspective, which is missing
in the existing work.
2.2.2 Shannon’s Perfect Secrecy
The fundamental principle of secure transmission was formalized by Shannon in [2].
That is, the intended receivers should recover the transmitted message without errors,
while other users should acquire no information. Fig. 2.2 illustrates Shannon’s system
for secrecy. The figures and notations in this section and the next section are referenced
from [11].
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Fig. 2.1 Diagram of the reviewed work
There are three parties in the system, i.e., Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice attempts to
transmit a message, denoted by M, to Bob in the presence of Eve. In this system,
both Bob’s and Eve’s channels are error-free and there is no restriction on Eve’s
computational power, which corresponds to the worst-case scenario for the encryption
methods.
In order to achieve secrecy, Bob must gain some sort of advantage over Eve. In
this case, Alice encodes the message M with a secret key Ks into a codeword, denoted
by Xcode. The key Ks is shared by Alice and Bob, but is not known by Eve. The
encoder could be some complex computing functions or simply a XOR operator, i.e,
Xcode = M⊕Ks, which is known as the one-time pad [75]. With Ks, Bob can recover M
without any error, while Eve cannot get any useful information other than some random
guess.
From the information-theoretic perspective, the message M and the codeword Xcode
are random variables. The entropy of a random variable indicates the amount of
information that this variable has or the uncertainty level of this variable [76]. The
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Fig. 2.2 System model for Shannon’s perfect secrecy
secrecy is measured by the conditional entropy of M given Xcode, which is also known
as Eve’s equivocation. Denoted by H(M|Xcode), it measures the uncertainty of M at
Eve based upon the correct reception of Xcode. Perfect secrecy can be achieved if Eve’s
equivocation equals to the a-priori uncertainty of M, i.e., H(M|Xcode) =H(M). In other
words, Xcode and M are statistically independent. Since there is no correlation between
Xcode and M, Eve cannot acquire any information about M from Xcode.
To achieve the aforementioned condition for perfect secrecy, it is shown that the
uncertainty of Ks must be at least the same as M, i.e., H(Ks)≥H(M), which means the
random secret key must have at least the same length as the message [77]. However,
this raises questions in key distribution and management.
2.2.3 Secrecy Capacity
While Shannon’s system relies on the secret key to create the advantage for Bob over
Eve, Wyner’s work in [3] leverages the imperfections of the channel instead of using
the secret key, provided that Bob’s channel is better than Eve’s. Wyner’s channel model
is shown in Fig. 2.3.
The encoder generates codeword Xcode with block length n, which is the input of
the main channel between Alice and Bob. The output of the main channel, denoted by
Y , is the input of the decoder at Bob and at the same time is the input of the wiretap
channel. The output of the wiretap channel, denoted by Z, is the observation of Xcode at
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Eve. Both the main channel and the wiretap channel are noisy channels. Eve’s channel
is a probabilistically degraded version of Bob’s channel.
Instead of achieving H(M|Z) =H(M), Wyner relaxed this secrecy condition into
that the equivocation rate 1nH(M|Z) is arbitrarily close to the entropy rate 1nH(M) for
sufficiently large n, i.e.,
1
n
I(M;Z) =
1
n
H(M)− 1
n
H(M|Z)≤ ε, (2.1)
where ε is an arbitrary small value. With this relaxed constraint, Wyner proved the
existence of such codes that asymptotically guarantee the secrecy against Eve and at the
same time a positive transmission rate for Bob’s reliable transmission. The maximum
achievable transmission rate under these premises is the secrecy capacity. It is worth
noticing that the maximum achievable transmission rate of the main channel is regardless
of the secrecy constraint. The wiretap channel induces maximum equivocation at Eve.
Wyner’s wiretap channel model was later generalized for the broadcast channel with
two receivers [37] and the Gaussian channel [38] which lies the foundation for many
wireless channels. In [37], a single-input two-output channel with private messages is
considered. The goal is to design a encoder that a common message can be decoded
by Bob and Eve while the private message is only decoded by Bob. There exists a
rate triple, {private message rate, equivocation rate at Eve, common message rate} for
secrecy if the the private message rate is equal to the equivocation rate. For the special
case when there is common message transmitted, the secrecy capacity, denoted by Cs,
can be defined by the maximum achievable private message rate. Further, it can be
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expressed by
Cs = max
V→Xcode→Y Z
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z), (2.2)
where V is an auxiliary input variable and V → Xcode → Y Z denotes the Markov
relationship. For the degraded Gaussian wiretap channel, let the channel capacity of
Bob and Eve be denoted by CB and CE , respectively. The secrecy capacity Cs can be
expressed by
Cs = (CB−CE)+, (2.3)
where (x)+ takes the larger value between x and 0. When CB >CE , there is a positive
secrecy capacity. When CB ≤CE , the secrecy capacity is zero. For complex Gaussian
channel via which complex-valued signals are transmitted, the real and imaginary parts
of the additive noise are jointly Gaussian random variables. The channel capacity C can
be calculated by [78]
C = log(1+ γ), (2.4)
where γ is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Notice that the channel capacity is only
achieved when the channel input is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean. The
discussion of secrecy capacity derivation is out of the scope of this thesis. More details
are available in [11].
2.2.4 Secrecy Outage Probability
For a non-fading channel, the secrecy capacity solely relies on the Bob’s and Eve’s
received SNR, whereas in fading channels, it also depends on the random channel coeffi-
cient that is subject to a certain distribution, e.g., a Rayleigh distribution. Therefore, the
secrecy capacity becomes a random variable that is subject to certain fading distribution.
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For a quasi-static fading channels, the channel capacity can be calculated using (2.4)
with random γ that is subject to certain fading distribution [78].
Analogy to the conventional outage metric, the outage formulation can be applied
to the random secrecy capacity in fading channels. In [39], the SOP is defined by the
probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is less than certain target secrecy
rate Rs > 0. Denoted by pout(Rs), the SOP can be calculated by
pout(Rs) = Prob{Cs < Rs}. (2.5)
pout(Rs) indicates the percentage of fading realizations where the wiretap channel
model can sustain target secrecy rate Rs. Moreover, it is a useful performance metric
when Eve’s CSI is not known to Alice. Notice that Rs is an arbitrarily chosen value for
certain system. The meaning of Rs is that Alice assumes that Eve’s channel capacity is
C′E =CB−Rs. If the actual channel capacity of Eve is less than Alice’s assumed capacity,
i.e., CE <C′E , then it can be derived that Cs > Rs. In this case, the wiretap codes with
transmission rate higher than C′E can guarantee the perfect secrecy. Otherwise, if Eve’s
channel is better than Alice’s assumption, i.e., CE >C′E , then Cs < Rs. In this case, the
wiretap codes with transmission rate higher than C′E is at the risk of leaking information
to Eve and the information-theoretic security is compromised.
The SOP is particular useful when Eve’s instantaneous CSI is not known by Alice,
which is usually the case because Eves could be passive and do not easily give away
their CSI. On the other hand, Bob’s CSI can be assumed to be available by Alice. In
this case, the SOP can be calculated if the distribution of Eve’s fading channel is known,
which can be used as performance measure for secure communications.
The work in [79] puts forth an alternative formulation other than (2.5), which
distinguishes the difference between insecure transmission and unreliable transmission.
For example, when CB < Rs (which implies that Cs < Rs), Alice knows that Bob’s
channel cannot support the secrecy rate, then suspends the transmission, which is not a
failure in achieving perfect secrecy.
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To explicitly measure the probability that a transmission fails to achieve perfect
secrecy, two rates are employed, i.e., the rate of the transmitted codewords RB and the
rate of the confidential information Rs. The rate difference RB−Rs is the cost for secure
communication against passive Eves. When CB > RB, Bob can successfully recover the
transmitted message. However, if CE > RB−Rs, the secure transmission fails. Thus,
the SOP can be defined as the conditional probability [79],
pso = Prob{CE > RB−Rs|message transmission}. (2.6)
The condition of message transmission is designable according to different targets. It can
be set to CB > Rs (e.g., in [30]) or CB > RB to guarantee Bob’s correct reception, or even
to maximize the throughput of the secure transmission [79]. With Bob’s instantaneous
CSI, Alice will transmit to Bob when the message transmission is guaranteed; otherwise,
Alice will stop the transmission.
When RB and Rs are fixed system parameters, pso is independent of the condition of
message transmission [79]. Thus, pso reduces to
pso = Prob{CE > RB−Rs}. (2.7)
In this case, CB and CE can be separately studied according to the fading distribution.
2.2.5 Physical Region in Information-Theoretic Security
As mentioned in Section 1.2, the location of a user plays a key role in the user’s channel
capacity, thus directly affects the difference between Bob’s and Eve’s channel capacities.
Therefore, the large-scale path loss, which mainly relies on the users’ locations, should
be incorporated in practical scenarios, no matter it is Gaussian channel or fading channel,
or it is a single-antenna system or multiple-antenna system. This section reviews the
work that considers users’ locations, which is normally studied in relation to some
sort of physical regions. An example of the physical region is illustrated in Fig. 2.4
where the AP that is equipped with an antenna array performs beamforming to secure
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Fig. 2.4 An example of secure physical region in a Wi-Fi network with one intended
user and multiple eavesdroppers.
a region surrounding Bob and limits Eve’s access to the legitimate transmission. The
common property shared by these papers is that their physical regions are based on
the information-theoretic security parameters. In comparison to the physical space
security that will be introduced in the next section, it is called capacity-based approach
for convenience.
There are versatile approaches from the location or physical region perspective.
This section provides a high-level overview in terms of system model, performance
metric and signal processing technique. Most of the related work [80–84] exploits
the advantage of beamforming and AN/jamming, while other work [30, 85, 86] purely
investigates the security performance of beamforming techniques. Not surprisingly,
there is also work that explores the possibility of achieving security in relay systems [87,
88].
A physical region is usually defined for the reason that Eve’s CSI or location is
random and unknown to Alice. Different kinds of regions are defined for different
beamforming and AN techniques, provided with certain level of Bob’s CSI or location.
The most common definition is based on the SOP. In [82, 84, 87, 88], the system perfor-
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mance metric is some sort of insecure region where the secrecy goal is compromised.
For example, the compromised secrecy region (CSR) in [82] is the region where the SOP
is above a certain threshold. In [84], the secrecy outage region (SOR) is used to define
the region where Eve causes the secrecy capacity below a target rate, i.e., secrecy outage
happens. The special case for such a definition is when the target secrecy rate is set to
zero, which is used to defined the vulnerability region (VR) in relay systems [87, 88].
When fading is not considered, e.g., spatial diversity and time-diversity are used to
counteract channel fading, the secrecy outage is caused solely by Eve’s random location.
Notice in such case, the meaning of SOP is extended from the small-scale fading to
the large-scale path loss, i.e., Eve’s random location. Such an example is the insecure
region in [83].
Opposite to the insecure region, the secure region is also used. In [81], the outage
secrecy region (OSR) is defined by the region where Eve causes the SOP that is below a
threshold. A similar definition is the secure region in [85] where for any Bob within the
SOP is below an arbitrarily small value. In addition, the jamming coverage is defined
by the region where the SOP is reduced by the utilization of jamming in a quasi-static
fading channel [80].
The goal of these papers is to either minimize the insecure region or maximize the
secure region or jamming coverage. In [80], a legitimate transmission from Alice to Bob
is aided by friendly jamming. The secrecy performance of various jamming strategies
given different levels of CSI is evaluated and the optimal jamming configuration is
studied regardless of Eve’s location. In particular, it is shown that a single jammer is
not sufficient to maximize the jamming coverage and efficiency simultaneously. As
an extension for [80], the cooperative jamming system is developed to optimize the
location and the power allocation for the jammer in [82].
Aided with multiple antennas, the authors in [81] develop a novel technique to
generate AN at Bob, when Bob has stronger ability than Alice, e.g., more antennas.
This method is robust in the sense that no feedback of Bob’s CSI is needed by Alice
and there is no restriction of Eve’s number of antennas. However, it is shown that the
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area in the vicinity of Bob is well protected whereas the area surrounding Alice is still
vulnerable. [83] extended the work in [81] by generating AN from both Alice and Bob
to impair Eve’s channel with an optimum power allocation strategy to minimize the
size of the insecure region. In [84], different jamming strategies as well as the optimal
power allocation between the information-bearing signal and the AN are investigated
in a massive MIMO system with and without the information of possible locations of
Eves.
Besides AN/jamming, multiple antennas are used for beamforming in [85]. Two
scenarios, i.e., non-colluding and colluding Eves, are investigated with the integral
expression of SOP and the closed-form upper bound. Based on these, the secure region
is derived to guide Bob’s location in presence of randomly located Eves. In addition,
the parameters that impact the secure region is analyzed. As for the distributed antenna
array, a simple cooperative system with a single relay is proposed in [87], where the
VR is studied for different synchronization and interference models. [88] continues the
work in a multi-hop relay system. However, both papers use the Gaussian channel as a
starting point.
There is other work that is closely related to, but not directly based on the physical
region [30, 86]. Although there is no concise geometric model, the performance of these
methods is evaluated based on geometric locations. In [30], a scenario where Eves’
locations follow the PPP distribution is considered. Alice is aware of Bob’s location and
only the distribution of Eves’ locations, but not Eves’ CSI. The closed-form expression
of SOP is derived for Rician fading channel where a line-of-sight (LOS) component
exists. It is shown that beamforming towards Bob’s location is the optimal strategy that
minimizes the SOP. In [86], a threat model that describes possible locations for Eve,
e.g., an annulus threat model with a uniform distribution of Eve, is used to quantify the
SOP for beamforming towards known Bob’s location with multiple antennas. However,
the work is limited in free-space scenario.
In most reviewed work, there is no closed-form formulation for these physical
regions, and only numerical approximations or results are used. Except that in [84–
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86], the SOR is analytically derived and a new outage probability is defined based on
the SOR. In [86], the analytic expressions are given for free-space scenario without
considering fading channel. The Rayleigh fading that generates simple expressions is
considered in [85]. However, it is not very practical to obtain Bob’s location or CSI
without the LOS component. In [84], the Rician fading channel is used, but the fading
effect is completely averaged out for very large number of antennas in massive MIMO
system and is treated as constant.
While a single Eve is at present in the network in most reviewed work, multiple Eves
are considered in [30, 84, 85]. In particular, the PPP is exploited to study the distribution
of unknown Eves’ locations in [30, 85]. It is worth noticing that almost all the reviewed
work does not take the antenna array’s configuration into consideration to optimize the
physical region. The only work that considers some aspect of the array configuration
does not explicitly have analytic expressions for the array configuration [30].
2.2.6 Physical Space Security
While the reviewed work in Section 2.2.5 is based on the information-theoretic param-
eters, there is another branch of work from the signal processing perspective that are
based on the traditional performance metrics, e.g., the bit error rate (BER) or signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). In comparison to the capacity-based approaches,
the work that are reviewed in this section is also referred to as the SINR-based approach
for convenience.
The principle of the SINR-based approaches is to limit the knowledge of the exis-
tence of the message to Eve[74, 89]. To this end, various techniques are developed to
confine the effective communications into certain physical region, e.g., by designing
transmission schemes that restrict the BER or SINR at Eve below certain thresholds.
The SINR-based approach and the capacity-based approach share the common ground
in the sense that the difference of Bob’s and Eve’s channel should be enlarged to improve
the security performance of the system.
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In fact, the boundary between the capacity-based approaches and the SINR-based
approaches is not so strict. From the theoretical perspective, the channel capacity is
determined by the SINR for most channels. For example, the SINR of Bob and Eve
is used to define the VR where Eve’s channel capacity is larger than Bob’s channel
capacity, i.e., zero secrecy capacity [88, 90]. As well pointed out in [40], while the
SINR-based approaches do not guarantee perfect secrecy in the information-theoretic
sense, they achieve a practical notion of secrecy in the way that discriminates the
performance among Bob and Eve, and are useful in some applications. In addition, they
can often simplify the system design [10]. For example, a SINR-based power allocation
and scheduling technique provides a simple solution for a multi-hop wireless network,
because finding the secrecy capacity for some complex systems is a hard problem [90].
Despite the difference between the SINR-based and the capacity-based approaches
in terms of the performance metric, there is another important difference, that is,
the SINR-based approaches have a strong background from the smart antennas, i.e.,
beamforming and direction-of-arrival (DoA) estimation [91]. The benefits that are
brought by beamforming and DoA estimation, i.e., focusing or suppressing energy
at certain directions and direction-finding, had been applied to improve security in
the physical layer in the early 2000s [92], when the information-theoretic security
still waited for its reemergence. In fact, one of the early attempts even employed
directional antenna on both the transmitter and the receiver to reduce the signal coverage
region [93].
A minor distinction of the SINR-based approaches from the capacity-based ap-
proaches is that most work takes application for the wireless local area network (WLAN),
such as 802.11. Thus, the AP acts as Alice and the downlink transmission from the
AP to Bob is to be protected in the presence of Eves. Nevertheless, the developed
techniques are also applicable to other wireless networks.
Intuitively, the ability of beamforming (or directional antennas) can be constructively
exploited to enhance the signal strength at Bob’s direction, while suppressing the signal
strength at other directions, especially at Eve’s direction if Eve’s location is known to
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the AP. Therefore, the physical region can be created by the AP(s) that is(are) equipped
with directional antenna or antenna array, and Eve’s access to the signal is limited if
Eve is not inside such a physical region. In the absence of Eve’s location or CSI, the
created physical region should be minimized so that the possibility of Eve being within
this region is minimized and the system security level is enhanced.
A common set-up is to use multiple APs, each of which is equipped with multiple
antennas, to jointly created a small region [74, 89, 94–97]. While one AP can only limit
the physical region to a certain extent, multiple APs can further reduce this region by
creating a smaller joint region. The idea is conceived in [94]. To achieve this goal, a
single packet is divided into fragments, each of which is separately transmitted by one
AP in the network in a time-division manner. To form the region, the AP needs to adjust
its transmit power according to the user’s location. Only the users in the joint region
can access the whole packet.
Although the multiple-AP technique brings some challenges to the practical design,
such as synchronization of multiple APs and other protocol modifications [94], this idea
is further developed by the authors in [74, 89]. To achieve a higher level of security,
secret sharing is used [98]. All fragments of the packet are encrypted in a way that
the whole packet can be decrypted only if all fragments are correctly received. In the
same work, the term ‘physical space security’ is coined. In [74, 89], the authors for the
first time defined the ER as performance metric, which refers to the area within which
Eve(s) can access and decode the signals being transmitted. Note that the ER here is
not defined based on the information-theoretic parameters. Without Eve’s location or
CSI, the ER is to be minimized in order to improve the system security level.
In the multiple-AP system, each AP can be assigned to different tasks, i.e., beam-
forming or jamming, depending on the transmission strategy. Besides the secret sharing
strategy, two other strategies are proposed to reduce the ER [74, 89], which uses jam-
ming signal or signals from multiple sources to cause more interference to reduce Eve’s
quality of reception. By controlling the direction of a jamming signal or multiple-source
signals, Bob’s reception is not affected. A similar idea of jamming can be found in [99],
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where jammers use an omni-directional antenna to forge a walled wireless coverage,
which is a secure Wi-Fi zone. Through adjusting locations and the transmit power of
jammers, the forged secure zone matches well with the prediction model against the
leakage to other zones.
The idea behind the multiple-AP systems is to confine the signal transmission in a
controlled region. The motivation is that the WLAN usually operates inside a physical
perimeter, e.g, an office floor, and the security threat can be reduced by imposing
physical boundaries to the boundless radio transmission through manipulation of the
properties of signal propagation. Such idea is emphasized in [95, 96, 100]. In [95],
multiple APs jointly perform beamforming with the transmit power control to isolate a
physical region. The approach is similar to the secret-sharing strategy used in [74, 89],
but with an improvement on the joint optimization of beam patterns for all APs. The
experiment results in several indoor scenarios show that different shapes and sizes from
5 feet × 5 feet to 25 feet × 20 feet can be isolated by three such APs.
The work in [96, 100] takes different routes to achieve the confinement of the radio
propagation. In [96], all the users inside a certain perimeter communicate with the base
station through some intermediate nodes. Multiple nodes are deployed alongside the
physical perimeter to detect the users within and manage the access control to the base
station. Once the users are detected and recognized as a legitimate user, they are granted
access to the base station. A similar idea is found in [100] where the Radio Frequency
Sentry Devices (RFSD) are deployed on the perimeter of a confined region. The RFSD
performs a ‘cloaking’ function, which consists of two stages, i.e., detection of the signal
transmission from the users inside the perimeter via DoA estimation and transmission
of an altered signal with approximately the same transmit power. Eves outside the
perimeter receive an superposition of the original signal and the altered signal from the
RFSD, thus cannot decode the message correctly. Both methods in [96, 100] serve the
purpose of confining a local transmission inside a predefined region.
So far, multiple-AP systems are mainly used to create the physical region. In the
following, the work that focuses on improving the performance of a single antenna array
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with more advanced techniques is presented. In [101] the authors proposed a cross-layer
design called the ‘simultaneous transmission with orthogonally blinded eavesdroppers’
(STROBE) to reduce Eves’ signal quality. The multiple antennas, such as in 802.11n
and 802.11ac standards, are designed to simultaneously transmit multiple data streams
using zero-forcing beamforming. STROBE exploits the capability of this multiple-
antenna technique to insert orthogonal interference that are transmitted simultaneously
with the intended data stream, so that potential Eves cannot decode correctly while Bob
is remain unaffected by the interference. Multipath creates advantages for Bob in the
STROBE system and the indoor experimental results show that a difference of 15 dB of
the SINR between Bob and Eves can be consistently served. The work in [102] designs
a type of smart antenna that has two synthesized radiation patterns that can alternatively
transmit in a time-division manner. The transmitted packet is divided into two parts,
each of which is transmitted via one synthesized pattern. Both patterns are slightly away
from Bob’s direction, but have an overlap at Bob’s direction. By fast switching between
the two patterns, an artificial fading effect is created for users that are not within the
overlapped region, thus reduces the signal quality of unintended users, while Bob is
little affected. The overlap region can then be minimized to enhance the security.
There are some versatile approaches that are combined with other techniques, e.g.,
joint design with encryption methods. In [103], the distributed nodes that are equipped
a single antenna in the same network cooperatively create the ER in a similar way
to [99], except that instead of jamming, the neighbor nodes transmit side information
which can be used to encrypt the transmission between Alice and Bob. Decryption
is only possible with both the encrypted message and the side information, i.e., the
receiver needs to be in the overlapped region from Alice and the helping nodes. The
overlapped region where decryption can be done is called the ER, which is to be reduced
by dynamic selection of the helping nodes according to their locations. In [97], a hybrid
cross-layer protocol that combines the network security protocol with the exploitation
of the secret-sharing scheme is designed as an extension to [74, 89]. The combination
2.3 Antenna Array Fundamentals 29
of the public key encryption and the ER reduction restricts the access to the legitimate
transmission even when Eve is located inside the ER.
The SINR-based approaches reviewed in this section do not have closed-form
expressions for the created physical regions, e.g., the ER. Since they are not based
on the information-theoretic parameters, the information-theoretic analysis is absent.
However, these arguments do not dismiss the usefulness of the SINR-based approaches.
On the contrary, many work resort to experimental results to prove the effectiveness
of these approaches [74, 89, 93, 95, 99, 101]. After all, the beamforming and jamming
technique that are exploited here are not essentially different from the capacity-based
approaches. Thus, the basic principle can be carried over to other applications. It is
worth noticing that while the linear array is used in most approaches, the circular array
is chosen in [94, 95, 102] where the fine-grained region is shaped.
2.3 Antenna Array Fundamentals
Antenna arrays are used in many areas, such as land-mobile, indoor-radio, and satellite-
based systems [104], and are used for a wide range of purposes, e.g., achieving security
as mentioned in Section 2.2. From the smart antennas perspective, beamforming is the
signal processing algorithm that performs on the antenna array and makes the array
‘smart’ [91]. Besides beamforming, the other main function of the smart antennas is
DoA estimation [105]. This section introduces some fundamental concepts. More
details are provided in [91, 104–106] and the references therein.
2.3.1 Uniform Linear Array
The antenna array consists of multiple antennas that are deployed in a certain geometry.
The array geometry refers to the positions of the antenna elements that make up the
array. The most common array geometry is the ULA where all elements are in a line
with equal spacing. The number of elements and the spacing of the ULA are denoted by
N and ∆d, respectively. An example of ULA is shown in Fig. 2.5. To study the behavior
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Fig. 2.5 Linear array of 8 elements
of the array, the antenna element is usually assumed as an omni-directional antenna
with spherical radiation pattern.
As shown in Fig. 2.5, the bore-sight direction of the ULA is the norm direction; the
end-fire direction is parallel to the array. The direction-of-emission (DoE), denoted
by θdoe, is the angle at which the ULA concentrates energy, and is usually defined in
relation to the bore-sight direction. For ease of mathematical derivation, the ULA shown
in Fig. 2.5 is put along y-axis with its center at the origin point and the first element
at the positive y-axis. In this way, the bore-sight of the array is on the x-axis and the
angles related to the array is the same angle in the polar coordinates.
The signals transmitted from different antenna elements interfere with each other
in space. The overall signal at a certain point is the superposition of all signals with
different amplitudes and phases. The array factor, denoted by G, indicates the complex
gain of the signal at a certain angle θ . As shown Fig. 2.5, assume that the vector from
the center of the array to the target user is −→r and the vector from the i-th element to the
target user is −→r i, i = 1, ...,N.
Strictly speaking, −→r and −→r i, i = 1, ...,N should point at the same position. When
|−→r | ≫ ∆d, i.e., the distance of the target user is far greater than the size of the array,
the far-field condition is fulfilled. In this case, |−→r | ≈ |−→r i|, and −→r and −→r i are assumed
to be parallel.
To calculate G, first consider a simple case where the array does not focus energy
at any particular angle and all elements transmit with the same amplitude and phase.
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The signal from the right element always arrives sooner at the target user than the
signal from the left element for θ ∈ [0, π2 ], which leads to certain advance in phase. The
phase difference can be calculated by 2π ∆d sinθλ for angle θ . Take the 1st element as the
reference point for phase zero. Then the relative phase shift between the i-th element
and the 1st element, denoted by φi(θ), is
φi(θ) = k∆d(i−1)sinθ , (2.8)
where k = 2πλ is the wave number. The array steering vector, denoted by s(θ), is defined
based on the relative phase shifts of the signals from all elements at angle θ ,
s(θ) = [e− jφ1(θ), ...,e− jφi(θ), ...,e− jφN(θ)]T . (2.9)
In this case, the superposition of all signals is then
G(θ) =
N
∑
i=1
e− jφi(θ). (2.10)
The beamforming weight vector, denoted by w, is used to precode the transmitted
signal. The vector w is a complex vector, thus the signal from each element is weighted
by a complex number. To concentrate energy at θdoe, all signals should arrive at angle
θdoe at the same time, which requires phase alignment. To correct for the different phase
shift φi(θdoe), w is set by
w =
s(θdoe)√
N
, (2.11)
where s(θdoe) is the array steering vector at θdoe and
√
N is the normalization factor
that keeps unit transmit power. In this case, G can be calculated by
G(θ ,θdoe) = wHs(θ) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e j[φi(θdoe)−φi(θ)]. (2.12)
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Because G is determined by two angles, i.e, θ and θdoe, the notation of G(θ ,θdoe) is
used in this thesis. Physically, it means the complex gain of the signal at angle θ when
the DoE angle is θdoe. Notice that (2.9)-(2.12) are the general expressions which are
valid for any array geometry. For ULA with N elements and ∆d spacing, G(θ ,θdoe) is
obtained by
G(θ ,θdoe) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e jk∆d(sinθdoe−sinθ)(i−1) (2.13)
=
1√
N
1− e jNk∆d(sinθdoe−sinθ)
1− e jk∆d(sinθdoe−sinθ) . (2.14)
Some examples of the array patterns for G(θ ,θdoe) is shown in Section 3.4.2.
2.3.2 Uniform Circular Array
Although the ULA is very common in practice, there are occasions where a ULA
is not appropriate. Other array geometries, e.g., the UCA, can be used. Examples
of UCA have been shown in the literature for creating physical regions for wireless
security [94, 95, 102].
For the UCA, all the N elements are equally allocated with spacing ∆d on a circle
with radius R. θdoe is the angle between the target user and the first element in the array.
In this thesis, only 2D-plane is considered. An example of a UCA with 8 elements is
shown in Fig. 2.6. For the ease of mathematical derivation, the center of the UCA is at
the origin point and the first element is put on the positive x-axis. In this way, θdoe is
the angle between the target user and the positive x-axis. In addition, the phase angle ψi
for the i-th element is
ψi = 2π(i−1)/N. (2.15)
G(θ ,θdoe) is determined by the array geometry. The overall signal at angle θ is the
superposition of the signals transmitted from all elements in the UCA. For the UCA,
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Fig. 2.6 Circular array of 8 elements
|−→r | ≫ R is assumed for the far-field condition. The same as ULA, assume |−→r | ≈ |−→r i|,
and −→r and −→r i are assumed to be parallel.
To calculate G(θ ,θdoe),−→e and−→e i are used to denote the unit vectors in the direction
of −→r and −→r i, respectively.
−→e = cos(θ)−→e x+ sin(θ)−→e y, (2.16)
−→e i = cos(ψi)−→e x+ sin(ψi)−→e y, (2.17)
where−→e x and−→e y are the unit vector on the x-axis and y-axis, respectively. The distance
|−→r i| is less than the distance |−→r | by the scalar projection of −→r i into −→r ,
−→r i =−→r −R−→r i ·−→r . (2.18)
An example is shown by −→r and −→r 2 for the 2nd element in Fig. 2.6. It can be calculated
that
−→r i ·−→r = cosθ cosψi+ sinθ sinψi = cos(θ −ψi). (2.19)
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Thus, the relative phase shift for the i-th element is
φi(θ) = kRcos(θ −ψi). (2.20)
According to (2.9)-(2.12), G(θ ,θdoe) for the UCA when transmitting towards θdoe is
G(θ ,θdoe) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e jkR[cos(θdoe−ψi)−cos(θ−ψi)]. (2.21)
The maximum gain, denoted by Gmax, is obtained at the DoE angle θdoe, which can
be calculated by
Gmax = max
θ
{G(θ ,θdoe)}= G(θdoe,θdoe) =
√
N. (2.22)
It is worth noticing that Gmax only depends on the number of elements N and is
regardless to the array geometry.
The ULA is a one-dimensional array, while the UCA is a planar array in 2D space.
In addition to the ULA and the UCA, there are other array geometries of planar arrays
for different purposes. In [107–109], semi-circular, triangular and rectangular arrays are
used for the DoA estimation. In [110–112], the L-shape, V-shape and Y-shape arrays
are exploited to address issues in the DoA estimation, e.g., pair matching and estimation
failure. The basic concepts, e.g., the array steering vector and the array factor still apply
for these array geometries.
2.3.3 Mutual Coupling
In this thesis, besides theoretical analysis, a practical issue, i.e., mutual coupling, which
is inherent in antenna arrays is investigated. The mutual coupling between two nearby
antennas is caused by the energy absorption of one antenna from another antenna
which either radiates or receives. The nearby antenna absorbs part of the energy that
is supposed to either radiate away from or be received by the other antenna. When
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Fig. 2.7 An example of a 2-antenna system with antenna 1 excited by a voltage source
two antennas are close together, their transmitted/received energy is highly correlated,
which degrades the antenna efficiency in both radiation and reception modes.
An example of a 2-antenna system is shown in Fig. 2.7 to illustrate the impact of
mutual coupling. The radiation and reception modes have the same principle. Thus, in
this example, the radiation mode is studied. Antenna 1 is excited by a voltage source vg1
with source internal impedance Zg1. The current and voltage on antenna 1 are denoted
by i1 and v1, respectively. The radiated field from antenna 1 is intercepted by antenna
2. The current and voltage that are induced on antenna 2 are denoted by i2 and v2,
respectively. The radiated field from antenna 2 again affects i1 and v1, which changes
the radiation pattern of antenna 1.
Mutual coupling is also known as active element pattern [113] and it is always
associated with multiple antenna techniques [114, 115]. G(θ ,θB) is subject to mutual
coupling, because it is calculated based on the assumption of an omnidirectional antenna
element, the pattern of which is distorted by the mutual coupling.
2.4 Channel Models
The security performance of the various techniques reviewed in Section 2.2 is deter-
mined by the wireless channel through which the signal propagates. Wireless communi-
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cation techniques are developed to take advantage of the wireless channel and mitigate
the impairments brought by wireless propagation. In this section, a brief introduction
of wireless channel models is given and some basic aspects that are involved in this
thesis, i.e., large-scale path loss and small-scale fading as well as the MISO channel,
are covered. More details are available in [116–118] and the references therein. In this
thesis, the indoor channel models, e.g., TGn channel [119], are focused on.
2.4.1 Large-Scale Path Loss
The basic channel model is the free-space path loss (FSPL) channel model when the
signal propagates in the free-space. The channel causes attenuation in the amplitude,
i.e., path loss. Let PL denote the path loss, which is usually measured in dB scale.
PL = 10log10
Pt
Pr
, (2.23)
where Pt and Pr are the transmit and receive power, respectively, and the unit transmit
and receive gains are assumed. In the free space, PL depends on the signal frequency
and the distance that the signal travels.
PL = 10log10
(4πd
λ
)2
, (2.24)
where d is the distance and λ = 2π/ f0 is the wavelength, where f0 is the carrier
frequency.
In a more realistic environment, it is difficult to obtain an accurate model that
characterizes the path loss. A simplified model, i.e., the large-scale path loss model, is
used to refer to the average loss in the signal strength over distance. Let d0 denote the
breakpoint distance. In the close range (i.e., d ≤ d0), the channel can be still assumed
to be the FSPL model. When d > d0, the path loss is
PL = 10log10
(4πd0
λ
)2
+10log10
( d
d0
)β
, (2.25)
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where β is the path loss factor and its typical value is from 2 to 6 [116]. When β = 2, it
reduces to the FSPL channel model. For realistic channels, the signal attenuates quicker
over distance than the free-space environment.
When there are objects that block the signal path or there are some changes in
the reflecting surfaces and scatters, the path loss varies randomly for a given distance,
which is referred to as shadowing. A common model is the lognormal shadowing
model, which includes a combination of a large number of random variations, and
thus is characterized by a decibel (dB) Gaussian random variable χ . Combined with
shadowing, PL can be expressed by
PL = 10log10
(4πd0
λ
)2
+10log10
( d
d0
)β
+χ. (2.26)
2.4.2 Small-Scale Fading
While the path loss models refer to the the signal variation over a large distance, the
small-scale fading effects are caused by changes over a small distance. The small-scale
fading is caused by multiple versions of the signal when it takes different paths to
arrive at the receive antenna; the multiple versions are combined either constructively or
destructively, which causes severe changes in the signal. Besides the multipath, another
reason that causes the small-scale fading is motion. The movements of the transmitter,
receiver or the surrounding objects change the channel characteristics.
The impulse response of a multipath channel is commonly comprised of a discrete
number of taps (hence, it is called tapped delay line model). Let h(t,τ) denote the
impulse response,
h(t,τ) =∑
i
αi(t,τ)δ [τ− τi(t)], (2.27)
where αi(t,τ) and τi(t) are the complex channel gain and the tap delay for the i-th path.
Note that αi(t,τ) and τi(t) change with time.
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WLAN packets are designed to have short time durations, which is illustrated by
an example in [117]. The human walking speed is very low (e.g. 1 m/s) for a typical
indoor environment, which leads to a large coherence time (e.g., 70 ms) compared to
the WLAN packet duration (e.g., less than 1 ms). Thus, the channel can be regarded
as a quasi-static fading channel, and the time variance can be suppressed. Thus, h(t,τ)
reduces to
h(τ) =∑
i
αi(τ)δ (τ− τi). (2.28)
The multiple versions of packet arrive at the receiver with different delay τi, which
could causes inter-symbol interference (ISI) among sequential packets. It is shown by
another example in [117] that the frequency-selective fading could be regarded as a flat
fading channel if the symbol duration is designed to be much longer than the root mean
square (RMS) delay spread. This is possible with the orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) technique that is incorporated in the 802.11 protocols. In this
thesis, a quasi-static fading channel with a single tap is used and the channel gain h is a
random variable subject to certain fading distribution.
There are two commonly used fading channels, Rician fading and Rayleigh fading
channels. When there exists a LOS, the channel is subject to Rician fading; when there
is no dominant path, the channel is called a non-line-of-sight (NLOS) channel and is
subject to Rayleigh fading. Let X be a complex Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and variance 2σ2, i.e., X ∼ CN (0,2σ2). For the Rayleigh fading channel, the
channel gain h can be represented by
h = X = XRe+ jXIm, (2.29)
where XRe and XIm are the real and imaginary part of X , and XRe,XIm ∼N (0,σ2). The
magnitude of h, i.e., |h|, is a Rayleigh random variable with probability density function
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(PDF)
f|h|(x) =
x
σ2
e−
x2
2σ2 . (2.30)
When there is a LOS, the Rician channel can be represented by
h = ν+X , (2.31)
where ν represents the LOS component. The magnitude |h| is a Rician random variable
with PDF
f|h|(x) =
x
σ2
e−
x2+ν2
2σ2 I0(
ν
σ2
x), (2.32)
where I0(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with order zero. Conven-
tionally, the Rician K-factor is used to denote the power ratio of the LOS and NLOS
component,
K =
ν2
2σ2
. (2.33)
Alternatively, the complex channel gain for Rician channel can be written in the form
of K-factor.
h =
√
K
K+1
e jφ +
√
1
K+1
g, (2.34)
where φ is the phase component of the LOS path and g is complex Gaussian random
variable with unit variance, i.e., g ∼ CN (0,1). The LOS component
√
K
K+1e
jφ is
deterministic and the NLOS component is
√
1
K+1g. The total power of h is normalized
to one.
The Rician fading channel model is a generalized model. Note that when K = 0,
the Rician channel degrades into the Rayleigh channel. When K approaches infinity,
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the fading channel becomes deterministic. In this thesis, the generalized Rician fading
channel model is considered.
2.4.3 MISO Channel Model
For the MISO channel, the signals for the array elements on the LOS path will experience
the phase differences between them, which can be captured by s(θ), where θ is the user’s
angle. For the generalized Rician channel model, the LOS component should encompass
s(θ), while the channel for each antenna element experiences the independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rician fading. Let h denote the channel gain vector
between the multi-antenna transmitter and the receiver. h can be written as
h =
√
K
K+1
s(θ)+
√
1
K+1
g, (2.35)
where s(θ) is the LOS component and g = [g1,g2, ...,gN ]T is the NLOS component;
the entry gi is i.i.d. circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and unit variance, i.e., gi ∼ CN (0,1). Note that in practice there is spatial
correlation in the channels between different antennas. The spatial correlation decreases
in a rich multipath propagation environment or when the spacing among the antenna
elements increases. In this thesis, the impact of the spatial correlation is not considered.
In this thesis, the channel with both the large-scale path loss and the small-scale
fading for a certain environment is considered. Thus, the breakpoint distance can be
assumed constant and the random shadowing can be ignored. In some literature [84, 85],
the large-scale path loss is simply represented by d−
β
2 and the constant components in
(2.25) is omitted. Therefore, the channel gain vector combining the large-scale path
loss and the small-scale fading can be expressed by
h =
1√
dβ
[√ K
K+1
s(θ)+
√
1
K+1
g
]
. (2.36)
This expression has been used in [30, 84]. Notice that d is assumed to be sufficiently
large so that the far-field assumption mentioned in Section 2.3 is fulfilled.
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Fig. 2.8 WARP v3 board
2.5 Experiment and Simulation Tools
In this thesis, the array factor is measured in real experiments on WARP as well as in
numerical simulations by NEC. WARP is a soft-defined radio platform which enables
transmission/reception and processing of signals in the physical layer [28, 29, 120, 121].
The results from NEC simulations are well accepted in the literature [122]. In this
section, a brief introduction to WARP and NEC tool is given.
2.5.1 WARP Hardware
WARP version 3 board integrates a Virtex-6 FPGA with peripheral functional modules,
which is shown in Fig. 2.8. For example, the clocking module generates the reference
frequency for up/down conversion in the transceiver as well as the sampling frequency
for the AD/DA conversion in the baseband processing. The radio-frequency (RF)
module, which mainly consists of the AD/DA chips and the transceiver chips, transforms
the sampled data into a radio signal for transmission, and also captures the received
radio signal and stores the sampled data. Just to name a few, there are also memory
module, Ethernet module, power module and so on.
The FPGA executes commands to control the peripherals. Each WARP board is
a node, like a PC/laptop in the network. To make the node work, there are some
customized hardware designs (e.g., set of commands, memory allocations and etc.) that
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Fig. 2.9 WARPLab network
are loaded to the FPGA via various methods, such as JTAG and SD card, when the
FPGA is powered on.
In this thesis, the WARPLab design is used, which allows physical layer prototyping
for single and multi-antenna transmit and receive nodes. Each WARPLab node (for
short ‘node’ hereinafter) is connected in a local network via Ethernet switch and cables,
together with a PC/laptop. A typical topology is shown in Fig. 2.9.
In Fig. 2.9, there is one laptop installed with MATLAB and several nodes, which are
connected via the switch. In the WARPLab hardware design, there are communications
protocols (TCP/UDP) that enable the exchange of packets between MATLAB and the
nodes. The packet flow between MATLAB and the nodes is focused on to give a brief
description of how a communications system is realized. The details of the WARPLab
design are beyond the scope of this thesis.
A packet can be either a command packet from MATLAB to the nodes, e.g.,
transmit/receive, or a data packet between MATLAB and the nodes, e.g., samples
of BPSK modulated symbols. As will be seen, these packets are transmitted between
MATLAB and the RF module on the node, which constitutes a communications system.
Before introducing the communications system, first, the transceiver’s structure is
given in Fig. 2.10. There are two or four RF interfaces on each node. Each RF interface
is half-duplex and can be set to transmit or receive mode per request. On the right side
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Fig. 2.10 Transceiver of one RF interface
of block diagram, there are three sample buffers which store data samples that are sent
from the MATLAB or captured from the RF band. On the left side, there are baseband
(BB) and RF amplifiers as well as the up/down-convertors. On the left side, the RF
chain is connected to the antenna.
In the transmit mode (red color, in the bottom), the data packet is delivered from the
MATLAB via switch to the buffer. The packet is normally on a intermediate frequency
(IF) band that contains both real and imaginary parts. Then it is split into I/Q branches
that are passed to the DA convertor and the up-converter before they are physically
sent via an antenna. During this process, there are two amplifiers, i.e., BB and RF
amplifiers, each has discrete power levels. In the receive mode (blue color on the top),
the process is just in the reverse order. The signal is captured by the antenna and is
down-converted and sampled. The I/Q branches are stored as complex numbers in the
buffer and later will be sent to MATLAB for post-processing. In addition to the captured
data, the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) is measured in hardware and stored
in a separate buffer. Notice that the reference and sampling frequencies can be either
generated by a local oscillator or obtained from an external source, which corresponds
to the phase-lock loop (PLL) unit in Fig. 2.10.
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2.5.2 Communications System on WARPLab
A basic SISO system can be formed by a transmit node and a receive node as shown
in Fig. 2.9. First, a packet is generated in MATLAB and delivered to the transmit
buffer. The structure of a data packet is shown in Fig. 2.11. The packet consists of a
preamble and a payload. The preamble is used for sample synchronization, channel
estimation and etc; the payload stores the messages or commands. Normally, the length
of the packet does not exceed the buffer’s size, e.g., 215 samples. The complex (or real)
samples in the packet are then transformed into an analog signal before up-conversion
to 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz. The transmitted signal travels via the wireless (or wired) channel
and reaches the receive antenna, where it is captured, down-converted, sampled and
stored in the receive buffer and waits to be delivered to MATLAB.
The process that a packet is generated from MATLAB and passed down to the
transmit node, then transmitted over the air and captured by the receive node, and
finally delivered back to MATLAB is how a basic communications system works on
WARPLab. The packet is both generated and post-processed in MATLAB, which grants
WARPLab users the freedom to construct their systems at will. A simple example is
shown in Fig. 2.12 to illustrate the design of a communications system. The blocks in
the dashed circle represent MATLAB processing.
In Fig. 2.12, an example of SISO system in WARPLab is shown. Data bits are
randomly generated from the source then mapped to a DQPSK symbol, which con-
stitutes the payload. A BPSK modulated preamble is added to the payload, as shown
in Fig. 2.11. The packet is then up-sampled and passed a square-root raised cosine
(SRRC) filter. The packet is up-converted to 5 MHz before being sent to the transmit
buffer. Up till this point, everything takes place in MATLAB. After the packet is sent to
the transmit buffer, it will be sent and received on chosen RF frequency and is finally
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Fig. 2.12 An example of SISO system on WARPLab
stored in the receiver buffer. The samples in the receiver buffer is packed and sent to
MATLAB for filtering, de-mapping and so on.
The MISO system can be built in the same way as the SISO system. The major
difference is that multiple RF interfaces are needed at the transmitter side, in order to
send the packets via different wireless/wired channels. A generalized system model is
shown in Fig. 2.13, where N RF interfaces are at the transmit node(s). Each RF interface
is a half-duplex transceiver shown in Fig. 2.10. The blocks inside the dashed boxes are
MATLAB processing.
In MATLAB, N packets are generated for N buffers on WARP nodes. For the
purpose of building a transmit beamformer, each packet is assigned to a different
complex weight, i.e., amplitude and phase. The radio waves that emit from different
antennas superimpose over the air and create patterns according to the design.
2.5.3 NEC
NEC provides us a numerical method to calculate patterns that have the mutual coupling
effect. It was originally developed at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for wire
antennas [123]. Different versions of NEC are freely distributed in the internet. In this
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Fig. 2.13 An example of MISO system on WARPLab
thesis, the 4NEC2 tool is used, which is based on NEC, to create antenna array and
generate array patterns.
In NEC, a wire antenna is decomposed into multiple thin, perfectly conducting
wire segments, each of which can be excited with different amplitudes and phases,
which corresponds to w. Multiple wire antennas can be allocated by an arbitrary array
geometry. Then, for any array geometry and any w, G(θ ,θB) can be simulated based
on a numerical solution of electromagnetic field integrals on such segments using the
method of moments [123].
An input file manages all the information needed for simulations, e.g., the configura-
tion of the wire segments, the array geometry and w. In this thesis, the half-wavelength
dipole, which is a copper wire of 0.001 m radius, is used as the array element. Each wire
is divided into 9 segments, of which the middle segment is excited by a voltage source
with a frequency of 2414 MHz, which corresponds the Wi-Fi channel 14. Different pat-
terns are produced by imposing w to the voltage sources. The dipoles are placed along
z-axis in 3-D Cartesian coordinates, so the azimuth pattern of each dipole is circular
if there is no mutual coupling. All elements are located in the x-y plane according to
Fig. 2.5 and 2.6.
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G(θ ,θB) that includes the mutual coupling can be simulated for a specific input
file. Compared to WARP experiments, the mutual coupling effect simulated in the
NEC tool does not incorporate numerous imperfections in practice, such as technical
malfunctions on fabrication, carrier frequency/phase offsets, inaccurate alignment of
array geometry and so on. The advantage of using NEC results is that they are more
accurate than the WARP results that need calibration before measurements, as will be
discussed in Section 4.5.2.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the literature for the wireless security in the physical layer is reviewed
with the focus on the physical region related work. The problem is to enhance the
security in the physical layer against the randomly distributed passive Eves. There
are two different routes to solve this problem, each of which incorporates various
techniques. One starts from information-theoretic security concepts and analyzes the
secrecy provided by creating the physical region via beamfomring, jamming, and etc.
The other route focuses on the creation of the physical region from a more practical
point of view. Both routes share the common ground, that is, the physical region that is
vulnerable to Eves (or secure from Eves) should be minimized (or maximized), which
serves as the basic principle of this thesis.
The array factors for both ULA and UCA are introduced. Although there is a wide
range of array geometries, e.g., L-shape and V-shape arrays, the commonly used ULA
and UCA are examined in this thesis. The fundamental concepts introduced in this
thesis and the methodologies used based on the array factor are applicable to other
arrays.
In this thesis, the antenna array is mounted on the AP and beamforming is exploited
to create the physical region. Thus, the MISO channel model is introduced in this
chapter. The generalized Rician fading channel model that incorporates the large-scale
path loss and the small-scale fading is used.
2.6 Conclusions 48
Finally, the WARP hardware is introduced to illustrate how to build a MISO system
using WARPLab design in order to develop the beamformer. The NEC tool is introduced
to build the ULA and the UCA and measure their array patterns.
Chapter 3
Spatial Secrecy Outage Probability
and Analysis for Uniform Circular
Arrays
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the security performance of the ER-based beamforming with the ULA
is investigated. As discussed in Chapter 2, the issue caused by passive Eves can be
addressed by creating a physical region using the beamforming technique. Now the
potential of using antenna array to enhance the security is explored from the physical
region perspective in different channel conditions.
Previous research based on the information-theoretic parameters has focused on
the information-theoretic secrecy with less attention to the spatial area in the physical
environment. However, there are many applications that require security inside an
enclosed area, such as different zones in an exhibition hall or different assembly lines in
a factory. It is desirable that signals can be confined in a limited physical region, which
is defined as the ER. In this thesis, the ER is defined based on the information-theoretic
secrecy parameter. The challenges for reducing the ER towards high wireless security
is the small-scale fading effects and the randomly located Eves.
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In this chapter, ER-based beamforming is proposed and the spatial security per-
formance is evaluated for the generalized Rician channel. To properly investigate the
security performance, first the system with geometric locations is defined, which enables
exploration from the spatial aspect. As for the system performance metric, the SSOP,
which has its roots in the information-theoretic security, is defined based on the ER to
describe the spatial security performance. To facilitate the analysis of the SSOP, its
analytic upper bound is derived. Combined with numerical results, the SSOP and its
upper bound for the ULA are analyzed with respect to different array parameters in
different channel conditions.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the system model that incor-
porates the geometric locations in the generalized Rician channel is introduced. In
Section 3.3, the concept of the ER is introduced. Then the SSOP and its upper bound
are derived and analyzed. In Section 3.4, the SSOP and its upper bound are analyzed for
the simple path loss channel model. In Section 3.5, the numerical results are discussed
and the properties of the SSOP and its upper bound are investigated for the generalized
Rician channel. In Section 3.6, the conclusions of this chapter are given.
3.2 System and Channel Models
3.2.1 System Model with Geometric Locations
Consider a dense wireless communications system where the AP communicates to Bob
in presence of a large number of Eves, as shown in Fig. 3.1. The AP is equipped with
an antenna array, e.g., the ULA, which has N antenna elements with spacing ∆d; while
Bob and Eves have a single antenna. So, it is a MISO system from the AP to either Bob
or Eve. For convenience, both Bob and Eves are simply referred to as a ‘general user’
or a ‘user’, unless otherwise stated.
Without loss of generality, the AP is located at the origin point in polar coordinates,
as shown in Fig. 3.1. Assume that the users are distributed by a homogeneous PPP Φe
with density λe [124]. The user’s coordinates are denoted by z = (d,θ). The subscripts
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Fig. 3.1 An example of a dense communications system with one AP, Bob and several
Eves
‘B’ and ‘E’ are used for Bob and Eves hereinafter. Thus, Bob’s coordinates are denoted
by zB = (dB,θB); the i-th Eve’s coordinates are zEi = (dEi,θEi), i ∈ N+.
Consider a time-division duplex (TDD) system. Assume that the AP could estimate
Bob’s CSI, which can be further used to estimate Bob’s coordinates (dB,θB). For
example, the AP sends a probe message, then the CSI can be estimated via a separate
feedback channel. Alternatively, the user could send a probe message and the AP listens
to and estimates the channel. Unlike the availability of Bob’s CSI, the AP cannot obtain
Eves’ CSI, because the passive Eves only listen to the channel between the AP and Bob;
thus their CSI is difficult to detect.
Let x be the modulated symbol with unit power, E[|x|2] = 1, and Pt be its transmit
power. The transmitted vector, denoted by u, is given by
u =
√
Ptw∗x, (3.1)
where w is the beamforming weight vector. For given θB, the AP designs w associated
with θB. To maximize Bob’s received signal power, the AP steers the mainbeam of array
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pattern towards θB, i.e., θdoe = θB. In this case, w is obtained by substituting θdoe = θB
into (2.11),
w =
s(θB)√
N
. (3.2)
Consider the channel model that incorporates both the large-scale path loss and the
Rician small-scale fading. In this thesis, the channel gain vector in (2.36) is used. The
large-scale path loss is determined by d, and s(θ) is related to θ . To emphasize the
location-based channel, h(z) is used to denote the MISO channel gain vector between
the AP and the user at z = (d,θ),
h(z) =
1√
dβ
(√ K
K+1
s(θ)+
√
1
K+1
g
)
, (3.3)
where β is the path loss factor and the Rician fading has Rician K factor. In this thesis,
the term ‘the generalized Rician channel’ is used to incorporate both the large-scale
path loss and the small-scale fading.
According to (3.1)-(3.3), the received signal of the user at z can be obtained by
r(z) = hT (z)u+nW
=
√
Pt
dβ
(√ K
K+1
sT (θ)+
√
1
K+1
gT
)s∗(θB)√
N
x+nW
=
√
Pt
dβ
h˜x+nW , (3.4)
where nW is the AWGN with zero mean and variance σ2n and h˜ is the equivalent channel
factor, which is given by
h˜ =
(√ K
K+1
sT (θ)+
√
1
K+1
gT
)s∗(θB)√
N
=
√
K
K+1
sT (θ)s∗(θB)√
N
+
√
1
K+1
gT s∗(θB)√
N
=
√
K
K+1
G(θ ,θB)+
√
1
K+1
sH(θB)g√
N
, (3.5)
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Fig. 3.2 An example of ULA with N elements
where G(θ ,θB) is the array factor when θdoe = θB. For the ULA, G(θ ,θB) is obtained
by substituting θdoe = θB in (2.13) and (2.14).
G(θ ,θB) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e jk∆d(sinθB−sinθ)(i−1) (3.6)
=
1√
N
1− e jNk∆d(sinθB−sinθ)
1− e jk∆d(sinθB−sinθ) , (3.7)
where k = 2π/λ . For the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi signals, λ = 3×10
8 m/s
2.4×109 Hz = 0.125 m.
It is reflection symmetry for the ULA, as shown in Fig. 3.2. Thus, the following
proposition can be deduced.
Proposition 3.2.1 Because of the symmetric geometry, the array patterns for G(θ ,θdoe)
at θdoe =±(θB±π) are of the same shape and are symmetric to each other. In other
words, it suffices to study G(θ ,θB) only in the range of θB ∈ [0, π2 ].
3.2.2 Channel Model and Distribution
Since h˜ is a random variable that depends on g, it is of interest to know the distribution of
the amplitude |h˜|. In (3.5), sH(θB)g is a circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random
variable, because s(θB) is deterministic for certain Bob’s location and is independent
to g. Similarly, G(θ ,θB) is deterministic as well. Therefore, |h˜| is a Rician random
variable. Let h˜LOS and h˜NLOS denote the LOS and NLOS components of h˜, respectively.
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According to (3.5), they can be written as
h˜LOS =
√
K
K+1
G(θ ,θB), (3.8)
h˜NLOS =
√
1
K+1
sH(θB)g√
N
. (3.9)
The power of the LOS component ν˜2 and the average power of the NLOS component
2σ˜2 are
ν˜2 = |h˜LOS|2 = KK+1G
2(θ ,θB), (3.10)
2σ˜2 = E[|h˜NLOS|2] = 1N(K+1)E[|s
H(θB)g|2] = 1K+1 . (3.11)
The pdf of |h˜| can be obtained according to (2.32),
f|h˜|(x) =
x
σ˜2
e−
x2+ν˜2
2σ˜2 I0(
ν˜
σ˜2
x), (3.12)
The Rician K factor for |h˜| is ν˜22σ˜2 = KG2(θ ,θB) and the total power is ν˜2 + 2σ˜2 =
KG2(θ ,θB)+1
K+1 . Both depend on G(θ ,θB) in (2.13) and (2.14).
For the case when the channel only contains the LOS path, the Rician fading channel
becomes deterministic. In (3.5), let K approach the infinity, the equivalent channel h˜ is
reduced to
h˜ = G(θ ,θB). (3.13)
For the worst case when the channel does not contain the LOS path, the Rician channel
becomes the Rayleigh channel.
Accordingly, the received signal power, denoted by Pr(z), can be computed from
(3.4),
Pr(z) =
Pt
dβ
|h˜|2. (3.14)
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Then, the SNR γ(z) can be written as
γ(z) =
Pr(z)
σ2n
=
Pt
σ2n dβ
|h˜|2. (3.15)
The channel capacity of the general user located at z can be calculated by
C(z) = log2[1+ γ(z)] = log2
[
1+
Pr(z)
σ2n
]
= log2
[
1+
Pt
σ2n dβ
|h˜|2
]
. (3.16)
For convenience, let CB =C(zB) and CEi =C(zEi) denote the channel capacities of Bob
and the i-th Eve hereinafter. From (3.14) to (3.16), it can be seen that the randomness
of CEi comes from the random location zEi and the small-scale fading. Specially, due
to the fact that h˜ in (3.5) depends on G(θ ,θB), G(θ ,θB) can be improved by properly
designing.
Given θB, the equivalent channel factor for Bob h˜B can be calculated by substituting
(2.22) into (3.5),
h˜B =
√
KN
K+1
+
√
1
K+1
sH(θB)g√
N
. (3.17)
h˜B has the maximum total power, i.e., E[|h˜B|2] = KN+1K+1 . Thus, PrB (or CB) is also the
maximum value in the range θ ∈ [0,2π].
3.3 SSOP and Upper Bound Derivation
The goal is to provide a reliable and secure transmission for Bob in presence of randomly
located passive Eves, by using the transmit beamforming with antenna arrays. Due
to the randomness of the i-th Eve’s capacity CEi, due to either random location or
small-scale fading, it is likely that one or more Eves have a higher channel capacity than
the known channel capacity CB. In this context, while Bob has a reliable transmission
from the AP, Eve can correctly receive the whole or part of the signal. That is referred
to as the secrecy outage event.
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Because the randomness of CEi is partially from Eves’ random locations, it is natural
to exploit the geometric region in the description of the above secrecy outage event. To
this end, the exposure region (ER) is introduced. Secrecy outage occurs whenever any
Eve randomly appears within the ER. Then, the SSOP is derived based on the ER, and
its analytic upper bound is derived, in order to measure the system security level.
3.3.1 Exposure Region
The secrecy outage formulation in [79], as shown by (2.6) in Section 2.2.4, is adopted
in this thesis. A secrecy outage event occurs when the perfect secrecy is compromised
based upon a reliable transmission for Bob. Let RB and Rs be the rate of the transmitted
codewords and the rate of the confidential information, respectively. For fixed RB and
Rs, the formulation in (2.7) should be used. A reliable transmission to Bob can be
guaranteed when CB ≥ RB. Eves’ CSI is unknown to the AP and is independent from CB.
The value CEi can be so large that CEi > RB−Rs. In this case, the secrecy is breached
and the secrecy outage event occurs.
The SOP in (2.6) cannot characterize the secrecy outage event for the PPP distributed
Eves. To solve this problem, the ER, denoted by Θ, is defined by the geometric region
where Bob faces the secrecy outage event. Particularly, the geometric region Θ where
C(z)> RB−Rs,∃z = (d,θ) ∈Θ, is considered. The i-th Eve will cause secrecy outage,
if and only if zEi randomly appears in Θ. Accordingly, Θ can be represented by
Θ= {z : C(z)> RB−Rs}. (3.18)
In the same time, CB ≥ RB need to be guaranteed.
Substitute (3.16) into (3.18) and rearrange (d,θ). Θ can be transformed into
Θ= {z : d < D(θ)}, (3.19)
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where
D(θ) =
[ Pt |h˜|2
σ2n (2RB−RS −1)
] 1
β
. (3.20)
D(θ) is a function regarding to θ and is regardless of d. In (3.20), h˜ can be replaced by
that for any channel model.
Notice that D(θ) determines the contour of Θ, which gives a clear geometric
meaning. In polar coordinates, Θ corresponds an enclosed area that is bounded by D(θ)
and contains the origin point (i.e., the AP).
The shape of D(θ) (i.e., Θ) is mainly determined by h˜. Because the equivalent
channel factor h˜ is random, D(θ) is a random variable which is subject to the small-scale
fading. Thus, Θ is a dynamic region with a shifting boundary. When the channel is
deterministic, D(θ) is also deterministic.
According to h˜ in (3.5), D(θ) is highly related to the array factor G(θ ,θB). Espe-
cially when it is the deterministic channel in (3.13), Θ is affected by the array pattern.
An example ofΘ is depicted in Fig. 3.3, where D(θ) is indicated by the (RB−Rs)-curve.
A reliable transmission is guaranteed for Bob, if Bob is inside the RB-curve. Secrecy
outage occurs if the randomly located Eve is inside D(θ). If Eve is located inside the
RB-curve, i.e., CEi > RB, the secrecy capacity is zero. For random fading channels, the
boundary of Θ, i.e., D(θ), also changes. So there will be some variations based on
pattern shown in Fig. 3.3.
Now a new expression for the size of Θ is formulated as one key parameter metric.
To this end, focus only on Eves that are randomly located inside Θ. This is because the
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perfect secrecy is compromised only when zEi ∈Θ. Intuitively, the smaller area of Θ is,
the smaller the number of Eves that are statistically located in Θ. This leads to lower
secrecy outage based on (3.18). The size of Θ is denoted by A. In polar coordinates, A
can be formulated using (3.20),
A =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
D2(θ)dθ =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
[ Pt |h˜|2
σ2n (2RB−RS −1)
] 2
β dθ . (3.21)
A is measured in m2 and depends on h˜.
3.3.2 Spatial Secrecy Outage Probability
Using (3.21), the probability of secrecy outage event associated to Θ can be quantita-
tively measured. Any Eve located inside Θ causes secrecy outage and this is referred to
as spatial secrecy outage (SSO) event. Thus, the probability of the SSO event is equal
to the probability that any Eve is inside Θ.
Denoted by p, the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) is defined by the
probability that any Eve located inside Θ. p measures the security level of the system
in presence of randomly located Eves. The meaning of the term ‘spatial’ is two fold: it
differentiates from the conventional secrecy formulation which does not have a dynamic
geometric implication; it also emphasizes the fact that the secrecy outage is caused by
spatially distributed Eves within the dynamic region Θ.
For the PPP-distributed Eves, the probability that m Eves are located inside Θ (with
size A) is given by
Prob{m Eves in Θ}= (λeA)
m
m!
e−λeA, (3.22)
The SSOP p can be formulated by referring to the ‘no secrecy outage’ event that no
Eves are located inside Θ. Using (3.22), it can be derived that
p = 1−Prob{0 Eve in Θ}= 1− e−λeA. (3.23)
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The smaller the SSOP p is, the less probable the secrecy outage occurs and the more
secure the transmission to Bob is.
The secrecy outage formulation in (3.23) is from the geometric aspect which allows
us to compute the probability that no Eve is inside the ER, whereas the geometric
concept is weakened in some research and the average secrecy outage is calculated over
all PPP distributed Eves’ locations [85, 125].
Notice in (3.23) that there is a positive correlation between p and A, which verifies
the intuition of ‘the smaller Θ is, the lower the secrecy outage’ in Section 3.3.1. For
certain environment, it is reasonable to assume that λe is a constant. Thus, p solely
depends on A.
p depends on the equivalent channel factor h˜ via A. Due to the fact that h˜ represents
random channel fading, it is more interesting to study the expectation of p, which
reflects the averaged behavior over a short time period. The averaged p, denoted by p¯,
can be calculated by
p¯ = E|h˜|[p] = 1−E|h˜|[e−λeA]. (3.24)
Theorem 3.3.1 p¯ in (3.24) can be computed by
p¯ = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
[KG2(θ ,θB)
K+1
+
x2+ y2
K+1
+
2
√
KG(θ ,θB)
K+1
x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dxdy, (3.25)
where λe is the density of Eves, c0 = Ptσ2n (2RB−RS−1)
, which is deterministic, β is the path
loss factor, K is the Rician K factor, G(θ ,θB) is the array factor when the DoE angle is
Bob’s angle θB.
Lemma 3.3.2 |h˜|2 can be decomposed by
|h˜|2 = KG
2(θ ,θB)
K+1
+
1
K+1
g2Re+
1
K+1
g2Im+
2
√
KG(θ ,θB)
K+1
gRe, (3.26)
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where gRe and gIm are the real and imaginary parts of a complex Gaussian random
variable g ∼CN(0,1). So, gRe and gIm are jointly normal distributed variables, i.e.,
gRe,gIm ∼ N(0, 12).
The following proof of Theorem 3.3.1 requires Lemma 3.3.2, the proof of which is given
in Appendix A.1.
Proof First, substituting c0 into (3.21), A in (3.24) can be simplified into
A =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
(c0|h˜|2)
2
β dθ . (3.27)
p¯ in (3.24) cannot be directly computed using the pdf of |h˜| in (3.12) and (3.27),
p¯ = 1−
∫ ∞
0
e−λeA f|h˜|(x)dx
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− λe
2
∫ 2π
0
(c0x2)
2
β dθ
] x
σ˜2
e−
x2+ν˜2
2σ˜2 I0(
ν˜
σ˜2
x), (3.28)
where ν˜2 = KG
2(θ ,θB)
K+1 , which depends on θ . It means that at different angle θ , h˜ follows
the Rician fading with different Rician K-factor and total power.
Instead, h˜ for each user at different location (d,θ) experiences an i.i.d. circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian distribution. According to Lemma 3.3.2, p¯ can be calcu-
lated by
p¯ = EgRe,gIm[p] = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
[KG2(θ ,θB)
K+1
+
1
K+1
x2+
1
K+1
y2+
2
√
KG(θ ,θB)
K+1
x
] 2
β dθ
}
fgRe(x) fgIm(y)dxdy. (3.29)
For the normal distribution,
fgRe(x) =
1√
π
e−x
2
, (3.30)
fgIm(y) =
1√
π
e−y
2
. (3.31)
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(3.25) can be obtained by substituting (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.29). Thus, the proof is
completed.
Theorem 3.3.3 For the special case when K → ∞, i.e., the channel is deterministic, p¯
in (3.25) can be simplified into
p¯ = 1− exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
[G2(θ ,θB)]
2
β dθ
}
. (3.32)
Proof limK→∞ KK+1 = 1, limK→∞
1
K+1 = 0 and limK→∞
√
K
K+1 = 0. For simplicity, assume
that x, y take value from a finite range [−Q,Q], where Q a sufficiently large positive real
number that satisfies
∫ Q
−Q fgRe(x)dx ≈ 1. For example, when Q = 3,
∫ Q
−Q fgRe(x)dx =
0.9999779. Thus, when K → ∞, p¯ can be approximated by
lim
K→∞
p¯≈ 1−
∫ Q
−Q
∫ Q
−Q
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
[G2(θ ,θB)]
2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dxdy
= 1− exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
[G2(θ ,θB)]
2
β dθ
}∫ Q
−Q
∫ Q
−Q
e−(x2+y2)
π
dxdy
= 1− exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
[G2(θ ,θB)]
2
β dθ
}
. (3.33)
Theorem 3.3.4 For the special case when K = 0, i.e., the Rayleigh channel, p¯ in (3.25)
can be simplified into
lim
K→0
p¯≈ 1−
∫ Q
−Q
∫ Q
−Q
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
(x2+ y2)
2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dxdy
= 1−
∫ Q
−Q
∫ Q
−Q
exp
{
−λeπc
2
β
0 (x
2+ y2)
2
β
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dxdy. (3.34)
For the deterministic channel, p¯ is mainly decided by G(θ ,θB). For the Rayleigh
channel, p¯ in (3.34) does not contain G(θ ,θB), because there is no LOS component in
Rayleigh fading channel.
Note that p¯ can be simulated by Monte-Carlo method based on (3.24) and numeri-
cally calculated based on (3.25). However, these methods do not provide any analytic
insights; thus the impact of certain parameters, such as N, θB, K and β , cannot be
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understood. In order to investigate the impact of these parameters, in the next section,
the analytic expression for the upper bound of p¯ will be derived to facilitate further
theoretical analysis.
3.3.3 Upper Bound of SSOP
To get the analytic expression for the upper bound, consider two major obstacles to
obtain the analytic expression for p¯. First, let Xθ = c0|h˜|2. Then (3.27) can be rewritten
as
A =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
X
2
β
θ dθ . (3.35)
Xθ contains the array factor G(θ ,θB), which makes the integral very difficult to solve
when β > 2. This is true for both deterministic and fading channels. The other obstacle
is that E[e−λeA] in (3.24) is difficult to obtain due to the composite array factor and the
Rician fading channels.
The idea to overcome the aforementioned obstacles is that while the direct solution
to E[e−λeA] is difficult, it is possible to obtain the moments of |h˜|. Using Jensen’s
Inequality, the upper bound for p¯, denoted by p¯up, can be obtained via the moments of
|h˜|. The following two inequalities based on Jensen’s Inequality are used.
Lemma 3.3.5 Because e(·) is a convex function, according to Jensen’s inequality,
E[eX ]≥ eE[X ], (3.36)
where X is a random variable. The equality holds if and only if X is a deterministic
value.
On the other hand, (·) 2β is a concave function, when β > 2. According to Jensen’s
inequality,
E[X
2
β ]≤ (E[X ]) 2β . (3.37)
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The equality holds when β = 2 for any X.
Theorem 3.3.6 The upper bound p¯up can be expressed by
p¯up = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ ,θB)dθ +
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
. (3.38)
Proof According to (3.24) and (3.36), it can be derived that
p¯ = 1−E|h˜|[e−λeA]≤ 1− e−λeE|h˜|[A]. (3.39)
Notice that A depends on random variable h˜ and is not constant, except for K =∞. Thus,
the equality holds only for the deterministic channel.
To solve (3.39), assume that θ ∼U (0,2π). According to (3.35), A in (3.39) can be
converted into
A = 2π
1
2
∫ 2π
0
1
2π
X
2
β
θ dθ = πEθ [X
2
β
θ ]. (3.40)
According to (3.37), (3.40) can be bounded by
A≤ π(Eθ [Xθ ])
2
β = π
(∫ 2π
0
1
2π
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
. (3.41)
In the inequality, the equality holds when β = 2 for any K.
According to (3.39) and (3.41), it can be derived that
E|h˜|[A]≤ πE|h˜|
[(∫ 2π
0
1
2π
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
]
. (3.42)
Then applying (3.37) and (3.42), it can be derived that
πE|h˜|
[(∫ 2π
0
1
2π
Xθ dθ
) 2
β
]
≤ π
(
E|h˜|
[∫ 2π
0
1
2π
Xθ dθ
]) 2
β
. (3.43)
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Exchanging the integral and E|h˜|, then substituting Xθ = c0|h˜|2, it can be derived that
E|h˜|[A]≤ π
( c0
2π
∫ 2π
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2]dθ
) 2
β
. (3.44)
Notice that when β = 2, the equality holds.
Apply (3.44) to (3.39) then obtain
p¯≤ 1− e−λeE|h˜|[A] ≤ 1− exp
[
−λeπ
( c0
2π
∫ 2π
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2]dθ
) 2
β
]
. (3.45)
The upper bound p¯up can be expressed by
p¯up = 1− exp
[
−λeπ
( c0
2π
∫ 2π
0
E|h˜|[|h˜|2]dθ
) 2
β
]
. (3.46)
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, |h˜| is a Rician random variable with total power
KG2(θ ,θB)+1
K+1 . Thus, E|h˜|[|h˜|2] = KG
2(θ ,θB)+1
K+1 . Substituting the previous result into (3.46),
it can be derived that
p¯up = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0
2π
∫ 2π
0
KG2(θ ,θB)+1
K+1
dθ
] 2
β
}
= 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ ,θB)dθ +
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
. (3.47)
Thus, the proof is completed.
Proposition 3.3.7 For the determinist channel, (3.39) reduces to an equality; thus, the
upper bound is tighter when β = 2 than that when β > 2. When β = 2, (3.44) reduces
to an equality; thus, the upper bound is tighter for the deterministic channel than that
for the fading channel. Only for the deterministic channel when β = 2, the equality
holds for p¯up = p¯. However, for the fading channel when β > 2, the tightness of the
upper bound is not clear. The numerical results of p¯up for different K and β will be
given in Section 3.5.2.
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Theorem 3.3.8 For the special case when K → ∞, p¯up in (3.38) can be simplified into
p¯up = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0
2π
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ ,θB)dθ
] 2
β
}
. (3.48)
Theorem 3.3.9 For the special case when K = 0, p¯up in (3.38) can be simplified into
p¯up = 1− exp(−λeπc
2
β
0 ). (3.49)
Compare p¯up in (3.38) and (3.48) to p¯ in (3.25) and (3.32), it can be seen that (·)
2
β
is moved outside of the integral, which makes solving the integral in (3.27) possible.
Besides, the expectation takes place on |h˜| directly, which is simpler with known pdf
of |h˜|. For the Rayleigh channel, p¯ in (3.34) and p¯up in (3.49) are both deterministic
values.
So far, the two major obstacles mentioned in the beginning of this section are
tackled. The final step to obtain the analytic expression of p¯up is to solve the integral∫ 2π
0 G
2(θ ,θB) in (3.38). Let A0 denote the integral,
A0 =
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ ,θB)dθ . (3.50)
A0 is actually the pattern area.
As (3.50) is a general expression, any type of array with an analytic expression or
numerically measured pattern can be calculated using this equation. For the ULA, the
analytic expression of A0 cannot be directly obtained by substituting G(θ ,θB) in (2.14).
Here, the analytic expression of A0 is directly given.
Theorem 3.3.10
A0 = 2π+4π
N−1
∑
n=1
N−n
N
J0(k∆dn)cos(k∆dnsinθB). (3.51)
A0 is in the form of finite summation of weighted J0(x), where J0(x) is the Bessel function
of the first kind with order zero.
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The proof of Theorem 3.3.10 is in Appendix A.2.
A0 is determined by N, ∆d and θB. It is relatively easy to analytically analyze A0,
because J0(x) has a decreasing envelope with the maximum value J0(0) = 1 at x = 0.
When x increases to infinity, J0(x) approaches zero, which makes J0(x) negligible for
certain values of n and ∆d. Thus, appropriate approximations of A0 can be found to
analytically analyze A0.
According to (3.38) and (3.50), the general expression of p¯up for any array type
under the Rician channel can be written in the form of A0,
p¯up = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
A0+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
. (3.52)
Because p¯up is positively correlated with A0, the properties of p¯up can be derived based
on those of A0, which serves as guidance for the analysis of p¯. Moreover, it is worth
noticing that the approximated p¯up based on the approximations of A0 ceases to be
the upper bound of p¯, but rather approximations of p¯. In the rest of this chapter, the
approximations of p¯up (i.e., the approximations of p¯) are used to provide theoretical
analysis thanks to the tractable nature, and accurate numerical results of p¯up and p¯ are
used to verify the theoretical analysis.
3.4 Impact of Array Parameters on SSOP
It can be seen from (3.52) that there is a positive correlation between p¯up and A0.
Thus, the analysis of p¯up can be carried out by studying the behavior of A0, which is
determined by N and θB. As stated in Proposition 3.3.7, p¯up = p¯ for the deterministic
channel when β = 2. Thus, the investigation starts from this simple channel model.
When K → ∞ and β = 2, p¯up in (3.52) can be simplified into
p¯up = 1− exp(−λec02 A0). (3.53)
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First the behavior of A0 for the ULA is analyzed with respect to N and θB via both
analytic and numerical methods. More numerical results for p¯up for other values of β
and K will be shown in Section 3.5.1.
3.4.1 Impact of Array Parameters on Pattern Area
Impact of Bob’s Angle
To analyze the impact of θB on A0, an appropriate approximation of A0 in (3.51) is
required. As stated in Proposition 3.2.1, the range of θB ∈ [0, π2 ] is chosen.
First, let A0,n, n = 1, ...,N−1, denote the summation term in (3.51),
A0,n = 4π
N−n
N
J0(k∆dn)cos(k∆dnsinθB). (3.54)
Then, A0 in (3.51) can be written by
A0 = 2π+
N−1
∑
n=1
A0,n. (3.55)
For the ULA, consider the half-wavelength spacing, i.e., ∆d = 0.5λ . This is because
when ∆d is smaller than 0.5λ , there will be very high mutual coupling that distorts
the array pattern; when ∆d is larger than 0.5λ , there will be large sidelobes and even
multiple mainbeams [106]. Thus, the behaviors of A0 are only considered in terms of N
and θB with ∆d = 0.5λ .
When ∆d = 0.5λ , A0,n in (3.54) can be written as
A0,n = 4π
N−n
N
J0(nπ)cos(nπ sinθB). (3.56)
An example of ULA with N = 8 and ∆d = 0.5λ is shown in Fig. 3.4. In the upper
plot, J0(nπ) decreases as n. The lower plot shows the decreasing envelope of A0,n, i.e.,
N−n
N J0(nπ). When n = 1, the value is the largest; when n = 7, the value is negligible.
As a result, for fixed N, A0, the summation of A0,n, can be approximated by the
first few summation terms. In the case when ∆d = 0.5λ , A0,1 is very dominant and it
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Fig. 3.4 J0(nπ) and N−nN J0(nπ) for n = 1,2, ...,N−1. N = 8
suffices to approximate A0 using only A0,1, i.e.,
A0 ≈ 2π+4πN−1N J0(π)cos(π sinθB). (3.57)
Thus, using (3.53) and (3.57), p¯up can be approximated by
p¯up ≈ 1− exp
{
− λec0
2
[
2π+4π
N−1
N
J0(π)cos(π sinθB)
]}
. (3.58)
From (3.57) and (3.58), it can be seen that for any fixed N, when θB increases from
0 to π2 , π sinθB increases from 0 to π . Then cos(π sinθB) decreases from 1 to −1. As
shown in Fig. 3.4, J0(π) < 0, leading to the approximations of A0 and p¯up being a
monotonic increasing function in the range θB ∈ [0, π2 ].
In Fig. 3.5, A0,n and p¯up versus θB are depicted for the ULA with N = 8 and
∆d = 0.5λ . In the left plot, A0,1 has the largest variation from θB = 0◦ to θB = 90◦. As
n increases, the variation becomes smaller. This corresponds to the decreasing envelope
shown in Fig. 3.4.
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In the right plot, the true value of p¯up is shown as comparison to its different
approximations. When n = 1, the approximated p¯up in (3.58) is comprised of the
constant 2π and A0,1; when n = 1,2, the approximated p¯up in (3.53) and (3.55) is
comprised of the constant 2π , A0,1 and A0,2, and so forth. It can be seen in Fig. 3.5 that
when n = 1, the approximation already captures the increasing trend of the true value.
With more A0,n, the approximation becomes closer to the true value. It is worth noticing
from Fig. 3.5 that for n > 2, cos(nπ sinθB) (i.e., A0,n) is not monotonic in the range
θB ∈ [0, π2 ]. However, when n > 2, N−nN J0(nπ) is less dominant than N−1N J0(nπ) for
N = 8. Overall, the true value of p¯up in general has a monotonic increasing relationship
with A0,1.
Impact of Number of Elements
While there exist simple approximations when N is fixed, it is more complicated when
N changes. Because when N is fixed and only θB changes, there is a fixed envelope for
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A0,n, n = 1, ...N−1. When N changes, the number of summation terms, i.e., A0,n, as
well as their envelopes also change. Therefore, a different method is adopted to analyze
how A0 changes with N.
Let {qn} be a sequence, n ∈ N+,
qn = J0(k∆dn)cos(k∆dnsinθB). (3.59)
Notice that {qn} is an infinite sequence and is independent from N. A0 in (3.51) is the
summation of the first N−1 terms of {qn} with weights and the constant 2π ,
A0 = 2π+4π
N−1
∑
n=1
N−n
N
qn. (3.60)
The weights are N−nN and N can be any positive integer larger than 1.
Examples of {qn} when ∆d = 0.5λ are shown in Fig. 3.6. There are three values of
θB. For different value θB, the behavior of {qn} differs greatly. When θB = 0◦, qn =
J0(nπ). So, {qn} are discrete samples of J0(x). When θB = 30◦, qn = J0(nπ)cos(nπ2 ),
which is zero for odd n; and it is the samples of (−1)n/2J0(x) for even n. When
θB = 60◦, qn = J0(nπ)cos(n
√
3π
2 ).
Take θB = 0◦ as an example. When N = 2,3,4, it can be derived that
A0 = 2π+4π
1
2
q1 = 4.3718, (3.61)
A0 = 2π+4π
2
3
q1+4π
1
3
q2 = 4.6575, (3.62)
A0 = 2π+4π
3
4
q1+4π
2
4
q2+4π
1
4
q3 = 4.2311, (3.63)
where q1 =−0.3042, q2 = 0.2203, q3 =−0.1812. As N increases, the weights for the
first few terms becomes more significant, which indicates the changing envelope. For
example, the weight of q1 increases from 12 to
3
4 . But, there is no clear increasing or
decreasing relationship when N increases from 2 to 4. It depends on the specific values
of qn.
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Fig. 3.6 qn for different θB
The conclusion can be generalized for any θB. When N increases, although the
number of summation terms increases with N, and the weights N−nN for smaller n
become more significant, the overall summation A0 is still determined by the nature
of {qn}, which is in turn determined by θB. In Fig. 3.7, the corresponding results for
p¯up versus N are shown. It can be seen that because of the difference in {qn}, when N
increases, p¯ changes differently for different θB.
The common behavior shared by p¯ for any θB is that when N is sufficiently large, p¯
approaches to a fixed value. This can also be traced back to a property of {qn}. The
sequence {qn} is comprised of weighted samples of J0(x), which approaches 0 when x
goes to infinity. As N increases, the weights at the end of {qn} approach 0 in addition
to the vanishing tails of J0(x). Thus, the total summation is more determined by the
front terms of {qn}. In addition, it can be seen in Fig. 3.7 that p¯ increases with θB.
In summary, when ∆d = 0.5λ , p¯up (i.e., A0) in general increases with θB ∈ [0, π2 ].
The relationship between p¯up and N is determined by θB. Nevertheless, for any θB, p¯up
approaches to certain values (depending on θB) when N increases.
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3.4.2 Impact of Array Parameters on Array Pattern
In the previous section, p¯up is analyzed via the pattern area A0. This is because p¯up
is based on Θ, which is determined by G(θ ,θB). Naturally, the area of Θ (i.e., A)
is determined by the area of the array pattern, which is A0. To fully understand the
properties of p¯up in Section 3.4.1, the array pattern of the ULA is studied and p¯up
is analyzed from the spatial aspect with respect to N and θB. Although the spatial
perspective does not provide a very accurate analysis, it does helps better understanding
of the properties of p¯up.
First, some array patterns with different N and θB are shown in Fig. 3.8, where
∆d = 0.5λ . Some patterns have different N with the same θB; while others have
different θB with the same N.
As can be seen in Fig. 3.8, for the same N = 4, the mainbeam becomes wider as θB
increases from 0◦ to 60◦. For θB = 0◦, the mainbeam gets narrower but longer when
N increases from 4 to 8. According to (2.22), Gmax =
√
N. Thus, the length of the
mainbeam increases in order of
√
N.
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Fig. 3.8 Array patterns of ULA for different N and θB, ∆d = 0.5λ
The half-power beamwidth (HPBW) is used to measure the width of the mainbeam.
Denoted by ∆θHP, it is the angular separation between the half power points of the
mainbeam. Based on its definition, G(θB−∆θHP/2,θB) =G(θB+∆θHP/2,θB) =
√
N
2 .
For θB ∈ [0, π2 ], the HPBW for ULA can be calculated by [106]
∆θHP = 2
[
θB− arcsin
(
sinθB− 2.782Nk∆d
)]
. (3.64)
It can be seen that ∆θHP is jointly determined by N and θB. arcsin(·) is a monotoni-
cally increasing function. For certain θB, when N increases, 2.782Nk∆d decreases, leading to
the decrease of ∆θHP.
To study the relationship between ∆θHP in (3.64) and θB. The derivative of ∆θHP is
calculated,
∂
∂θB
∆θHP = 2− 2cosθB√
1− (sinθB− 2.782Nk∆d )2
. (3.65)
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Fig. 3.9 ∆θHP versus θB for different N, ∆d = 0.5λ
Theorem 3.4.1 When ∆d = 0.5λ ,
∂
∂θB
∆θHP =

< 0 θB ∈ [0,arcsin 1.391Nπ )
= 0 θB = arcsin 1.391Nπ
> 0 θB ∈ (arcsin 1.391Nπ , π2 ]
(3.66)
The proof of Theorem 3.4.1 is in Appendix A.3. Theorem 3.4.1 suggests that the turning
point is θB = arcsin 1.391Nπ . ∆θHP first decreases till the turning point, then increases till
π
2 .
Examples of ∆θHP versus θB for different N are shown in Fig. 3.9. The turning
point of ∆θHP are at 6.36◦, 4.23◦ and 3.17◦ for N = 4,6,8, respectively, all of which are
relatively small compared to the whole angle range. Thus, ∆θHP in general increases in
the whole range θB ∈ [0, π2 ]. In addition, given the same θB, the larger N, the smaller
∆θHP is.
When N is fixed, Gmax is the same for different θB, which means the length of the
mainbeam is fixed. As θB increases from 0◦ to 90◦, the mainbeam in general becomes
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wider. Therefore, the mainbeam area becomes larger. For ∆d = 0.5λ , the sidelobes
are less dominant compared to the mainbeam. Thus, the mainbeam contributes to the
majority part of the pattern area, which explains why A0 in general increases in the
range θB ∈ [0, π2 ].
When θB is fixed to a certain value, Gmax increases with N, which means the
mainbeam becomes longer. On the other hand, as N increases, the mainbeam becomes
narrower. Thus, the area of the mainbeam could either increase or decrease with N,
resulting in a complex relationship between A0 and N.
3.5 Numerical Results for Generalized Rician Channel
Model
Both p¯ and p¯up are determined by two group of parameters: channel parameters (K
and β ) and array parameters (N and θB). In Section 3.4, the simple case that p¯ = p¯up is
analyzed with respect to the array parameters. In this section, the numerical results are
used to analyze the proprieties of p¯ and p¯up for the generalized Rician channel (i.e., any
K and β ) with respect to the array parameters. In addition, the tightness of the upper
bound will be examined.
3.5.1 SSOP and Its Upper Bound
In (3.52), p¯up is positively correlated with
[
c0K
2π(K+1)A0+
c0
K+1
] 2
β . For any fixed β and
K, p¯up also has a positive relationship with A0. Thus, the conclusions that are reached
about A0 regarding to the impact of N and θB also apply to p¯up of the generalized Rician
channel with different β and K.
For convenience, let A1 denote
c0K
2π(K+1)A0+
c0
K+1 . When β increases from 2 to 6, A
2
β
1
decreases, because A1 is generally larger than 1. It is also noticed that when A0 = 2π ,
the K factor disappears in the equation, i.e, A1 = c0. When A0 < 2π , the larger K is, the
smaller A1 (i.e., p¯up) is; when A0 > 2π , the larger K is, the larger A1 (i.e., p¯up) is.
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Fig. 3.10 p¯up for different values of A0, K and β . Pt/σ2n = 40 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz,
Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1×10−4
It can be seen that the properties of p¯up with respect to K and β mainly relies on the
value of A0. Thus, in Fig. 3.10, the examples of p¯up for different values of K and β are
given for three typical values of A0, i.e., 4.1326, 2π and 15.3761, which corresponds to
θB = 0◦, 48.35◦ and 90◦ when N = 8.
In Fig. 3.10, the logarithm scale is used to clearly show the ranges of p¯up and K.
It can be seen that, when β increases, p¯up drops very quickly, because in this case,
the constant c0 is very large (i.e., 2.2222× 103). For fixed β , p¯up increases, stays
unchanged or decreases depending on the value of A0.
The range of K in linear scale is from 0.01 to 100. When K = 0.01, the Rician
channel approaches the Rayleigh channel (K = 0). When K = 100, the Rician channel
approaches the deterministic channel (K → ∞). It can be seen that for fixed β , p¯up is a
constant for K = 0 and is irrelevant to A0 (nor N, θB). When K > 10, p¯up approaches to
a certain value that depends on A0 which in turn depends on N and θB.
While it is relatively straightforward to analyze the properties of p¯up with respect to
(K,β ,N,θB), the properties of p¯ cannot be easily analyzed according to (3.25). Thus,
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numerical results are used. An example of p¯ and p¯up versus θB for β = 3 and N = 8 is
given in Fig. 3.11. β = 3 is a typical value for some indoor scenarios such as home and
factory [116]. Typical values of K are chosen as 0, 1, 10 and ∞.
It can be seen that p¯ and p¯up increase in the range θB ∈ [0, π2 ], except for K = 0.
When K = 0, the curves are flat because p¯ and p¯up are irrelevant to θB, according to
(3.34) and (3.49). By comparing p¯up and p¯, it can be observed that the upper bound
reflects the trend very well. It can also be seen that for both p¯ and p¯up, the curve for
K = 10 is closer to that for K →∞, while the curve for K = 1 is closer to that for K = 0.
In Fig. 3.11, there is a pivot point at θB = 48.35◦ where A0 = 2π , and all curves
of p¯up come across. When θB < 48.35◦, A0 < 2π; thus p¯up decreases with K; When
θB > 48.35◦, A0 > 2π; thus p¯up increases with K; As K changes, the curve of p¯up pivots
around this point and approaches the curves for K = 0 or K → ∞.
For completeness, Fig. 3.12 shows an example of p¯ and p¯up versus N for β = 3 and
θB = 0◦. It can be seen that p¯ and p¯up decrease to different floor levels depending on K.
The same behavior has been shown in Fig. 3.7 where K = ∞ and β = 2. In addition, for
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both p¯ and p¯up, the curves for K = 10 are closer to those for K → ∞, while the curves
for K = 1 are closer to those for K = 0.
Although both p¯ and p¯up decreases with N, p¯ converges with a much slower speed,
which causes a larger gap between p¯ and p¯up as N increases. The differences of the
gaps between p¯ and p¯up for different K is not very obvious in Fig. 3.11, because N is
small.
In summary, the properties of A0 with respect to N and θB can be extended to p¯up,
because there is a straightforward relationship between p¯up and A0 for any K and β .
On the other hand, the numerical results show that while p¯ has similar properties to A0
with respect to N and θB, the gaps between p¯ and p¯up increase as N. Therefore, in the
next section, the tightness of p¯up will be examined.
3.5.2 Tightness of Upper Bound
In this section, the tightness of the upper bound is examined via numerical results with
respect to (K,β ,N,θB). An example of p¯ and p¯up for different K and β with N = 8
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and θB = 0◦ is shown in Fig. 3.13. At lower region of K, the channel approaches the
Rayleigh channel. Thus, p¯ and p¯up converge to the certain values that only depend on
β according to (3.34) and (3.49). At higher region of K, the channel approaches the
deterministic channel. p¯ and p¯up converge to the certain values that depend on β and
G(θ ,θB), according to (3.32) and (3.48).
It can also be seen that when β = 2, the curves for p¯ and p¯up emerge as K increases,
which corresponds to p¯ = p¯up for the deterministic channel. For other values of β , as K
increases, the gaps between p¯ and p¯up increases.
In this section, the ratio between p¯up and p¯ is used to measure the tightness of p¯up.
Let η denote the ratio,
η =
p¯up
p¯
. (3.67)
η ≥ 1. The smaller value of η , the tighter p¯up is. In Fig. 3.13, it can be deduced that
when β = 2, η will take the maximum value at K = 0 and approach the minimum value
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Fig. 3.14 η versus θB for deterministic and Rayleigh channels for all β , N = 8
η = 1 at K →∞. On the contrary, when β > 2, η will take the minimum value at K = 0
and approach the maximum value at K → ∞. Thus, in the following, the extreme cases
K = 0 and K → ∞ are used to study the range of η for different N, θB and β .
In Fig. 3.14, η is plotted against θB for K = 0 and K → ∞ for all β . The ULA has
N = 8 elements and ∆d = 0.5λ . For Rayleigh channel, both p¯ and p¯up are irrelevant
to θB, thus η is flat across θB ∈ [0,90◦]. For the deterministic channel, when β = 2,
η = 1; when β > 2, η in general decrease with θB.
Comparing the curves for both the deterministic and the Rayleigh channels, it is
noticed that when β > 2, the ratios are located closely in a cluster. However, there does
not exist monotonic relationship between η and β . For example, when β = 6, η for the
deterministic channel is smaller than that when β = 4.
In Fig. 3.15, η is plotted against N for K = 0 and K → ∞ for all β . The ULA has
∆d = 0.5λ and θB = 0◦. For the Rayleigh channel, η is flat across N for all β . For
the deterministic channel, η in general increases with N when β > 2, which verifies
the observation from Fig. 3.12. It can be seen that when as N increases, η does not
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Fig. 3.15 η versus N for deterministic and Rayleigh channels for all β , θB = 0◦
converge to a certain value, but increases instead. This means that in the larger region
of N, p¯up does not serve the purpose of predicting the behavior of p¯ anymore.
Notice that in both Fig. 3.14 and Fig. 3.15, when θB or N change, η fluctuates in a
different way than how p¯up changes with θB or N in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.7. The tightness
for each inequality in (3.36) and (3.37) depends on the properties of p¯. The combination
of two inequalities makes the tightness of upper bound hard to investigate.
In summary, when β = 2, η decreases with K till the minimum value η = 1; when
β > 2, η increases with K till certain value that depends on N and θB, and the values of
η for different β stay in a cluster. For given β and K, η generally decreases with θB
and increases with N. In a lower region of N, e.g., N < 10, the value of η is smaller
than 2.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the secure transmission to Bob with ER based beamforming in presence
of PPP distributed is investigated with a ULA. The ER is created by beamforming based
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on the SSO and the physical layer security is quantitatively measured by the SSOP
from the spatial aspect. The concepts of ER and SSOP are applicable to a general array
geometry and a general fading channel.
The exact expression of the SSOP is obtained, which can be used for numerical
simulations; in the mean time, its analytic upper bound is obtained to facilitate analytical
analysis. Both analytical and numerical results show that the SSOP and its upper bound
in general increase with the DoE angle (i.e., Bob’s angle) in the range [0, π2 ] for a ULA
with any number of elements and half-wavelength spacing; and they asymptotically
approach certain values depending on the DoE angle when the number of elements
increases. These properties can also be verified by observing array patterns. The
tightness of the upper bound (i.e., the ratio η) of the SSOP is also examined by
numerical results, which shows that η has a monotonic relationship with K, but a
non-linear relationship with β . It is worth noticing that η increases with the number
of elements, which makes it less useful in predicting the behavior of SSOP when the
number of elements is very large.
Chapter 4
Comparison of Spatial Secrecy Outage
Probability for Uniform Linear and
Circular Arrays
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the security performance of the ER-based beamforming with the UCA is
studied and compared with the ULA. Compared to the ULA, the UCA has a symmetric
geometry around 360◦ and is more flexible on the choices of array configuration. Thus,
it is more appealing to applications that require a wider range of coverage. In addition
to the theoretical analysis, the practical issue, i.e., the mutual coupling, is examined
towards the wireless security.
The expressions for the SSOP and its upper bound in Chapter 3 are generally
applicable to any array type. Different array geometries should have different behaviors
in terms of security. By studying the secrecy performance of the UCA, a comparison
can be made with the ULA, which will provide some insights on choosing an array
geometry for different situations to achieve higher level of security.
To investigate the SSOP for the UCA, the system model and the methodology used
in Chapter 3 are reused except for the ULA geometry. The analytic expressions of the
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pattern area for the UCA are derived, based on which the SSOP and the tightness of the
upper bound for the UCA are evaluated, and the comparison with the ULA with respect
to the array parameters is made.
The analysis about the SSOP and its upper bound in Chapter 3 reveals the important
role of the array factor; it determines the shape of the ER and affects the SSOP. However,
the mutual coupling distorts the array factor in practice and has different impact for
different array geometries. In this chapter, a practical beamformer is built on WARP
and the mutual coupling effect is numerically analyzed with WARP experiments and
NEC simulation results towards the security performance.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the system model is briefly
introduced with the focus on the UCA and the expressions of the SSOP and its upper
bound for the UCA are derived. In Section 4.3, the SSOP and its upper bound are
analyzed for the UCA with respect to the array parameters; a parallel comparison with
the ULA is made. In Section 4.4, the theoretical analysis and numerical results are given
for the generalized Rician channel. In Section 4.5, the mutual coupling is introduced
and the conclusions are reached via studying the experimental and simulation results.
In Section 4.6, the conclusions of this chapter are given.
4.2 System Model and SSOP for UCA
4.2.1 System Model with UCA
Consider a dense wireless communications system where the AP communicates to Bob
in presence of a large number of Eves. While the AP is equipped with an antenna array,
Bob and Eves have a single antenna. Users are distributed by a homogeneous PPP Φe
with density λe.
The UCA has N elements that are equally allocated on a circle with radius R with
spacing ∆d. An example of UCA is shown in Fig. 2.6. To avoid ambiguity, the subscript
‘L’ and ‘C’ are used to distinguish between the ULA and the UCA hereinafter. The DoE
angle is set to Bob’s angle, i.e., θdoe = θB. GC(θ ,θB) can be obtained by substituting
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θdoe = θB into (2.21),
GC(θ ,θB) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e jkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θ−ψi)], (4.1)
where k = 2π/λ and ψi = 2π(i−1)/N.
The term ‘array dimension’, denoted by la, is used to refer to the size of the array.
For the ULA, the array dimension is the array length, i.e., la,L = (N− 1)∆d; for the
UCA, the array dimension is the diameter, i.e., la,C = 2R. The relationship between ∆d
and l for the ULA and the UCA is then given by
∆dL =
la,L
N−1 , (4.2)
∆dC = la,C sin(
π
N
). (4.3)
Unlike the ULA, the configuration of the UCA is more flexible, i.e., the spacing
is not necessarily set to 0.5λ . To uniformly investigate and compare the ULA and the
UCA, the term ‘array configuration’ is used to refer to (N, la). In this chapter, the ULA
and the UCA are set to either the same la or the same ∆d for any given N.
While it is the reflection symmetry for the ULA, the UCA has both reflection sym-
metry and rotational symmetry. Similar to Proposition 3.2.1, the following proposition
can be deduced.
Proposition 4.2.1 The array pattern for GC(θ ,θB) repeats itself every 2πN for θB. As the
first element of the UCA lies on the positive x-axis, GC(θ ,θB) is symmetric regarding
to θB = iπN , i ∈ Z. Therefore, it suffices to study GC(θ ,θB) in range of θB ∈ [0, πN ].
Nevertheless, as often in comparison with the ULA, the range of θB is set to [0, π2 ] for
the UCA.
The large-scale path loss and the Rician small-scale fading are considered in addi-
tion to the AWGN. Assume that the AP has the knowledge of Bob’s CSI or coordinates,
but has no knowledge of Eves’ CSI except for their distribution, i.e., the PPP distribu-
tion. Substituting GC(θ ,θB) in (4.1) for the general expression G(θ ,θB), |h˜C|2 can be
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obtained from the general expression |h˜|2 in (3.26). Thus, the received signal power
Pr(z) in (3.14) and the channel capacity C(z) in (3.16) for the UCA can be written based
on |h˜C|2.
4.2.2 SSOP and Its Upper Bound for UCA
Θ is defined in the same way for the UCA as for the ULA, as shown in (3.19). For the
UCA, D(θ) in (3.20) relies on |h˜C|2, which in turn depends on GC(θ ,θB). Similarly,
p¯C can be obtained by substituting GC(θ ,θB) into the general expressions p¯ in (3.25),
p¯C = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0
∫ 2π
0
[KG2C(θ ,θB)
K+1
+
x2+ y2
K+1
+
2
√
KGC(θ ,θB)
K+1
x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dxdy. (4.4)
It can be seen that it is not tractable to analytically analyze.
The upper bound p¯up,C can be obtained by substituting A0,C into (3.52),
p¯up,C = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
A0,C +
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
, (4.5)
where A0,C is the pattern area for the UCA and is given by
A0,C =
∫ 2π
0
G2C(θ ,θB)dθ . (4.6)
Notice that (4.4) and (4.5) are for the generalized Rician channel.
For the special cases, i.e., the deterministic channel and Rayleigh fading channel,
p¯C and p¯up,C can be obtained by substituting K → ∞ and K = 0 into (4.4) and (4.5),
respectively, which is the same as Theorem 3.3.3, Theorem 3.3.4, Theorem 3.3.8 and
Theorem 3.3.9. Notice that for the Rayleigh fading channel, p¯ in (3.34) and p¯up in
(3.49) are regardless of the array geometry.
To obtain the analytic expression for p¯up in (4.5), the analytic expression of A0,C is
required. Here, A0,C is directly given.
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Theorem 4.2.2
A0,C = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lNJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB , (4.7)
where Wn = 2sin( nNπ); J0(x) and JlN(x) are the Bessel function of the first kind with
order zero and lN, respectively.
The proof of Theorem 4.2.2 is in Appendix A.4. A0,C is obtained in the form of double
summation of Bessel functions of the first kind.
the probabillity p¯C in (4.4) and p¯up,C in (4.5) are determined by the channel parame-
ters (i.e., K, β ) as well as G(θ ,θB) in (4.1) or A0,C in (4.7), both of which depend on N,
R and θB. Thus, in this section, the impact of N, R and θB is investigated for different
channel parameters K and β . As mentioned in Proposition 3.3.7, for the deterministic
channel when β = 2, p¯C = p¯up,C, in which case p¯up reduces to
p¯up,C = 1− exp
(
− λec0
2
A0,C
)
. (4.8)
First, the investigation of the properties of p¯up,C in (4.8) is carried out with respect to N,
R and θB. Then the properties of p¯C and p¯up,C for the generalized Rician channel will
be examined.
Due to the positive correlation between p¯up,C and A0,C, the properties of A0,C are
first examined. Notice that A0,C in (4.7) contains the complex component e jlNθB . Since
A0,C is the pattern area, it should be a real value. In Appendix A.5, A0,C is further
derived to obtain the ‘real-value’ form. However, for even and odd N, the ‘real-value’
forms of A0,C are slightly different. Here, the ‘real-value’ forms of A0,C are directly
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given,
A0,C,even = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J20(kRWn)+4π
N−1
∑
n=1
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)cos(lNθB),
(4.9)
A0,C,odd = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J20(kRWn)+4π
N−1
∑
n=1
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
J2lN(kRWn)cos(2lNθB).
(4.10)
A0,C,even in (4.9) and A0,C,odd in (4.10) are only slight different, which allows us to use
the same method to approximate and analyze them. A0,C,even is taken as an example in
this chapter; therefore, the subscript even is omitted in the expressions for convenience.
4.3 Impact of Array Parameters on SSOP for UCA
4.3.1 Impact of DoE Angle
To analytically analyze A0,C in (4.9), an appropriate approximation is needed. To this
end, A0,C is re-written by
A0,C = 2π+
N−1
∑
n=1
A0,C,n, (4.11)
where A0,n,C, n = 1, ...,N−1, is the summation term in (4.9),
A0,C,n = 2πJ20(kRWn)+4πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)cos(lNθB). (4.12)
Proposition 4.3.1 Because nN is not an integer for n= 1, ...,N−1, Wn = 2sin( nNπ) ̸= 0.
When N is even, sin( nNπ) = 1 at n =
N
2 . Therefore, Wn is in the range (0,2] and kRWn is
in the range (0,2kR], for n = 1, ...,N−1.
Similar to the method used in Section 3.4.1, the most dominant A0,C,n should be
chosen to approximate A0,C. The value of A0,C,n is dominated by J0(kRWn). On one
hand, JlN(x) in general decreases as l increases. On the other hand, the inner summation
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Fig. 4.1 Upper plot: JlN(x); lower left plot: J0(kRWn) versus n; lower right plot:
JlN(kRW3) versus l. N = 8, R = 1.75λ .
of JlN(kRWn) in (4.12) is weighted by (−1)ln, which further cancels the impact of
JlN(kRWn) on the overall summation.
An example of JlN(x) is shown by the upper plot in Fig. 4.1, where N = 8 and
R = la2 =
(N−1)∆dL
2 . The UCA has the same array dimension as the ULA with the same
N. For ∆dL = 0.5λ , 2kR = 21.99.
Because the order of JlN(x) increases in the step of N in (4.12), JlN(x) with higher
orders vanishes quickly in lower range of x ∈ (0,2kR]. It can be seen that up till around
x= 5, JlN(x) is negligible for l ≥ 1. For the values of n that satisfy kRWn < 5, J0(kRWn)
is absolutely dominant in A0,C,n in (4.12). In addition, for the whole range x ∈ [0,2kR],
only the first few JlN(x), i.e., l = 1,2, are comparable to J0(x).
Take N = 8 as an example in the following. kRWn are written by
kRWn =
2π
λ
· (N−1)∆d
2
·2sin( n
N
π) = (N−1)sin( p
N
π)π = 7sin(
p
8
π)π. (4.13)
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The range of kRWn is [7π sin π8 ,7π]. The value of J0(kRWn) in this range is shown in
the lower left plot in Fig. 4.1. It can be seen that there is no absolutely dominant term of
J0(kRWn), because unlike A0,L,n that has the term N−nN , there is no such term for A0,C,n.
Based on the previous analysis of A0,C,n, A0,C in (4.11) can be approximated by
choosing the A0,C,n that has the most significant J0(kRWn). In this case, J0(kRW3) has
the largest absolute value, which makes the biggest impact in the summation of A0,C.
Thus, A0,C,3 is picked to approximate A0,C,
A0,C ≈ 2π+2πJ20(kRW3)+4πJ0(kRW3)
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)3lJ8l(kRW3)cos(8lθB). (4.14)
In the lower left plot in Fig. 4.1, it shows that when l ≥ 3, JlN(kRW3) becomes negligible.
Thus, only l = 1,2 are taken into consideration,
A0,C ≈ 2π+2πJ20(kRW3)+4πJ0(kRW3)[J16(kRW3)cos(16θB)− J8(kRW3)cos(8θB)].
(4.15)
Then, the approximation of p¯up,C can be obtained by substituting (4.15) into (4.8).
For A0,L,n in (3.56), θB exists for all A0,L,n, n = 1, ...,N− 1. Compared to A0,L,n,
θB has less impact on A0,C,n, because for smaller n where kRWn < 5, JlN(kRWn) is
negligible, which means θB does not impact these A0,C,n; for the rest A0,C,n, θB affects
only the summation terms for l > 1, which are not dominant. This means that A0,C does
not change as much with θB as A0,L. Given the positive correlation between A0 and p¯up,
p¯up,C does not change as much with θB as p¯up,L.
An example p¯up,C and its approximation versus θB are shown in Fig. 4.2 together
with p¯up,L with the same N = 8 and la = 3.5λ . It can be seen that the approximation
is very close to p¯up,C. By comparing p¯up,C and p¯up,L, it can be seen that p¯up,C varies
much less in the range θB ∈ [0, π2 ] than p¯up,L. It can also be seen that in the lower range
of θB, e.g., [0◦,50◦], p¯up,L is smaller than p¯up,C.
For the ULA, the difference between the maximum and minimum value of p¯up,L
is 0.3784. For the UCA, the difference between the maximum and minimum value of
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Fig. 4.2 p¯up,L, p¯up,C and the approximation of p¯up,C versus θB. N = 8, R = 1.75λ .
Pt/σ2n = 40 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1×10−4
p¯up,C is 0.0636. From both theoretical analysis and numerical results, it can be seen
that in the range θB ∈ [0, π2 ], p¯up,C is more constant than p¯up,L.
4.3.2 Impact of Array Configuration
Impact of Number of Elements
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, JlN(x) is negligible for high order lN in the low region of
x. Let x0 denote the upper limit where JlN(x) is negligible in the range x ∈ [0,x0] for
certain lN. x0 depends on the order lN. For example, in the upper plot in Fig. 4.1, J8(x)
is negligible in the range x ∈ [0,5] and J16(x) is negligible in the range x ∈ [0,12]. As
the order lN increases, x0 increases.
As shown in Proposition 4.3.1, for fixed R, the range of x = KRWn is fixed, i.e.,
(0,2kR]. As N increases, x0 also increases. Once x0 becomes larger than 2kR, all JlN(x)
for l ≥ 1 are negligible in the range (0,2kR]. Thus, for sufficiently large N, A0,C in (4.9)
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Fig. 4.3 Upper plot: p¯up,C and the approximation versus N. R = 1.75λ , θB = 0◦.
Lower plot: p¯up,C and the approximation versus R. N = 8, θB = 0◦. Pt/σ2n = 40 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1×10−4
can be approximated by
A0,C ≈ 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J20(kRWn). (4.16)
For fixed R, the asymptotic behavior of A0,C with N can be analyzed through (4.16).
As N increases, Wn = 2sin( nNπ) takes more samples of sinx in the range of x ∈ (0,π],
thus J20(kRWn) takes more samples of J
2
0(x) in the range x ∈ (0,2kR]. Because J20(x) is
non-negative, the more samples are taken, the larger the summation of A0,C is. However,
when N is not very large, (4.16) is not valid and there does not exist a simple monotonic
relationship between A0,C and N.
Due to the positive correlation between A0,C and p¯up,C, p¯up,C has the same behavior
with repect to N. The upper plot in Fig. 4.3 shows the examples of p¯up,C versus N,
where R is fixed to 1.75λ .
In the lower region of N, besides J0(kRWn), other orders of JlN(kRWn) still contribute
to the summation of A0,C in (4.9), which leading to the fluctuating behavior. After
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N ≥ 19, in the range of (0,2kR], the summation of other orders of JlN(kRWn) becomes
less significant and the approximation in (4.16) is very close to the true value. After
N > 25, the asymptotic behavior of p¯up,C is almost linearly increasing with N.
Compared with p¯up,L, p¯up,C in general increases with N and there is no upper limit
in theory, whereas p¯up,L in general decreases with N and approaches to certain values
depending on θB.
Impact of Array Dimension
The impact of R can be analyzed from (4.11) and (4.12) without any approximation.
For n = 1, ...,N−1 and l ≥ 0, the envelopes of JlN(kRWn) decreases and approaches
zero with different speed as R increases. Thus, the summation of A0,C also in general
decreases and approaches certain value as R increases. But due to the difference in the
converging speed of JlN(kRWn), there will be some fluctuations.
From (4.12), it can be seen that, if R is sufficiently large, all JlN(kRWn) approach
zero. As a result, the value of A0,C approaches the value 2π , which gives the limit of
p¯up,C by 1− exp(−λec0π). However, this is only a theoretical limit. Because, in fact,
when R approaches infinity, the expression of GC(θ ,θB) in (4.1) no longer holds true
for the far-field condition in Section 2.3.2.
In the lower plot in Fig. 4.3, p¯up,C versus R is shown for fixed N = 8. It can be
seen that the true value fluctuates as R increases, because the curve is a superposition
of JlN(kRWn) with different orders lN. In general, p¯up,C decreases and approaches the
value of 1− exp(−λec0π), which is 0.5025 in this case. However, in the low region of
R, e.g., R < 2λ , the decreasing behavior is not very obvious.
The approximation in (4.15) is also plotted as a comparison in the lower plot in
Fig. 4.3. It can be seen that in general, the approximation is inaccurate. This is because
the approximation in (4.15) is obtained for N = 8 and R = 1.75λ , which works the best
only for that particular array configuration. This can be verified by the proximity of the
true value and the approximation at R = 1.75λ in the lower plot in Fig. 4.3.
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4.3.3 Impact of Array Parameters on Array Pattern
The same as the ULA, the behavior of A0,C with respect to N, R and θB can be explained
from the spatial aspect by looking into the array pattern of GC(θ ,θB), which determines
the shape of Θ in (3.20). Similar to the ULA, the mainbeam of the UCA is investigated
first.
The mainbeam for the UCA can also be characterized by Gmax and ∆θHP,C. Gmax in
(2.22) is regardless of the array geometry. For the UCA, ∆θHP,C is directly given here.
Proposition 4.3.2
∆θHP,C = 4arcsin
1.1264
2kR
= 4arcsin
1.1264
kla
. (4.17)
The proof of Proposition 4.3.2 is in Appendix A.6. ∆θHP,C is only determined by R (i.e.,
la). Since arcsin(·) is monotonically increasing, ∆θHP,C is reversely proportional to R.
Both ∆θHP,L in (3.64) and ∆θHP,C in (4.17) are reversely proportional to the array
dimension la, since (3.64) can be rewritten with respect to la using (4.2).
∆θHP,L = 2
[
θB− arcsin
(
sinθB− N−1N
2.782
kla
)]
. (4.18)
Proposition 4.3.3 When θB = 0, ∆θHP,L and ∆θHP,C is approximately the same given
the same la.
Lemma 4.3.4 For 0 < x≪ 1, 2arcsin( x2)≈ arcsin(x)
The following proof of Proposition 4.3.3 requires Lemma 4.3.4, the proof of which is
given in Appendix A.7.
Proof When θB = 0, ∆θHP,L in (4.18) is given by
∆θHP,L = 2arcsin
(N−1
N
2.782
kla
)
. (4.19)
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Fig. 4.4 Array patterns of UCA for different N and θB, R = 0.6533λ
According to (4.19), the following approximation holds true,
N−1
N
2.782
kla
≈ 2.782
kla
= 2
1.391
kla
≈ 21.1264
kla
. (4.20)
Notice that the right side in (4.20) is twice the input of arcsin(·) in (4.17). Usually,
both N−1N
2.782
kla
and 1.1264kla are far less than 1. For example, when N = 8, ∆d = 0.5λ
and R = (N−1)∆d2 ,
N−1
N
2.782
kla
= 0.1107 and 1.1264kla = 0.0512. According to (4.17), (4.19),
(4.20) and Lemma 4.3.4, ∆θHP,L ≈ ∆θHP,C given the same la for the ULA and the UCA.
Thus, the proof is completed.
Two groups of array patterns for the UCA with different N and θB are shown in
Fig. 4.4. The radius R is fixed to 0.6533λ , which gives the same ∆θHP,C for all patterns.
The first group is for fixed N = 8 and different θB. Discrete values of θB are chosen in
the range (0, πN ), as mentioned in Proposition 4.2.1. The second group is for fixed θB
and different N.
By observing the first group of patterns, it can be seen that the mainbeam for
different patterns is of the same length due to the same N, and the mainbeam widths are
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of the same due to fixed R. Thus, it can be deduced that the area of the mainbeam stays
more or less the same. It can also be observed that the sidelobe level (SSL) does not
change much. Thus, the total area A0,C is rather constant over the range of θB.
By observing the second group of the array patterns, it can be seen that while the
mainbeam width stays the same due to fixed R, the mainbeam length increases with
N. Thus, the area of the mainbeam increases along with N. In the same time, the SSL
changes dramatically as N changes. For N = 8, the sidelobes are comparable to the
mainbeam, which leads to a complex relationship between the total area A0,C and N.
In Fig. 4.5, the patterns of the ULA and the UCA with the same (N, la) are shown.
It can be seen that when θB = 0◦, the mainbeams of the ULA and the UCA are
approximately the same. The SSL for the ULA is very low compared to the mainbeam,
leading to the fact that the pattern area of the ULA is mainly contributed by the
mainbeam; for the UCA, there are larger sidelobes, resulting in a bigger pattern area
than the ULA.
When θB = 60◦, ∆θHP,L is larger than when θB = 0◦, according to Fig. 3.9 and
Fig. 4.5, which results in a larger A0,L. On the contrary, A0,C stays more or less constant
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in θB ∈ [0,90◦]. Thus, as θB increases, A0,L grows bigger than A0,C. The above analysis
explains the comparison of p¯up,L and p¯up,C in Fig. 4.2.
For the UCA, when R increases and (N,θB) are fixed, the mainbeam becomes
narrower and smaller. However, the SSL changes in a complex way, which makes it
hard to get useful conclusions from the patterns. Thus, the patterns are not shown here.
4.4 Numerical Results for Generalized Rician Channel
Model
4.4.1 SSOP and Its Upper Bound for UCA
In Section 4.2.2, p¯C and p¯up,C have been derived for the generalized Rician channel. In
Section 4.3, the special case when K → ∞ and β = 2 is analyzed, where p¯C = p¯up,C.
With the aid of the same method used for the ULA, in this section, the behaviors of p¯C
and p¯up,C with respect to N, R and θB are analyzed for the generalized Rician channel.
In addition, the tightness of p¯up,C is studied via ηC according to the general definition
in (3.67).
In fact, the relationship between p¯up,C and A0,C is exactly the same as that for the
ULA, because the general expression of p¯up in (3.38) applies to any array type. Thus,
the properties of p¯up,C with respect to N, R and θB is similar to those of A0,C. In the
same way, it is natural to conjecture that the properties of p¯C with respect to N, R and
θB are also similar to A0,C, but with some deviation, depending on the particular channel
parameter and array parameter.
To avoid repetition, the detailed analysis is referred to in Section 3.5.1. Here, some
examples of p¯C and p¯up,C are used to verify the previous conclusions. In Fig. 4.6, p¯C
and p¯up,C versus R for a typical value β = 3 are shown, where N = 8 and θB = 0◦.
It can be seen that for the Rayleigh channel (i.e., K = 0), both curves for p¯C and
p¯up,C are flat and are identical to those of the ULA in Fig. 3.11, because they do not rely
on G(θ ,θB), according to (3.34) and (3.49).
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Fig. 4.6 p¯C and p¯up,C versus R for different K. β = 3, N = 8, θB = 0◦. Pt/σ2n = 40 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1×10−4
Comparing the curves for K →∞ and β = 3 in Fig. 4.6 with the lower plot in Fig. 4.3
when β = 2, it can be seen that the two curves have very similar fluctuating behavior
with respect to R. Furthermore, comparing the curves with different K (except for
K = 0) in Fig. 4.6, it can be seen that all curves have very similar behavior with respect
to R, which verifies that the properties of p¯C and p¯up,C with respect to N, R and θB is
similar to those of A0,C. The examples of p¯C and p¯up,C versus θB and N are in Fig. B.1
and B.2 in Appendix B.1. Similar conclusions can be concluded from those two figures.
The same as the ULA, when K = 10, both curves of p¯C and p¯up,C are close to those
when K → ∞; when K = 1, both curves of p¯C and p¯up,C are close to those when K = 0,
which can be observed in Fig. 4.6. However, for different (K,β ) and (N,R,θB), the
tightness of upper bound ηC is different.
In summary, it can be seen from the numerical results that the properties of p¯C and
p¯up,c with respect to N, R and θB are in general consistent with those of A0,C.
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4.4.2 Tightness of Upper Bound for UCA
In Section 3.5.2, it has been concluded that ηC decreases with K when β = 2; and ηC
increases with K when β > 2. For fixed β and (N,R,θB), ηC is bounded by two extreme
cases, i.e, K = 0 and K → ∞. Thus, in the following, the examples of ηC for K = 0 and
K → ∞ are given.
In Fig. 4.7, ηC versus R is shown for all β . It can be seen that when β = 2, ηC = 1,
because this is the simple case, in which p¯C = p¯up,C. When β > 2, ηC for different β is
located in a cluster for given R and has no monotonic relationship with β , which is the
same as ηL.
In Fig. 4.7, as R changes, there are some fluctuations for ηC. However, there is
no obvious increasing or decreasing in the whole range of R. More results of ηC for
different θB and N are in Fig. B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B.2.
Take β = 3 as an example to compare ηC with ηL, and the results are shown in
Fig. 4.8. Since η is always a constant when K = 0, only the results η for K → ∞
are plotted. In the upper plot in Fig. 4.8, η versus θB is shown. While ηL in general
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Fig. 4.8 Upper plot: ηC versus θB for N = 8 and R = 1.75λ ; lower plot: ηC versus N
for R = 1.75λ and θB = 0◦. K → ∞ and β = 3
decreases with θB ∈ [0, π2 ], ηC is more constant and smaller than ηL. In the lower plot
in Fig. 4.8, η versus N is shown. Both ηL and ηC increases with N. However, ηC is
smaller than ηL for any N, except for N = 2. Furthermore, ηC converges to certain
value, while ηL keeps increasing.
Based on the previous analysis, it can be concluded that not only is ηC smaller than
ηL in general, but it is also more constant for changing N, R and θB, which indicates that
the upper bound is tighter for the UCA. It is worth noticing that the range of ηC is mostly
within [1,1.4], which is very tight. Thus, p¯up,C can provide a good approximation for
p¯C.
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4.5 Impact of Mutual Coupling
4.5.1 Array Factor and Mutual Coupling
This section primarily focuses on the impact of the mutual coupling on the maximum
gain Gmax in (2.22), because both PrB and CB depend on h˜B in (3.17), which is calculated
based on Gmax. In addition, the distortion to the array pattern is numerically measured.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, G(θ ,θB) is calculated based on the assumption that
each element in the array is omni-directional, and Gmax =
√
N, which is independent
from θB. However, due to the mutual coupling, the pattern of each element in the array
is not omni-directional. Thus, the maximum gain in practice becomes angle dependent.
Let Gmax,mc denote the distorted maximum gain.
Gmax,mc = Gmax f (θB) =
√
N f (θB), (4.21)
where f (θB) is the attenuation function for Gmax, 0 < f (θB)≤ 1. The subscript mc is
short for ‘mutual coupling’.
According to (3.16), the message transmission condition (i.e., CB ≥ RB) used for
the secrecy outage formulation in Section 3.3.1 can be converted into
PrB =
Pt
dβB
|h˜B|2 ≥ σ2n (2RB −1). (4.22)
Using Gmax,mc in (3.26), |h˜B|2 that is subjected to the mutual coupling can be given by
|h˜B|2 =
KG2max,mc
K+1
+
1
K+1
g2Re+
1
K+1
g2Im+
2
√
KGmax,mc
K+1
gRe. (4.23)
Because Gmax,mc changes with θB, |h˜B|2 also changes with θB. To guarantee (4.22),
Pt need to be adjusted according to dB for certain channel parameters and RB, which
causes complexity in adjusting Pt based on Gmax,mc, i.e., f (θB). If Pt is not adjustable,
e.g., the current AP in Wi-Fi networks, (4.22) may not be guaranteed.
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Pearson’s correlation coefficient, denoted by ρ , is used to measure the correlation
between two random variables X and Y .
ρ =
cov(X ,Y )
std(X) · std(Y ) , (4.24)
where cov(·, ·) stands for the covariance and std(·) the standard deviation. ρ takes value
from -1 to 1, where 1 means total positive correlation, 0 means no dependence at all, and
-1 means total negative correlation. The array patterns obtained from experiments and
simulations can be regarded as samples of variables. Thus, the correlation coefficient
ρ between different patterns can be calculated to indicate how close they are. The
larger ρ , the more alike two patterns are. Notice that in the expression of ρ in (4.24),
cov(X ,Y ) is normalized against their the average values of X and Y . Thus, the value of
ρ between two patterns only indicates the closeness of shapes, or the likeness, between
two patterns, but does not reflect the maximum gain attenuation.
The mutual coupling effect was observed when building a practical transmit beam-
former on WARP [120]. First, the WARP experiment set-up is introduced before
demonstrating the results. Then the experiment results are shown and compared with
NEC results. The mutual coupling is difficult to analytically calculate because of
the complex electromagnetic boundaries in the near field. Therefore, both WARP
experiments and NEC simulations are used to study the impact of the mutual coupling.
4.5.2 WARP Experiments
In this section, WARPLab is used to build the transmit beamformer with antenna arrays.
An introduction to the WARP hardware and how to build a MISO communications
system on WARPLab is in Section 2.5. This section explains how to build a practical
beamformer with calibratied phase and how to measure the beam pattern in an anechoic
chamber, in order to observe the mutual coupling effect.
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Beamformer Set-Up
WARP node can hold up to four RF interfaces, each of which can be regarded as a
transceiver in the WARPLab design. In this section, one/two nodes with multiple
antennas, i.e., RF interfaces, are used to act as the AP, and another node with a single RF
interface as a general user, in order to measure the pattern. To simulate transmissions in
Wi-Fi network, such as 802.11n, the carrier frequency is set to f0 = 2.484 GHz, which
is the center frequency of Wi-Fi channel 14. This is to avoid co-channel interferences
from other wireless devices.
In WARPLab, data packets are generated and processed in MATLAB. So the data
source and sink are both in MATLAB. The transmit and receive RF interfaces are also
controlled by MATLAB. A system diagram that describes the transmission from the
AP to the user is shown in Fig. 4.9. This diagram is based on the one in Fig. 2.13, but
with the focus on the RF end, in order to introduce the phase calibration later. The
packet that contains the preamble and the payload is first generated and configured in
MATLAB; then it is passed into the buffer on WARP board and later sent over the air
via the transmit RF interfaces. The receive RF interface captures and stores the packet
in the buffer again before sending it back to MATLAB for post-processing. More details
of the system diagram and the structure of the RF interface are shown in Fig. 2.10, 2.12
and 2.13.
The transmit beamforming is explained combined with the system model in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. As shown in Fig. 4.9, x is an arbitrary symbol in the packet and the same
packet is transmitted over all channels with different weights. In MATLAB, the packet
is pre-coded by w. Each weighted symbol, i.e., w∗i x, i = 1, ...,N, is delivered to the
corresponding buffer and waits to be transmitted. In the RF interface, an appropriate
level of transmit power Pt is chosen. The discrete symbols are converted into analog
signals, up-converted and transmitted via the antenna. On the receiver side, the signal
is captured, down-converted and converted into discrete signal. Note that all arrows
are in dashed lines, because it only represents the data flow and some not-so-relevant
blocks/processing are omitted. The block in the dashed diagram includes the analog
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Fig. 4.10 Data packet structure
processing and is considered as a discrete channel to the transmitter and the receiver.
The channel input is ui =
√
Ptw∗i x, i = 1, ...,N and the channel output is r.
In this thesis, the beamformer is built in the baseband. Thus, pure sinusoidal signals
of an intermediate frequency 5 MHz are used as payload. Each packet has a preamble
that consists of a long-training symbol (LTS), a guard interval and a pilot. The LTS is
known by both transmitter and receiver and is used for sample-level synchronization by
correlation at the receiver. The payloads are pre-coded by w. The transmitted signals
are superimposed in the air and form beam patterns. The figure of the data structure is
shown in Fig. 4.10.
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At the receiver side, the packets via different channels are superimposed. The
received signal is down-converted and sampled. The received packet that contains
received symbol r is stored in the buffer. The RSSI is also recorded. RSSI can be
converted into dBm values. However, in our case, the absolute power level is not of
interest. The transmit power is fixed at an appropriate level, so that the patterns can be
measured by appropriately normalized values at different θ , i.e., r(θ). In addition, the
amplifiers at the receiver side is set to minimum levels, to avoid the thermal noise being
amplified.
There are two main challenges in building the transmit beamformer that forms actual
patterns over the air, i.e., carrier frequency offset (CFO) and random initial phase in
each radio interface. The details of the solution to the CFO problem and the calibration
process for the random initial phase are in Appendix C. .
Beamformer Measurements
The following explains how to measure the pattern G(θ ,θdoe) in an anechoic chamber,
where the channel between the transmit and receive antennas is similar to a free-space
path loss channel. As shown in Fig. 4.11, the transmit antenna array is composed of
commercial 2.4 GHz dipole antennas and is put on a rotating platform; the receive
antenna is put on a fixed platform at the other end of the chamber. The two WARP
nodes are set up as described in Section 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 (notice that the receive WARP
node is hidden from this view).
At the transmitter side, the sinusoid signal that is pre-coded by w in (3.2) is sent.
For both the ULA and the UCA, it is sufficient to measure the DoE angle θdoe ∈ [0, π2 ].
For all measurements, the total transmit power is set to a fixed value that is large enough
so that the background noise can be ignored. For example, Pt = 0 dBm and a free-space
path loss is 54.07 dB for 5 m, which gives a receive SNR roughly at 45.93 dB if the
background noise power is assumed to be −100 dBm.
Since the distance between the array and the receive antenna is fixed, the array factor
G(θ ,θdoe) can be directly measured by Pr = r2, according to (3.14). For each θdoe,
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Fig. 4.11 Set-up in the anechoic chamber
the received signal Pr is measured at a discrete step in the range of θ ∈ [−π2 , π2 ]. Then
G(θ ,θdoe) can be calculated as the average value of all data samples that are received
at angle θ .
4.5.3 Experiment Results
As stated in Section 2.3.2, the mutual coupling is the coupling effect between two
neighbor antenna elements. The first experiment measures how the pattern of dipole
(i.e., omnidirectional pattern) is changed when it is in a 4-element ULA with ∆d = 0.5λ .
This ULA is placed along y-axis as shown in Fig. 2.5 and the pattern of the first element
is measured. For this purpose, only the first element is activated, while keeping the other
elements inactive. The measurement is taken every 5◦ in the range of θ ∈ [−90◦,90◦].
The pattern of the first element is plotted in Fig. 4.12. For ease of comparison, the
pattern is normalized with regard to its own maximum gain, i.e., 1.
It can be seen that the patterns shown in Fig. 4.12 is not circular, because the radiation
power from the first element induces electromagnetic fields in the nearby antennas,
which interfere with its own radiation pattern. To be more specific, the maximum value
is a bit off θ = 0◦; at the angle θ = ±90◦, the array gain is approximately half of
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Fig. 4.12 1st WARP experiment: Pattern of the 1st element in ULA
the maximum gain. In addition, the imperfection in WARP experiments causes some
fluctuations to the pattern, which makes it less smooth.
The second experiment measures the pattern of the whole ULA. For comparison, 7
independent measurements are carried out for θB ∈ [0◦,90◦] in steps of 15◦. For each
measurement, the same method is used to measure G(θ ,θB) as the first experiment. All
7 patterns are normalized with respect to the maximum value of all patterns and are
plotted in Fig. 4.13.
As can be seen in Fig. 4.13, the maximum gain stays more or less the same when
θB < 30◦, however it drops as θB approaches 90◦, which is not observed from the
theoretical patterns in Fig. 3.8 when N is fixed. This is because the overall pattern is
the superposition of individual patterns of every active element, which are distorted as
shown in Fig. 4.12, where the pattern has larger gain near θB = 0◦ and smaller gain near
θB = 90◦. Furthermore, the pointing becomes worse as θB increases, because when
θB > 30◦, G(θB,θB) is no longer the maximum value.
To compare with the ULA, the pattern of the UCA with N = 8 and ∆d = 0.5λ
is measured. The antenna elements are placed as shown in Fig. 2.6. Similar to the
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Fig. 4.13 2nd WARP experiment: GL(θ ,θB)
second experiment, several values θB ∈ {0◦,5◦,10◦,15◦,20◦} are chosen. All patterns
are normalized and plotted in Fig. 4.14.
As can be seen in Fig. 4.14, the maximum gain stays nearly the same for all θB,
which is similar to the patterns shown in Fig. 4.4 for fixed N. The reason is that although
each element’s pattern is distorted, the distortion is symmetric. Thus, the overall array
pattern is less affected, which makes the UCA less sensitive to the mutual coupling.
4.5.4 NEC Simulations
It suffices to observe the mutual coupling effect from the measurements in WARP exper-
iment. However, it is not suitable for numerical analysis of the mutual coupling, because
the observed phenomenon in WARP experiment is a result of many combined factors,
such as the mutual coupling, noise and other imperfections in the real experiments. In
addition, it takes considerable time to complete the measurements for different array
configuration (N, l).
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Fig. 4.14 3rd WARP experiment: GC(θ ,θB)
Unlike WARP experiments, G(θ ,θB) is directly calculated based on the input
model instead of measuring the received signal r. To verify the observation of the
mutual coupling effect on the ULA and the UCA in the WARP experiments, the NEC
simulations are run corresponding to the three WARP experiments in Section 4.5.3.
The input file of the specifications in the NEC simulation has been explained in
Section 2.5.3. For a fair comparison to the WARP experiments in Anechoic chamber, the
free-space environment without a ground is chosen. For easy comparison, the patterns
are uniformly normalized with regard to their maximum value. The simulation results
are shown in Fig. 4.15-4.17.
Comparing Fig. 4.15 with Fig. 4.12, it can be seen that both patterns are distorted
due to mutual coupling effect. More importantly, the patterns resemble each other.
However, it is also obvious that there is more variation in the WAPR pattern. This is
because NEC simulation only includes the mutual coupling and excludes other realistic
factors, such as technical malfunctions on fabrication, inaccurate alignment of array
geometry and so on.
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Fig. 4.15 1st NEC simulation: Pattern of the 1st element in ULA
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Fig. 4.16 2nd NEC simulation: GL(θ ,θB)
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Fig. 4.17 3rd NEC simulation: GC(θ ,θB)
Comparing Fig. 4.16 with Fig. 4.13, the same phenomenon of the maximum gain
attenuation for the ULA can be found. It is worth noticing that for the NEC and WARP
patterns, the amount of maximum gain attenuation is different. This is mainly caused by
the power calibration for each RF in the WARP experiments. Comparing Fig. 4.17 with
Fig. 4.14, it can be seen that for the UCA, there is almost no maximum gain attenuation.
4.5.5 Result Analysis for SSOP
The array patterns measured from the WARP experiments and NEC simulations for
both ULA and UCA are shown in Section 4.5.3 and 4.5.4. This section examines these
results more closely and analyzes them in terms of the security performance.
Through the comparison of the NEC and WAPR results, it can be seen they are very
similar. In Fig. 4.18, the correlation coefficients between the WARP and NEC results
for the ULA and the UCA are shown. The angle range for the ULA is θB ∈ [0◦,90◦],
and for the UCA, it is θB ∈ [0◦,20◦]. It can be seen that for both ULA and UCA, the
NEC and WAPR patterns are highly correlated with ρ > 0.85. The value of ρ ranges
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Fig. 4.18 ρ between different patterns for ULA (upper plot) and UCA (lower plot)
from -1 to 1. Unfortunately there is no rigorous threshold value for ρ that yields high
correlation. Fig. 4.19 shows the WARP and NEC patterns when ρ = 0.8567 as marked
in Fig. 4.18. It can be seen that the main beams of the two patterns are almost identical.
The shapes of sidelobes of the two patterns are very alike. In this case, ρ = 0.85 is
considered as a high correlation.
As stated in Section 4.5.4, due to the absence of many practical factors, NEC
simulations reflects purely the mutual coupling effect. Given the high correlation
between the WARP and NEC results, the NEC results can be used to study the mutual
coupling effect. Therefore, from now on, the mutual coupling effect is studied via NEC
simulations.
In Fig. 4.18, the correlation coefficients between the NEC results and the theoretical
patterns for both ULA and UCA are shown as well. For the ULA, most values of ρ
are larger than 0.94, except for ρ ≈ 0.85 at θB = 45◦. For the UCA, all values of ρ are
larger than 0.9.
The high correlation between the NEC and the theoretical patterns suggests that the
mutual coupling does not alter the shape of the pattern very much, although Gmax,L is
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Fig. 4.19 WARP and NEC patterns for the same UCA, θB = 5◦
affected. This means that for the UCA, the conclusions reached about the impact of
(N,R,θB) on A0 are still valid. For the ULA, the power loss of Pr(zB) in (4.22) can be
compensated by increasing Pt , which, however, changes p¯.
In Section 4.5.3 and 4.5.4, the patterns of ULA with N = 4 and UCA with N = 8
have been shown. To fairly compare the ULA and the UCA, the ULA and the UCA are
set with the same N = 8 and ∆d = 0.5λ . The NEC results are generated in the same
way as in Section 4.5.4. For the ULA, choose θB ∈ [0◦,90◦] in a step of 15◦; and for
UCA, choose θB ∈ [0◦,20◦] in a step of 5◦. Then, the results of the UCA are expanded
into the range θB ∈ [0◦,90◦] according to Proposition 4.2.1.
From the simulated patterns, the maximum gain can be recorded for each pattern,
from which f (θB) can be calculated. The results of f (θB) are shown in the upper plot
in Fig. 4.20. It can be seen that fL(θB) decreases with θB and the minimum value of
fL(θB) is about 0.7; while fC(θB) is more or less flat. It is worth noticing that for the
ULA, the attenuation is not very big when θB < 30◦.
Based on the results, f (θB) can be numerically fitted via MATLAB toolbox. For
example, two fitting functions are given below and the results are shown in the upper
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Fig. 4.20 Upper figure: mathematical fitting for f (θB); Lower figure: p¯ versus θB with
or without mutual coupling effect
figure in Fig. 4.20.
fL(x) =−0.8639x6+3.783x5−6.166x4+4.855x3−2.054x2+0.199x+1, (4.25)
fC(x) =−0.2517x6+1.186x5−2.058x4+1.587x3−0.5048x2+0.0386x+0.9999.
(4.26)
To illustrate the impact of the mutual coupling on p¯, a special case when K =∞ and
β = 2 is used. Then (4.22) is reduced to
PrB =
Pt
d2B
N f 2(θB)≥ σ2n (2RB −1). (4.27)
When Pt is adjustable, in order to compensate the attenuation f (θB), Pt is increased by
1
f 2(θB)
. p¯mc is used to denote the averaged SSOP subject to the mutual coupling.
In the lower plot in Fig. 4.20, p¯ and p¯mc versus θB are plotted for both ULA and
UCA. The curves for p¯ are calculated based on (3.32); while the curves for p¯mc are
based on the NEC simulation results. The results show that for the UCA, p¯mc,C is
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approximately equal to p¯C, which indicates that the UCA is less sensitive to the mutual
coupling. For the ULA, because the attenuation at θB = 0◦ is the least, the power
increase affects the most. Thus, there is bigger increase at lower region of θB.
In summary, the mutual coupling affects the patterns of both ULA and UCA. The
pattern shape of both array are little affected. The maximum gain of the ULA attenuates
more as θB increases; in the low region of θB, the ULA suffers less from the mutual
coupling. Compared to the ULA, the UCA is less insensitive to the mutual coupling for
all θB.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the secure transmission to Bob with ER based beamforming in presence
of PPP distributed is investigated with a UCA, which is compared in parallel with a
ULA in the previous chapter via both analytic expressions and numerical results. The
analysis shows that for a UCA, the variation of the SSOP with the DoE angle (i.e., Bob’s
angle) is much smaller than that for a ULA; but the SSOP asymptotically increases
with the number of elements for a UCA rather than converging to certain values; as the
radius increases, the SSOP gradually decreases with some fluctuations and approaches
a fixed value. The behaviors of the SSOP with respect to the array parameters can also
be verified by the array pattern.
In complement to the theoretical analysis, the mutual coupling is investigated with
the focus on the impact on the array pattern. The experiments on WARP and the
NEC simulations show that while the shape of the patterns is not severely affected, the
maximum gain attenuation for the ULA is severe. This means that the properties of
the SSOP are still valid to a large extent; however, the mutual coupling degrades the
security performance for the ULA, especially in the large region of Bob’s angle.
Compared to the ULA, the SSOP of a UCA is more constant in the whole range
of Bob’s angle, although the SSOP of a ULA is smaller at the bore-sight direction.
For the UCA, the tightness of the upper bound does not change much even for a large
number of elements. From the practical point of view, the UCA is less sensitive to
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the mutual coupling over Bob’s angle range, and is more flexible on the choices of
array configurations. Thus, the UCA is a better choice in creating and optimizing
the the SSOP. In the following chapter, the UCA is chosen as an example to develop
optimization algorithms.
Chapter 5
Array Configuration Optimization of
Uniform Circular Arrays
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the security performance of the ER-based beamforming with the ad-
justable UCA is enhanced. To this end, the system performance metric, i.e., the SSOP,
is to be minimized. Two numerical optimization algorithms are developed for different
transmit power constraints, and are examined against the mutual coupling effect in
practice.
The conclusions from Chapter 3 and 4, where the security performance of the ER-
based beamforming with the ULA and the UCA are studied and compared with respect
to the channel parameters and the array parameters, provide some insights on the
possibility to optimize the array parameters to achieve higher level of security. The
goal of this chapter is to enhance the security by designing the optimization algorithms
based on the previous observations and conclusions.
To achieve this goal, the array parameters need to be jointly analyzed via numerical
methods, which provides more accurate results than the pure theoretical analysis. First,
the key parameters that affect the security performance are identified, and are used to
formulate the optimization problem. Then, based on the analysis on the key parameters,
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two numerical algorithms are developed as solutions to the optimization problem
for both adjustable transmit power and fixed transmit power. The algorithms can be
generalized for any channel parameter. In addition, the mutual coupling is investigated
for a wider range of parameters via NEC simulations than in Chapter 4, and its impact
on the optimization algorithms is revealed.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the system model for the UCA
as well as the basic concepts that are used in this chapter are introduced. In Section 5.3,
the optimization problem is formulated. In Section 5.4, the key parameters in the
optimization problem are jointly analyzed. In Section 5.5, two numerical optimization
algorithms are developed and the error analysis for the configurable beamforming
technique is given. In Section 5.6, more detailed analysis of the mutual coupling on
the UCA is given and its impact on the optimization algorithms is investigated. In
Section 5.7, the conclusions of this chapter are given.
5.2 System Model
5.2.1 System Model with Adjustable UCA
Consider a dense wireless communications system with a large number of users that are
distributed by a homogeneous PPP with density λe. The AP wishes to transmit to Bob
in presence of Eves. The system model is similar to Section 3.2.1 and 4.2.1, except that
the AP is equipped with an adjustable UCA. Assume that Bob’s CSI, or coordinates, is
available at the AP, while the knowledge of Eves’ CSI or coordinates are not known. In
addition, assume that the channel does not vary between the current transmission and
the next transmission. Thus, the array configuration can be adjusted according to Bob’s
CSI or coordinates for the next transmission.
An example of the adjustable UCA is shown in Fig. 5.1. Unlike in Chapter 3 and 4,
the total number of elements and the number of active elements are distinguished in this
chapter. The active elements are the elements that are used during transmission, while
others remain silent or unused. To avoid ambiguity, Nmax is used for the total number of
5.2 System Model 119
1
2
3
y
x
R
max
N
1
max
N
1i
i
1i
max,t
P
Fig. 5.1 UCA with Nmax, R and Pt,max
elements, while N denotes the number of active elements. In addition, Pt,max is used
to denote the maximum available transmit power, while Pt refers to the actual transmit
power, which is also adjustable. Therefore, for certain UCA, Nmax and Pt,max are fixed
values, while N and Pt are adjustable and do not exceed Nmax and Pt,max, respectively.
Although there is no limit for R in theory, it is usually not very large in practice.
For example, a 1 m-diameter array is considered very large for an indoor AP. The
commercial circular WLAN phased array terminal FCI-3710 developed by Fidelity
Comtech has 15.24 cm radius. In this chapter, the range is chosen as R ∈ [5 cm,25 cm],
i.e., [0.4λ ,2λ ] for the 2.4 GHz carrier frequency. In addition, without the need to
compare with the ULA, (N,R) is used as the array configuration instead of (N, la).
In this chapter, it is assumed that Nmax is fixed for certain value, e.g., 8 elements,
because it is usually fixed for certain device. For example, the aforementioned FCI-3710
has 8 elements. Another example is that a single WARP node can hold 4 RF interfaces.
On the other hand, although the radius R is difficult to change during transmission, it
can be chosen as certain optimum value against the security performance. Thus, the
array configuration (N,R) as well as the transmit power Pt can be adapted or optimized
according to Bob’s dynamic location.
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The channel gain vector h(z) for the generalized Rician channel in (3.3) is used.
Thus, the received signal, channel capacity and etc. can be calculated according to the
general expressions in Section 3.2.1.
5.2.2 Array Mode
Nmax is usually unadjustable once the array is installed. On the contrary, it is relatively
simple to control N. For example, the antenna elements in the array could be elec-
tronically switched on and off, or it can be done from the baseband by not generating
data packets or being weighted with zero. Thus, the AP can decide N for the next
transmission.
For the UCA with Nmax elements, the range of N is from 1 to Nmax. However, only
the values of N that give a UCA are considered. In other words, a N-element sub-array
is picked. The discussion of the non-uniform circular array is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
For convenience, the term ‘array mode’ is used to refer to the sub-array. Let Mi j
denote a particular array mode. The set {Mi j} refers to all possible array configurations
for certain UCA with Nmax. The first index i is associated with the number of active
elements N. {Mi} is a subset of {Mi j}, which contains all Mi j with the same N, but
different angles. The second index j is associated with the angle of Mi j in {Mi}. Take
the 8-element UCA in Fig. 2.6 as an example, there are 2, 4, 8 elements that can form
the sub-arrays. When N = 4, there are two array modes with 45◦ angle difference; one
has elements (1,3,5,7) and the other has elements (2,4,6,8).
In this chapter, the index i is in descending order of N. i = 1 is assigned to the
Nmax-element UCA, and there is only one array mode in {M1}, i.e., M1. For the same
example in Fig. 2.6, {M2} has 4 elements and {M3} has 2 elements. The index j is in
ascending order of first element in the sub-arrays. For the same example in Fig. 2.6, the
first element in the sub-array for M21 is element 1, and the first element in the sub-array
for M22 is element 2. In Fig. 5.2, {Mi j} for the UCA with Nmax = 8 is shown. There
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Fig. 5.2 {Mi j} for an UCA with Nmax = 8; gray elements are active.
are 7 array modes in total. In particular, {M3} has 2 elements, which is equivalent to a
2-element ULA.
The purpose of distinguishing Mi j ∈ {Mi} is that they have different θdoe given the
same θB and different G(θ ,θdoe) generates different SSOP. For example, when θB = 5◦,
the DoE angle for M21 is θdoe = θB = 5◦; however, for M22, it is θdoe = θB−45◦=−40◦
due to the 45◦ rotation between M21 and M22.
5.2.3 Coverage Zone for Bob
The intuition brought by the adjustable UCA is that N can be adjusted to achieve a
lower SSOP; in the mean time, CB ≥ RB needs to be guaranteed. In (4.22), CB ≥ RB is
converted into
PrB ≥ σ2n (2RB −1). (5.1)
According to (3.14) and (3.26), PrB is given by,
PrB =
Pt
dβB
( KN
K+1
+
1
K+1
g2Re+
1
K+1
g2Im+
2
√
KN
K+1
gRe
)
. (5.2)
PrB depends on N. In other words, N be adjusted based on the current Bob’s CSI (e.g.,
PrB) for the next transmission.
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For certain Pt and N, PrB is a random variable due to random dB and the Rician
fading (i.e., gRe and gIm). If a certain channel realization (i.e., gRe and gIm) is known,
dB can be estimated, which can be used to guide the adjustment of Pt or N for the
next transmission. However, due to the unknown fading realization, it is impossible to
estimate dB by PrB alone.
In order to make progress, the mean value E[Pr(zB)] is used to provide guidance on
the adjustment of Pt or N. Using (5.2), E[Pr(zB)] is obtained by
E[Pr(zB)] =
Pt
dβB
KN+1
K+1
. (5.3)
In this way, the small-scale fading is averaged out. Replacing PrB with E[Pr(zB)] in
(5.1), it can be derived that
Pt
dβB
KN+1
K+1
≥ σ2n (2RB −1). (5.4)
For fixed Pt , N and (K,β ), dB should not exceed certain threshold to satisfy (5.4), which
can be expressed by
dB ≤
[ Pt
σ2n (2RB −1)
KN+1
K+1
] 1
β
. (5.5)
Let dth,N denote the threshold for dB for certain channel condition (i.e., K and β ) and
certain Pt ,
dth,N =
[ Pt
σ2n (2RB −1)
KN+1
K+1
.
] 1
β
. (5.6)
For certain Pt , K and β , upon acquisition of PrB, the AP will calculate dB using
PrB to replace E[Pr(zB)] in (5.3) and assumes that the calculated dB is the true distance.
Then, this value is compared with dth,N for all available N. All the values of N that
satisfy dB ≤ dth,N are eligible for the next transmission, from which the optimum value
of N that gives the minimum SSOP will be chosen. Since the channel realization for the
next transmission is assumed to be unchanged, the estimated dB, even though not the
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true value, suffices to provide guidance for the adjustment of N. For convenience, in
this chapter, Bob’s distance is still used to refer to the assumed Bob’s distance by the
AP, unless otherwise stated.
The coverage zone is defined based on dth,N for different N. Fig. 5.3 shows an
example of dth,N for the UCA with Nmax = 8. dth,N in (5.6) is proportional to N. The
concentric circles shows the coverage distance for different N. For the maximum
available transmit power Pt,max, dth,Nmax is the maximum coverage distance, which is
denoted by dmax,
dmax =
[ Pt,max
σ2n (2RB −1)
KNmax+1
K+1
] 1
β
. (5.7)
The term ’zone’ is used to describe the annular/circular area divided by dth,N with
different N. In Fig. 5.3, there are 3 zones for the UCA with 8 elements and Pt,max. Zone
1 is the area within the dth,2 curve; zone 2 is the annular area between the dth,2 and dth,4
curves; zone 3 is the annular area between the dth,4 and dth,8 curves.
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For Bob being in different zone, an appropriate number of active elements N should
be used. For example, when Bob is in zone 2, N can be either 4 or 8, but not 2. For
the UCA with Nmax elements and Pt,max, Bob’s reliable transmission can be guaranteed
only when dB ≤ dmax.
Since Bob is uniformly distributed in the coverage zone, it is interesting to know
the area of these zones. Let S be the total coverage area and S(k) be the area of zone k,
k = 1,2,3. For example, the zone area in Fig. 5.3 can be calculated by
S(1) = πd2th,2, (5.8)
S(2) = π(d2th,4−d2th,2), (5.9)
S(3) = π(d2max−d2th,4), (5.10)
S =∑
k
S(k) = πd2max. (5.11)
Thus, the probability that Bob is in zone k, denoted by q(k), is
q(k) =
S(k)
S
. (5.12)
5.3 Problem Formulation
The aim of this chapter is to enhance the security level of the transmission from the
AP to Bob with the ER-based beamforming on the adjustable UCA. As the system
performance metric, the SSOP is to be minimized. Given the difference from the system
models in Section 5.2.1 and in Section 4.2.1, the expressions of the SSOP and its upper
bound for the adjustable UCA are slightly different.
In Section 4.2.1, c0 = Ptσ2n (2RB−RS−1)
is regarded as a constant. However, the impact
of Pt is considered in this chapter. For convenience, a new constant that excludes Pt is
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defined. Denoted by c1, it is given by
c1 =
1
σ2n (2RB−RS −1)
. (5.13)
Therefore, p¯C in (4.4) and p¯up,C in (4.5) can be re-written by
p¯C = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
(c1Pt)
2
β
∫ 2π
0
[KG2C(θ ,θB)
K+1
+
x2+ y2
K+1
+
2
√
KGC(θ ,θB)
K+1
x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dxdy, (5.14)
p¯up,C = 1− exp
{
−λeπ(c1Pt)
2
β
[ KA0,C
2π(K+1)
+
1
K+1
] 2
β
}
, (5.15)
where different forms of A0,C are given in (4.6), (4.7), (4.9) and (4.10).
There are four groups of parameters that affect p¯C in (5.14) and p¯up,C in (5.15).
The first group includes some constants, i.e., the system requirements parameters
(RB,Rs), the noise variance σ2n and the density λe. The second group includes the
channel parameters, i.e., K and β . The third group includes Pt and (N,R), which can be
controlled by the AP and forms the basis of the optimization problem. The fourth group
includes Bob’s location, (dB,θB).
As concluded in Section 4.4.2, p¯up,C is tight to p¯C, and can be used to predict the
behaviors of p¯C with respect to the (N,R,θB). Furthermore, according to Proposi-
tion 3.3.7, for the deterministic channel when β = 2, p¯up,C = p¯C. p¯up,C is also positively
correlated to A0,C which is tractable to analytically analyze. Therefore, in this chapter,
the optimization of p¯C starts from the deterministic channel when β = 2. Then, the
developed optimization algorithms are extended to the generalized Rician channel.
In Section 4.3, (N,R) in the third group of parameters together with θB have been
separately studied. For the purpose of designing optimization algorithms, they will be
jointly investigated for the adjustable UCA with Pt and Mi j.
In this chapter, two scenarios are considered together. For Bob being at a particular
location, the most appropriate Mi j and Pt can be chosen according to (dB,θB). For
Bob being randomly located in the coverage area, while Nmax is assumed to be fixed
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as mentioned in Section 5.2.1, R can be designed for all possible Bob’s locations to
achiever higher security level. In other words, the average security performance over all
possible Bob’s locations should to be evaluated.
Based on the previous analysis, the optimization of p¯C can be stated as follows. In
order to enhance the security level of the system, p¯C is to be minimized by adjusting
Pt and Mi j (i.e., N) and designing R according to Bob’s dynamic location (dB,θB) for
given (K,β ) and constants λe and c1. In addition, to guarantee a reliable transmission
to Bob, as mentioned in Section 5.2.3, the constraint CB ≥ RB needs to satisfied by
adjusting Pt and N according to dB. The optimization problem can be formulated by
min p¯C(Pt ,N,R,dB,θB) ∀(dB,θB), (5.16)
s.t. CB ≥ RB. (5.17)
As previously discussed, first, the optimization problem will be analyzed for K →∞
and β = 2, in which case p¯C = p¯up,C, and is given by
p¯C = 1− exp
(
− λec1PtA0,C
2
)
. (5.18)
According to (5.1) and (5.2), the constraint in (5.17) can be written as
PtN ≥ σ2n (2RB −1)dβB . (5.19)
In practice, it is not always applicable or desirable to implement the transmit power
control (TPC) on the downlink transmission. For example, typical Wi-Fi systems do
not implement TPC. Most WLAN APs, such as Cisco WLAN controller, only provide
a few power levels, and the dynamic TPC is not supported during transmission. Thus,
all transmissions are sent at the same power, e.g., 35 dBm [94]. This can be partly
attributed to the fact that energy consumption is not a critical issue because the AP is
normally connected to the power line and the implementation of TPC is not at no cost.
Furthermore, there is also doubt about the effectiveness of a fine-grained TPC in the
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indoor environment [126]. On the other hand, there is no doubt about the usefulness of
TPC in wireless communications. Therefore, in this chapter, the two transmit power
constraints, i.e., with/without adjusting Pt are studied separately.
In Chapter 4, approximations of p¯up,C have been used to analyze the behavior of
A0,C and p¯C. However, for the purpose of optimizing p¯C, the numerical results, which
are more accurate, will be mainly relied on in this chapter. In the next section, the third
and fourth groups of parameters, i.e., (Pt ,N,R) and (dB,θB), will be jointly studied.
5.4 Problem Analysis
5.4.1 Array Dimension and Averaged SSOP over Bob’s Locations
In Section 4.3.2, the impact of R has been analyzed. In the low region of R, e.g.,
[0.4λ ,2λ ], p¯C fluctuates without obvious decreasing as R changes. Thus, it is likely
that the minimum value of p¯C is not given by the largest or smallest value of R.
Examples of p¯C versus R for different θB and N are shown in Fig. 5.4. For the
purpose of MATLAB simulation, R takes value every 1 cm in [0.4λ ,2λ ]. In the upper
plot, some typical values of θB, i.e., θB = 0◦, 10◦, 20◦, are taken for the UCA with
Nmax = 8. In the lower plot, all possible N are taken for UCA with Nmax = 8, i.e.,
N = 2,4,8.
The fluctuating behavior of p¯C with respect to R can be observed for different θB
and N. For different θB and N, the local minimum of p¯C is given by different value of R.
It suggests that different R is required to minimize p¯C for different θB and different dB
(i.e., N). However, R can only be a particular value. Therefore, Ropt for Bob’s locations
needs to be found.
MMSE method is used to find Ropt in a certain range of R that produces the minimum
p¯C for all (dB,θB). First, Ropt for θB ∼U (0,2π) is to be found, based on which Ropt
for all (dB,θB) is found.
To establish the cost function, imagine that R is adjustable, which provides the
hypothetical function of p¯C,min with respect to θB. Notice that the value of p¯C,min for
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Fig. 5.4 p¯C versus R. Upper plot: N = 8; Lower plot θB = 0◦
each θB is in fact given by a different value of R, which is not practical. To find Ropt , let
the mean-square error, denoted by err(R), be the mean square of the difference between
p¯C and p¯C,min over the range θB ∈ [0,2π],
err(R) = EθB [(p¯C− p¯C,min)2]. (5.20)
Thus, Ropt can be found by
Ropt = argmin
R
err(R). (5.21)
(5.21) can be converted into the following expression, the derivation of which is in
Appendix A.8.
Ropt = argmin
R
¯¯pC, (5.22)
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where ¯¯pC is the averaged SSOP over Bob’s angles and is defined by
¯¯pC =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯C dθB. (5.23)
Next, Ropt for all (dB,θB) will be found. In polar coordinates, the mean square error
over two-dimension is given by
err2(R) =
1
S
∫ 2π
0
∫ dmax
0
dB(p¯C− p¯C,min)2 ddB dθB. (5.24)
where 1S is the probability that Bob is at a certain location (dB,θB). Thus, Ropt can be
found by
Ropt = argmin
R
err2(R). (5.25)
(5.25) can be converted into the following expression. The derivation is referred to in
Appendix A.9.
Ropt = argmin
R
(
q(1) ¯¯p(1)C +q
(2) ¯¯p(2)C +q
(3) ¯¯p(3)C
)
, (5.26)
where ¯¯p(k)C is the averaged SSOP over Bob’s angles in zone k and is defined by
¯¯p(k)C =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯(k)C dθB. (5.27)
It can be seen that (5.27) is based on (5.23). In the following, the property of the
averaged SSOP over Bob’s angles ¯¯pC will be studied with respect to R for fixed N, in
order to find Ropt .
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Substituting the expression of p¯C in (5.14) into (5.23), the expression of ¯¯pC can be
obtained,
¯¯pC = 1− 12π
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ 2π
0
exp
{
− λe
2
(c1Pt)
2
β
∫ 2π
0
[KG2C(θ ,θB)
K+1
+
x2+ y2
K+1
+
2
√
KGC(θ ,θB)
K+1
x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dθB dxdy. (5.28)
Although (5.28) can be numerically calculated, it is untraceable to analytically analyze.
Thus, the upper bound, denoted by ¯¯pup,C, is required for theoretical analysis.
Theorem 5.4.1
¯¯pup,C = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0KA¯0,C
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
, (5.29)
where A¯0,C is the expectation of A0,C over θB and is given by
A¯0,C = EθB [A0,C] =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
A0,C dθB. (5.30)
The proof of Theorem 5.4.1 is in Appendix A.10. The tightness of ¯¯pup,C can be analyzed
with the help of the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4.2 For random variable X ∼U (a,b), the smaller (b−a) is, the tighter
the two inequalities in Lemma 3.3.5 are.
The proof of Proposition 5.4.2 is in Appendix A.11. In the derivation to obtain ¯¯pup,C,
A0,C is the random variable with respect to θB. According to Proposition 5.4.2, the less
variation of A0,C, the tighter ¯¯pup,C is. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the variation of
A0,C in the range θB ∈ [0, π2 ] is not big compared to the ULA. Thus, ¯¯pup,C can be used
to analytically analyze ¯¯pC.
To obtain the analytic expression of ¯¯pup,C, A¯0,C is directly given here.
Theorem 5.4.3
A¯0,C = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J20(2kRsin
nπ
N
). (5.31)
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Fig. 5.5 ¯¯pC versus R for all θB and (dB,θB), N = 8
The proof of Theorem 5.4.3 is in Appendix A.12. It can be seen that (5.31) is the same
as the approximation for A0,C in (4.16). Therefore, A¯0,C in general decreases with some
fluctuations as R increases.
According to (5.29), ¯¯pup,C is positively correlated with A¯0,C. Thus, the behavior of
¯¯pup,C and A0 is consistent with respect to R. As previously stated, ¯¯pup,C is tight to ¯¯pC.
Thus, it can be conjectured that ¯¯pC decreases in general with some fluctuations as R
increases. This can be verified by the numerical results shown in Appendix B.3.
Because ¯¯pC fluctuates in a certain range of R, there must exist at least one local
minimum. Numerical results are used to find Ropt in (5.22) and (5.26). For example,
chose Nmax = 8 and R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ]. The results of ¯¯pC for all possible θB and
(
q(1) ¯¯p(1)C +
q(2) ¯¯p(2)C +q
(3) ¯¯p(3)C
)
for all possible (dB,θB) are shown in Fig. 5.5. It can be seen that
for both curves, there are more than one local minima. In the range R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ], Ropt
can be chosen by the smallest local minimum. Coincidentally, for both curves Ropt is
1.76λ in the range R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ].
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5.4.2 Transmit Power and Number of Elements
In this section, the relationship between Pt and N is studied. Both Pt and N are included
by p¯C in (5.18) and the constraint in (5.19). According to (5.18), there is a monotonically
increasing relationship between Pt and p¯C; according to (5.19), the larger Pt , the easier
to satisfy the constraint for fixed dB. However, p¯C is determined by the product of
PtA0,C, while the constraint has the product of PtN. Therefore, the trade-off between Pt
and N is studied.
The key to the problem lies in the relationship between A0,C and N. In Section 4.3.2,
the asymptotic behavior of p¯C is almost linear when N is very large. However, when N
is not very large, there does not exist a simple monotonic relationship between A0,C and
N; instead, the change is non-linear, e.g. N ≤ 8, which is a common setting for indoor
devices. This means that when N increases, PtN increases, but PtA0,C (i.e., p¯C) could
increase or decrease.
The product of PtN should be adapted to Bob’s distance dB, according to (5.19).
When Bob moves farther away form the AP, i.e., dB increases, the AP should respond
by increasing Pt or N, in order to satisfy CB ≥ RB. Alternatively, if dB does not change,
the AP can double Pt while halving N, to seek a lower p¯C. Next, the trade-off between
adjusting Pt or N is studied for the previous two cases.
For the first case, imagine a situation where Bob’s distance dB changes. Assume
that the benchmark of Bob’s distance is dB0 and the AP uses N0 active elements with
transmit power Pt0. As Bob moves closer to or farther away from the AP, the AP needs
to adjust either Pt or N to keep PtN/d
β
B unchanged, in order to satisfy CB ≥ RB.
The results are plotted in Fig. 5.6, where N0 = 8, R = 1.6λ and θB = 0◦. Bob’s
distance dB is normalized against the benchmark dB0. In the upper plot, it shows how
Pt is changed with dB when N is fixed, i.e., N = N0 In the middle plot, it shows how N
is changed with dB when Pt is fixed, i.e., Pt = Pt0. In order to satisfy CB ≥ RB, when
fixing either Pt or N, the other parameter increases along with d
β
B .
The lower plot in Fig. 5.6 shows the change of p¯C when changing Pt or N. As
discussed previously, p¯C increases along with Pt , whereas p¯C increases in general with
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Fig. 5.6 Plots for moving dB. Upper plot: Pt/Pt0 versus dB/dB0 for fixed N; middle plot:
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N with some fluctuations. Compared the two curves, it can be seen that the variation
of p¯C when changing Pt is bigger than that of N, which suggests that Pt has a more
dominant role in p¯C.
For the second case, the trade-off between changing Pt and changing N is studied
when dB is fixed. For fixed dB, the product of Pt and N should be kept constant, i.e.,
PtN = Pt0N0. The AP starts with N = N0 elements and Pt = Pt0, then Pt and N are
adjusted. The numerical results are shown in Fig. 5.7, where N0 = 8, R = 1.6λ and
θB = 0◦. The upper plot shows the change of Pt versus N. The lower plot shows how
p¯C changes with N.
It can be seen from the upper plot that for fixed dB, when N increases, Pt decreases
to keep the product of PtN unchanged. From the lower plot, it can be seen that p¯C
generally decreases along with Pt , although there is some fluctuations due to the increase
of N. Thus, the same conclusion can be drawn as in the first case, which is that Pt plays
the dominant role in the pair (Pt ,N) in terms of p¯C.
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In the previous cases, θB is chosen as a particular angle, i.e., θB = 0◦. To eliminate
the impact of θB, the averaged value A¯0,C is studied versus N for a fixed radius R= 1.6λ .
The results are shown in Fig. 5.8. An auxiliary line of y = x is drawn. It can be seen
that in general, the change of A¯0,C versus N is smaller than the gradient of y = x. Thus,
Pt is the more dominant factor in PtA0,C.
When Bob moves closer to the AP, i.e., dB/dB0 < 1, reducing Pt leads to a smaller
p¯C than reducing N, as shown by the lower plot in Fig. 5.6. When Bob stays at the same
distance, reducing N leads to the increase of Pt and the increase of p¯C, as shown by the
lower plot in Fig. 5.7. When Bob moves further beyond the the maximum coverage
distance is dmax, although it is preferable to increase N rather than Pt , it is unlikely to
do so because it is hard to change Nmax once the array is installed.
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that for given UCA with Nmax
elements, when (Pt ,N) are adjustable, it is preferable to adjust Pt than N. In other words,
it is preferable not to change N when Pt is adjustable.
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5.4.3 Array Mode and Bob’s Location
For adjustable Pt , there is no need to change N, i.e., Mi j. However, when Pt is fixed, N
can be adjusted according to dB. In addition, different Mi j in {Mi} gives different p¯C
for the same θB. Thus, in this section, the task is to find the optimum Mi j that gives the
minimum p¯C for certain (dB,θB) and satisfies CB ≥ RB, when Pt is fixed.
p¯C for different Mi j of UCA with 8-elements and R = 1.6λ is shown in Fig. 5.9.
The angle range is chosen to be θB ∈ [0◦,90◦], because it is the smallest range where
the patterns of {M3} do not repeat themselves. p¯C of {M2} and {M3} is plotted for
θB ∈ [0◦,90◦] in the upper and lower plots, respectively. It can be seen that, different
Mi j in {Mi} has different p¯C. The minimum curve p¯C,min is shown by the dotted curve.
For each θB, one array mode in {Mi} gives p¯C,min.
Take the example in Section 5.2.2 for instance. When θB = 5◦, the AP can choose
p¯C,min from M21 and M22. This is especially true for {M3}, where N = 2. Because {M3}
can also be regarded as linear array, which has larger SSOP near θdoe = 90◦. However,
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Fig. 5.9 p¯C for different Mi j over θB; upper plot: {M2}; lower plot: {M3}. For better
vision, the minimum value curve is drawn with an offset by -0.01.
this can be avoided by choosing an appropriate array mode that turns θdoe = 90◦ for
one array mode to θdoe = 0◦ for another array mode.
Because there is no monotonic relationship between A0,C and N, as shown in
Section 4.3.2, larger N does not necessarily mean smaller or lager p¯C. In Fig. 5.10, p¯C
for different N is shown for the UCA with 8 elements and R = 1.6λ . For example,
when θB = 0◦, N = 4 produces smaller p¯C than that of N = 8.
An important issue when choosing Mi j is that the constraint CB ≥ RB must be
satisfied. As introduced in Section 5.2.3, the choice of Mi j is limited by Bob being in
different zone. For example, when Bob is zone 3 and θB = 0◦, although M21 gives p¯C,min,
only M1 can be used, so that CB ≥ RB can be satisfied. Combining the observations
from Fig. 5.9 and 5.10, the optimum Mi j can be chosen according to (dB,θB) to achieve
p¯C,min.
For the generalized Rician channel with any β and K, the conclusions regarding
to Pt , N, R and Mi j are still valid, because the behavior of p¯C and ¯¯pC with respect to
N, R (and θB for p¯C) is consistent with that of A0,C and A¯0,C. In summary, Ropt can be
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found by numerically searching the minimum value of ¯¯pC for either all possible Bob’s
angles or all possible Bob’s locations in a local range of R; when Pt is adjustable, there
is no need to adjust Mi j; when Pt is fixed, the optimum Mi j can be numerically found
according to Bob’s location.
5.5 Optimization Algorithms
Based on the empirical results in Section 5.4, two numerical algorithms for two different
constraints, i.e., adjustable and fixed transmit power are developed. For each constraint,
the optimum (N,R) (i.e., Mi j) is found according to Bob’s dynamic location (dB,θB).
When Pt is adjustable, it is preferable to adapt Pt rather than N according to dB. Thus,
the optimization problem degrades to finding Ropt that minimizes ¯¯pC for all θB ∈ [0,2π],
which is shown in (5.22). When Pt is fixed, adjusting Mi j according to (dB,θB), which
is called configurable beamforming technique, can produce ¯¯pC,min. In the meantime,
Ropt that gives the minimum ¯¯pC for all (dB,θB) should be found in (5.26). For both
constraints, assume that the total number of elements Nmax is fixed.
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Fig. 5.11 Flowchart for Algorithm 1
The numerical optimization algorithms are provided because there exist the ana-
lytical expressions only for the upper bounds p¯up,C and ¯¯pup,C, which cannot provide
accurate solutions for Ropt and the optimum Mi j. In addition, the developed numerical
methods can be applied to arbitrary value of any parameters, such as β and K.
5.5.1 Numerical Optimization for Radius
When Pt is adjustable, the optimization of R is for fixed Nmax, which is straightforward
according to (5.22). When Pt is fixed, according to (5.26), the optimization of radius R
is for a combination of different N, which is based on (5.22). Thus, only the numerical
optimization algorithm for adjustable Pt (i.e., fixed N) is introduced.
The numerical implementation of the algorithm, referred to as Algorithm 1, is
illustrated by flowcharts in Fig. 5.11 to Fig. 5.13. The detailed algorithm is available in
Appendix D.1. As shown in Fig. 5.11, the algorithm first takes in some parameters and
computes the iteration numbers. Then, ¯¯pC is calculated, which is used to find Ropt .
The continuous ranges of R, θB, θ are sampled and become discrete. The more
samples are taken, the more accurate the result is; however, the computing complexity
also increases. It can be seen from Fig. 5.11 to Fig. 5.13 that the running time of
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Fig. 5.12 Flowchart for ‘compute ¯¯pC’ in Algorithm 1
Algorithm 1 main depends on the ‘compute ¯¯pC’ function shown in Fig. 5.12. For
convenience, assume that the basic computing unit, i.e., ‘compute S2’ takes 1 unit time
length. The asymptotic running time of Algorithm 1 is O(NRNθBN
2
QNθ ). There is no
specific restriction on the sampling interval as long as the chosen resolution generates a
reasonable value. Table 5.1 shows an example of the runninig time of Algorithm 1 in
MATLAB for different sampling interval for R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ].
One of the practical issues mentioned in Section 5.2.1 is the range of R. As can be
seen in Algorithm 1, the range of R is an input of the algorithm. Thus, Ropt is only the
optimum value in this range. For a better understanding, ¯¯pC is shown in a larger range
R ∈ [0.4λ ,4λ ] in Fig. 5.14.
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Table 5.1 Running time of Algorithm 1
R(cm) 1 0.5 0.1
NR 21 41 201
time(sec) 2.6913 5.0563 24.5662
Previously in Fig. 5.5, Ropt is 1.76λ in the range of [0.4λ ,2λ ], which gives ¯¯pC,min =
0.532. For the increased radius range, there are three more local minimums at 2.4λ ,
3.12λ and 3.76λ , which give ¯¯pC,min as 0.5086, 0.5107 and 0.5086, respectively.
Take R = 2.4λ for example, there is a big increase in the radius (i.e., by 0.64λ ),
compared to R = 1.76λ , which increases the difficulty in the deployment of the UCA.
However, the improvement of ¯¯pC (i.e., 0.0234) is not significant. Thus, the trade-off
can be decided according to the specific applications.
The process to find Ropt for all (dB,θB) is similar to Algorithm 1. The difference is
that instead of ¯¯pC, ∑k q(k) ¯¯p
(k)
C is calculated. Thus, Algorithm 1 is repeated for all k, and
in each iteration, q(k) needs to be calculated.
To illustrate the security enhancement of Algorithm 1, the same example as in
Fig. 5.5 is used. Let ρ1 define the ratio of the difference between the value of ¯¯pC at
certain R and the value of ¯¯pC at Ropt to the value of ¯¯pC at that R. The results of ρ1
versus R are shown in Fig. 5.15. It can be seen that up to more than 20% improvement
can be achieved by choosing Ropt .
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5.5.2 Configurable Beamforming Technique
When Pt is fixed, Mi j can be adjusted to minimize the SSOP according to (dB,θB). The
first step is to determine which zone Bob is in, according to dB. This is to determine the
available array modes for Bob. The second step is then to choose the optimum Mi j from
the available array modes according to θB. The previous process can be transformed
into searching the optimum Mi j according to (dB,θB) in look-up tables. This section
shows how to create the look-up tables that store the optimum Mi j for (dB,θB).
For this purpose, the same example shown in Fig. 5.9 is used. p¯C,min for {M2} and
{M3} are plotted together with the curve for M1 in Fig. 5.16. It can be seen that in
general, less number of active elements N gives smaller p¯C,min. But it is also noticed
that for certain value of θB, larger N generates smaller p¯C,min, e.g., θB = 0◦.
For certain θB, once the minimum curve is picked, the optimum Mi j can be subse-
quently decided by using Fig. 5.9. For example, when θB = 45◦, it can be seen from
Fig. 5.16 that the dashed curve, i.e., {M2}, gives p¯C,min. Then, in Fig. 5.9, it can be
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Fig. 5.17 Index of optimum Mi j versus θB for Bob in zone 1 to zone 3. For better vision,
the curves for zone 1 and zone 3 are drawn with offsets of 0.1 and -0.1, respectively.
seen in the upper plot that the dashed curve, i.e., M22, gives the smaller value of p¯C at
θB = 45◦. Therefore, M22 is chosen for θB = 45◦.
So far, only θB is taken into consideration. According to the analysis in Section 5.2.3,
when Bob is in different zone, there is a lower bound of N that should be used to
guarantee CB ≥ RB. For the previous example when θB = 45◦, if Bob is in zone 3 in
Fig. 5.3, only M1, i.e., N = 8, can be used, because using M22 leads to CB < RB.
For Bob being in different zones, there are limited number of array modes that can
be chosen to guarantee CB ≥ RB. When Bob is in zone 1, all array modes are available.
When Bob is in zone 2, {M1} and {M2} are available. When Bob is in zone 3, only M1
is available. In Fig. 5.17, the optimum Mi j for Bob being in different zone is plotted for
θB ∈ [0◦,90◦]. The y-axis shows the index of Mi j. For convenience, M1, M21, M22, M31,
M32, M33, M34 are indexed from 1 to 7.
The plots in Fig. 5.17 can be converted into look-up tables. Denoted by T (k), it
stores the M(i j) (or its index) that generates p¯C,min. In Fig. 5.17, the plot for Bob in zone
k is converted into table T (k). T (1) and T (2) are shown in Table 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.
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Table 5.2 Look-up table T (1)
θB(◦) Mi j θB(◦) Mi j θB(◦) Mi j
[0,3.5] M21 [34.5,37.5] M34 [67.5,75.5] M34
[3.5,7.5] M32 [37.5,41.5] M31 [75.5,79.5] M22
[7.5,10.5] M33 [41.5,48.5] M22 [79.5,82.5] M31
[10.5,14.5] M22 [48.5,52.5] M33 [82.5,86.5] M32
[14.5,22.5] M34 [52.5,55.5] M34 [86.5,90] M21
[22.5,30.5] M33 [55.5,59.5] M21
[30.5,34.5] M21 [59.5,67.5] M31
Table 5.3 Look-up table T (2)
θB(◦) Mi j θB(◦) Mi j θB(◦) Mi j
[0,7.5] M21 [36.5,37.5] M1 [67.5,81.5] M22
[7.5,8.5] M1 [37.5,52.5] M22 [81.5,82.5] M1
[8.5,22.5] M22 [52.5,53.5] M1 [82.5,90] M21
[22.5,36.5] M21 [53.5,67.5] M21
Here, the angle resolution is taken as 0.5◦. Nevertheless, the resolution can be any
practical value. For the outer zone 3, T (3) has only one entry, i.e., M1. Therefore T (3) is
not explicitly shown here.
The look-up table T (k) can be generated and stored ready in the AP. After the AP
acquired Bob’s location (dB,θB), the corresponding T (k) is chosen according to dB;
then the optimum Mi j is decided according to θB in T (k). The procedure of creating the
look-up table T (k) is illustrated by flowcharts in Fig. 5.18 to Fig. 5.20, which is referred
to as Algorithm 2. The details of Algorithm 2 are available in Appendix D.2.
Similar to Algorithm 1, the continuous ranges of θB and θ are sampled. The
running time of the algorithm depends on the resolution of the sampling. It can be seen
from Fig. 5.18 to Fig. 5.20 that the running time mainly depends on the ‘compute p¯C’
function shown in Fig. 5.19. For convenience, assume that the basic computing unit,
i.e., ‘compute S2’ takes 1 unit time length. The asymptotic running time of Algorithm 2
is O(NMi jNθBN
2
QNθ ). Table 5.4 shows an example of the runninig time of Algorithm 2
in MATLAB for different sampling interval for θB ∈ [0,90◦].
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Table 5.4 Running time of Algorithm 2
θB(◦) 1 0.5 0.1
NθB 91 181 901
time(sec) 0.4105 0.7900 3.7975
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Fig. 5.18 Flowchart for Algorithm 2
To illustrate the security enhancement of Algorithm 2, the same example as in
Fig. 5.16 is used. Let ρ2 define the ratio of the difference between p¯C,min for {M1}
and the minimum value p¯C,min for {M1,M2,M3} to p¯C,min for {M1}. The results of ρ2
versus θB are shown in Fig. 5.21. It can be seen that an improvement ranging from
about 5% to 47% can be achieved by Algorithm 2.
5.5.3 Error Analysis on Configurable Beamforming Technique
In Section 5.5.2, the numerical optimization process to find the optimum Mi j according
to (dB,θB) is shown. It is assumed in Section 5.2.1 that Bob’s CSI or (dB,θB) is
known by the AP, e.g., via channel estimation and feedback channel. However, the
estimated CSI could be erroneous, which means that AP’s knowledge of (dB,θB) could
be erroneous. In section 5.2.3, it has been stated that the true value of dB is not vital;
thus the error on dB is not considered here. In this section, the impact of the angle error
on the configurable beamforming technique is studied. Furthermore, the impact of R on
the error performance is evaluated.
5.5 Optimization Algorithms 146
1idx
 Nidx 
QNm
QNn 
BB
Nidx  
1
B
idx
0,1 1  Sm
1n
0,1 2  Sidx
1mm
1 idxidx
1
BB
idxidx 
A
B
compute  ),(
B
idxidxpC 
compute ,2S 1  idxidx
1 nncompute ,1S
true
false
true
false
true
false
true
false
true
false
ijM
Nidx 
Fig. 5.19 Flowchart for ‘compute p¯C’ in Algorithm 2
Let θˆB denote the erroneous estimation of θB. There are different types of errors
that can lead to an erroneous estimation of θB, e.g., imperfect feedback from Bob to the
AP. In this section, without the discussion of the detailed types of errors, a generalized
error on θB, i.e., the uniform distribution θˆB ∼U (0,2π), is assumed.
For the configurable beamforming technique, the look-up tables T (k) are created and
stored in the AP. The erroneous θˆB could lead to a wrong decision of the optimum Mi j,
thus leading to an increase in p¯C. Take T (2) in Table 5.3 as an example to illustrate the
impact of θˆB. For example, assume that Bob is in zone 2 and the true angle is θB = 30◦.
According to T (2), the optimum array mode is M21, which corresponds to the SSOP
p¯C = 0.4597, as it can be found in the upper plot in Fig. 5.9. If θˆB = 50◦, the array
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Fig. 5.20 Flowchart for ‘compute T (k)’ in Algorithm 2
mode would be M22, accoding to T (2). The SSOP given by M22 at θB = 30◦ is 0.6055,
which is larger than that of M21.
While θˆB could lead to a wrong array mode, thus an increased p¯C, it is also possible
that θˆB does not lead to a wrong array mode. For the same example that θB = 30◦, if
θˆB = 55◦, the chosen array mode would still be M21 according to T (2), which happens
to be the optimum array mode. Therefore, how p¯C is affected depends on both θˆB and
the particular look-up table T (k).
Let M′i j be the chosen array mode based on θˆB at (dB,θB). Let ∆p¯C denote the
difference between p¯C using M′i j and p¯C using Mi j. Therefore, ∆p¯C depends on both
(dB,θB) and θˆB ∼ U (0,2π). The mean value of ∆p¯C at (dB,θB) is then EθˆB[∆p¯C].
Since Bob is randomly distributed in the coverage zone, the mean value of the increased
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SSOP over all possible (dB,θB), denoted by errθˆB , can be calculated by
errθˆB = EθˆB,zB[∆p¯C] =
1
S
∫ 2π
0
∫ dmax
0
dBEθˆB [∆p¯C]ddB dθB. (5.32)
errθˆB in (5.32) can be numerically calculated in the similar way to (5.24).
In Fig. 5.22, the result of errθˆB versus R is shown, where Nmax = 8. It can be seen
that the error performance varies with R. At R = 1.68λ , errθˆB is the smallest, which
means that in terms of error performance, R = 1.68λ is the optimum value in the range
of R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ]. Notice that in Fig. 5.5, R = 1.76λ gives the smallest value of ¯¯pC for
all (dB,θB). Thus, the minimum averaged SSOP and the minimum error are not given
by the same radius.
Comparing Fig. 5.22 and Fig. 5.5 jointly, it is easily noticed that there exists no
one-to-one mapping between them. While ¯¯pC is the security metric, errθˆB refers to
the reliability or the resistance to θˆB. Thus, there is a trade-off between ’security’ and
’reliability’ when choosing the value of R. It is also worth noticing that the method used
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in this section applies to a generalized error distribution, since errθˆB in (5.32) does not
limit for the uniform distribution.
5.6 Impact of Mutual Coupling
5.6.1 NEC Results for a Range of Radius
The analysis of p¯C in Section 5.4 and the optimization algorithms in Section 5.5 are
based on the numerical results that do not include the mutual coupling. Section 4.5
mainly investigated the mutual coupling for the UCA in terms of ρ between the true
and NEC patterns as well as Gmax. In this section, further results of the mutual coupling
is given for a range of radius, in order to investigate its impact on the optimization
algorithms in Section 5.5.
To have a comprehensive understanding of the maximum gain attenuation, the
patterns of the UCA in the range R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ] and several typical values of θB are
simulated in the NEC tool. Then, Gmax of each pattern is recorded and plotted in
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Fig. 5.23. It can be seen that for different value of R, there exists an different extent
of attenuation of Gmax. For example, the UCA shown in Fig. 4.17 has a radius of
R = 0.6533λ , which does has a very small variation of Gmax. For other values of R in
this range, there exists a relatively larger variation. The minimum value of Gmax for
UCA in the range R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ] is higher than 0.8, which is larger than that of the ULA
with the same number of elements as shown in Fig. 4.20.
Beside Gmax, the patterns of GC(θ ,θB) are altered to a different extent for different
R. First, Fig. 5.24 shows an example to illustrate the difference caused by the mutual
coupling. Nmax = 8, R = 0.8λ , θB = 0◦. The pattern without the mutual coupling is
numerically calculated according to (4.1). The pattern with the mutual coupling is
calculated by the NEC simulation. Since Gmax =
√
8, the NEC pattern is normalized to
√
8 before compared with the theoretical pattern. It can be seen that there is not much
difference in the mainbeam. However, there is a bigger difference in the sidelobes due
to the mutual coupling.
Next, the patterns of the UCA with a wide range of configurations are simulated
in NEC. For Nmax = 8, typical values are chosen, i.e., θB = 0◦,5◦,10◦,15◦,20◦ in the
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range R = [0.4λ ,2λ ]. The correlation coefficient ρ between the theoretical and NEC
patterns is calculated. The results are shown in Fig. 5.25.
It can be seen that ρ is generally above 0.8 in the range of R= [0.4λ ,2λ ], except for
R = 0.48λ . This shows that the mutual coupling does not cause a significant distortion
to the pattern of UCA. The high correlation between the theoretical and NEC patterns
indicates that the optimization algorithm, which is based on empirical results on the
theoretical patterns, can still work when considering the mutual coupling. On the
other hand, there do exist some differences between the theoretical and NEC patterns,
which means that when calculating Ropt or T (k) in line 19 in Algorithm 1 and line 24 in
Algorithm 2, the NEC data instead of the theoretical data should be used. In addition, it
is interesting to see that as R increases, ρ also increases in general. Because the mutual
coupling originates from the proximity of neighbor antennas, the closer the neighbor
antennas are, the stronger the mutual coupling effect is.
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Fig. 5.25 Correlation coefficient of theoretical and NEC simulated patterns, Nmax = 8
5.6.2 Mutual Coupling Effect for Adjustable Transmit Power
To find Ropt in (5.22) when Pt is adjustable, the optimization algorithm should be based
on the NEC simulation data instead of the theoretical calculation.
p¯C with the mutual coupling is calculated according to in Algorithm 1, and the
results are shown in the upper plot in Fig. 5.26. To compare with the upper plot in
Fig. 5.4, the same array configuration is adopted, i.e., Nmax = 8 and R ∈ [0.4λ ,2λ ]. In
addition, the same values of θB are chosen.
Compared to Fig. 5.4, it is not hard to notice the similarity between the theoretical
and NEC simulated curves for the same θB, which can be explained by the high
correlation between them, as shown in Fig. 5.25. However, some differences can be
observed.
Because of the differences between the theoretical and NEC simulated results, ¯¯pC
in Fig. 5.5 needs to be re-calculated based on the NEC results, in order to find Ropt .
The lower plot in Fig. 5.26 shows ¯¯pC based on the NEC results in comparison with
5.6 Impact of Mutual Coupling 153
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
R/λ
p¯
C
 
 
θB = 0
◦
θB = 10
◦
θB = 20
◦
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
1200
1400
1600
R/λ
¯¯ p C
 
 
theoretic
NEC
Fig. 5.26 Upper plot: p¯C versus R. Lower plot: ¯¯pC versus Nmax = 8
the theoretical curve. It can be seen that the optimum value for the NEC result is
Ropt = 1.6λ compared to Ropt = 1.76λ for the theoretical result.
5.6.3 Mutual Coupling Effect for Fixed Transmit Power
In this section, the impact of the mutual coupling on the configurable beamforming
technique is studied. The same as in Section 5.6.2, the NEC data that includes the
mutual coupling should also be used in the calculation of the optimum Mi j as well as
Ropt .
As introduced in Section 5.5.2, the first step is to find out which zone Bob is in
according to dB. Due to the maximum gain attenuation, the coverage zones, e.g. in
Fig. 5.3, are distorted, because the zone boundary dth,N in (5.6) is proportional to Gmax.
In Fig. 5.27, Gmax of three different array modes for an 8-element UCA with R =
1.6λ is shown. Recall that in Fig. 5.23, it has already been shown that there exists
attenuation at R = 1.6λ for N = 8. It can be seen that for sub-arrays with N = 4 and
N = 2, there is also attenuation over θB.
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The attenuation of Gmax leads to the changes of the zone boundary, i.e., dth,N , which
in turn affects the choice of available array modes to certain Bob’s location. For example,
for Bob at θB = 20◦ and dB = dth,2, because the actual transmit gain at this angle is
smaller than the theoretical value, CB ≥ RB cannot be guaranteed if the AP chooses
N = 2. Thus, in practice, the AP need to keep track of the actual zone boundary, which
can be done by converting Fig. 5.27 into a look-up table.
Besides the impact on the zone boundary, the mutual coupling also affects the
configurable beamforming technique in the sense of creating the look-up tables shown
in Algorithm 2. In practice, the computation in line 24 should be based on NEC
simulation data instead of theoretical calculation. To illustrate the difference, Fig. 5.10
is re-generated based on the NEC simulation results. The results are shown in Fig. 5.28.
For comparison, the theoretical results and the NEC simulation results are given in
the upper and lower plots, respectively. It can be seen that for the same N, p¯C changes
differently with θB. In addition, the relative position of the three curves, i.e., N = 8,4,2,
is also changed. Thus, the generation of look-up tables should be based on the practical
data with the mutual coupling.
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Since the mutual coupling affects dth,N and the generation of look-up tables, it is
natural to conjecture that Ropt in (5.26) is also affected by the mutual coupling. To solve
(5.26), ¯¯p(k)C and q
(k) must be re-calculated based on the NEC data. According to (5.12),
q(k) is calculated from the zone area S(k). Because dth,N is now angle dependent, S(k) in
(5.8)-(5.11) can now be calculated by
S(1) =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
d2th,2(θB)dθB, (5.33)
S(2) =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
d2th,4(θB)−d2th,2(θB)dθB, (5.34)
S(3) =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
d2max(θB)−d2th,4(θB)dθB, (5.35)
S =∑
k
S(k) =
1
2
∫ 2π
0
d2max(θB)dθB. (5.36)
The numerical result of ¯¯pC versus R is shown in Fig. 5.29. For comparison, ¯¯pC that is
based on the theoretical data is also shown.
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It can be seen that the mutual coupling dramatically changes ¯¯pC over the range
of R. The minimum value of ¯¯pC is 0.4429 at R = 1.6λ for the NEC result, compared
to 0.5082 at R = 1.76λ for the theoretical result. From the above analysis, it can be
concluded that even though the configurable beamforming still works with the mutual
coupling effect, its security performance and optimization are affected by the mutual
coupling. The generation of T (k) and the searching of Ropt need to be based on the NEC
data.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, the secure transmission to Bob with ER based beamforming in presence
of PPP distributed is enhanced by optimizing the array configuration of the adjustable
UCA according to Bob’s location. Based on the empirical results, two different opti-
mization algorithms have been developed for the two scenarios, the fixed and adjustable
transmit power. For the adjustable transmit power scenario, the transmit power is
adjusted according to Bob’s distance and the radius is optimized for all Bob’s angles
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to minimize the averaged SSOP. For the fixed transmit power scenario, the optimum
array mode is chosen according to Bob’s location, which is called the configurable
beamforming technique that generates look-up tables that stores the optimum array
mode for Bob’s specific location. The two optimization algorithms have the potential
to be generalized for any channel type and any array type. It is worth noticing that the
former scenario is more practical of relevance, e.g., base stations in cellular network,
while the latter scenario is only applicable in applications with fixed transmit power. In
addition, the impact of the mutual coupling is evaluated for the optimization algorithms.
The high correlation coefficient between the theoretical and NEC data suggests that the
mutual coupling in general does not harm the algorithms; however, the optimum values
are changed and should be calculated based on the NEC data in the two numerical
algorithms.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this thesis is to enhance the wireless security in the physical layer from
the spatial aspect. For this purpose, the ER-based beamforming is investigated in the
context of indoor wireless networks, e.g., the 802.11 WLAN, where the AP is equipped
with antenna array. The ER is created to protect the transmission to Bob in the presence
of the PPP located Eves. Various parameters, especially the array configuration, are
examined towards security and numerical optimization algorithms are developed to
enhance the security.
Although there is abundant research work that aims to enhance the wireless security
from the physical layer, not many work considers the problem from the spatial aspect,
i.e., creating physical region to enhance the security level. The existing approaches in
the field of the physical space security lack of the support from the information-theoretic
secrecy and there is rarely work that considers the optimization of the array itself for
further enhancement of security. With the aid of the stochastic geometry tool (i.e., the
PPP distribution) and the mathematical derivation of the analytic expression of the upper
bound for SSOP, this work solves the former problem by characterizing the ER based
on the information-theoretic parameter, which brings many practical work surveyed in
the field of the physical space security close to the information-theoretic security, and
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the latter problem is investigated by studying the impact of the array parameters on the
SSOP and optimizing the array configuration according to Bob’s dynamic location(s).
The research work mainly focuses on two commonly used array geometries, the
ULA and the UCA. However, the SSOP related expressions are generally applicable
to any array geometry that has either analytic expression or numerical representations.
Furthermore, although the Rician channel is used in the system model, the method also
applies to other type of fading channel, e.g., Nakagami fading channel. In addition to the
theoretical analysis, a practical beamformer is built on WAPR hardware. Observations
from the experimental results in the anechoic chamber reveal the mutual coupling effect
on the ER, which is also intensively simulated in NEC simulation tool. The conclusions
of each chapter are summarized in the following.
In Chapter 3, the concept of the ER, the SSOP and the upper bound of the SSOP
are established, which is useful to a general array geometry and a general fading
channel. Then, the commonly used ULA is examined in terms of the SSOP. The
analysis shows that in general the SSOP and its upper bound increase with the DoE
angle and asymptotically approach certain values depending on the DoE angle when
the number of elements increases. The ratio of the SSOP upper bound to the SSOP has
a relatively small value for a small value of number of elements; however, for a large
value of number of elements, the ratio grows very large, thus cannot be used to predict
the behavior of SSOP.
In Chapter 4, the SSOP analysis for a UCA is conducted and compared with a ULA
in addition with the mutual coupling study with WARP and NEC results. It shows that
the SSOP of a UCA is more constant in the whole range of Bob’s angle, although the
SSOP of a ULA is smaller at the bore-sight direction. For the UCA, the tightness of the
upper bound does not change much even for a large number of elements. Furthermore,
the UCA is less sensitive to the mutual coupling over Bob’s angle range, and is more
flexible on the choices of array configurations. Thus, the UCA is a better choice in
creating and optimizing the the SSOP.
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In Chapter 5, based on the SSOP analysis on the UCA in Chapter 4, the array
configuration of the adjustable UCA is optimized according to Bob’s location. Two
optimization algorithms are developed for the fixed and adjustable transmit power
scenarios. For the adjustable transmit power scenario, the transmit power is adjusted
according to Bob’s distance and the radius is optimized for all Bob’s angles to minimize
the averaged SSOP. For the fixed transmit power scenario, the configurable beamforming
technique generates look-up tables that stores the optimum array mode for Bob’s specific
location. While the former scenario makes piratical sense, the latter scenario is only
applicable in certain applications with fixed transmit power. The mutual coupling in
general does not harm the algorithms; however, the optimum values are changed and
should be calculated based on the NEC data in the two numerical algorithms.
Overall, it is clear that the ER formulation and the performance metric SSOP are
crucial to the study of the wireless security in the physical layer. By studying the
ULA and the UCA in the Rician fading channel, some valuable insights are obtained,
which provides the basis of the optimization for the array configuration for user with
dynamic location in a dynamic environment. The mathematical derivation of analytic
expressions, theoretical and numerical results as well as the experimental and simulation
results show that this work has meet the objective mentioned in the introduction of the
thesis.
6.2 Future Work
The above conclusions demonstrated the contributions obtained in this research work
and indicates that wireless security can be further enhanced by the ER-based beamform-
ing technique in the physical layer. In this section, the improvements on the current
work is discussed first. Then, the possibilities to extend the ER-based beamforming and
combine with other techniques are addressed.
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6.2.1 Improvements to Current Work
In this research, the spatial distribution of Bob and Eves are modeled as the homo-
geneous PPP. In practice, the system varies from a small local network with a dozen
of users to an integrated network with hundreds of users. The locations of the users
may not fit in the defined distribution. For example, the potential Eves may be largely
located in the public area, such as the hall or lobby in the office building other than
uniformly scattered in the whole floor. In this case, the optimization of the radius of the
UCA based on the defined distribution may be not accurate. To solve this problem, a
more realistic spatial distribution should be studied or measured.
Another assumption on the system is that the accurate knowledge of Bob’s in-
stantaneous CSI at the AP, which could be very difficult, because the acquisition of
the CSI requires feedback mechanism, which is vulnerable to the impairments of the
wireless channel as well as active attacks. In fact, there is a lot of ongoing research
about the imperfect CSI and different approaches are developed for different system
requirements. One direction of the improvement is to study the impact of imperfect
CSI on the characterization of the SSOP given different level knowledge of Bob’s CSI.
The other direction could be the development of ER-based optimizations to reduce such
impact. In addition, while in theory Eves stay silent and are assumed to be known
only by the distribution, in practice, this constraint could be loosened if some sort of
knowledge of Eves can be exploited, which will give more advantage to optimize the
array configuration.
Besides the above aspects from the system model, some theoretical aspect can be
further improved. The upper bound of the SSOP is vital for the theoretical analysis. It is
derived based on Jensen’s inequality. However, in this thesis, the tightness of the upper
bound is analytically examined for limited cases. Accurate analysis relies on numerical
results. On one hand, the upper bound should be analyzed quantitatively for different
parameters to gain better understanding; on the other hand, a tighter bound should be
found if possible.
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Finally, the configuration beamforming technique can be further improved. In
this thesis, the UCA is considered as an example to demonstrate the potential of
adjusting array configuration to achieve higher level of security. This technique can
also be applied to the ULA and even some irregular form of arrays, e.g., non-uniform
circular array, which has been studied intensively from the pattern synthesis perspective.
Another improvement can be made on error analysis for the configuration beamforming
technique. Currently, the radius is optimized with the uniformly distributed angle error.
In practice, there could be a different kind of distribution, e.g., if more advanced DoA
estimation technique is used, the error may be located in a small region with high
probability.
6.2.2 Extensions to Other Techniques
In this research, the ER-based beamforming is developed based on MISO system in the
context of indoor WLAN where the AP is equipped with multiple antennas. The link
between the physical region and the array factor can be carried over to other systems
either for beamforming or for transmission of the AN. Thus, this research can serve
as the foundation to further improve some existing work in the area of physical space
security. In this section, some initial ideas combining the ER-based beamforming with
other existing work are presented.
In [81] the antenna array is installed on Bob that generates the AN. However, no
optimization is provided based on the array configuration. The ER-based beamforming
can be applied to formalize the OSR and guides the design for further enhancement
of the system security level. Similar gap exists for many practical work that exploits
the advantage of beamforming, such as [74, 89, 95]. The ER-based beamforming is
applicable no matter it is single-AP or multiple-AP systems. For example, the UCA
with optimized radius can replace the UCA used in [74] to get a better control on the
jointly created region. In [102], the UCA alternatively transmit with two pre-defined
patterns that has an overlapped region which is defined as the ER. Through the ER-based
beamforming, the two pre-defined patterns can be further optimized.
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Inspired by the work in [102] where the fast fading effect is created by the alternating
two overlapped patterns in the time domain, similar idea could be achieved in the
frequency domain, for example, in the OFDM-based system. Instead of transmitting the
packet in a time-division manner, different sub-carriers bear different segment of the
packet and transmit with two (or even more) pre-defined patterns. These patterns can be
optimized by the ER-based beamforming in this thesis. An even wilder idea could be
combining the spatial and code division methods and apply the idea with the ER-based
beamforming in CDMA systems.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Derivations and Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3.2
According to (3.5),
h˜ =
√
K
K+1
G(θ ,θB)+
√
1
K+1
sH(θB)g√
N
=
√
K
K+1
G(θ ,θB)+
√
1
K+1
g, (A.1)
where
g =
sH(θB)g√
N
=
∑Ni=1 e jφi(θB)gi√
N
. (A.2)
Because φi(θB) is deterministic and gi ∼CN(0,1), so φi(θB)gi ∼CN(0,1). Thus, the
sum of N i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables gi is also a complex Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and variance N. Therefore, g is a complex Gaussian
variable, g∼CN(0,1).
Let gRe and gIm denote the real and imaginary part of g, where gRe and gIm are joint
normal variables, i.e., gRe,gIm ∼ N(0, 12). Thus,
h˜ =
√
K
K+1
G(θ ,θB)+
√
1
K+1
gRe+ j
√
1
K+1
gIm. (A.3)
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Then the square of the amplitude of h˜ is obtained by
|h˜|2 =
[√ K
K+1
G(θ ,θB)+
√
1
K+1
gRe
]2
+
1
K+1
g2Im
=
K
K+1
G2(θ ,θB)+
1
K+1
g2Re+
1
K+1
g2Im+
2
√
K
K+1
G(θ ,θB)gRe. (A.4)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.10
(3.50) can be written as
A0 =
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ ,θB)dθ . (A.5)
According to (2.13), it can be derived that
G(θ ,θB) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e jk∆d(sinθB−sinθ)(i−1), (A.6)
where k = 2πλ . Thus, (A.5) can be further derived,
A0 =
∫ 2π
0
G(θ ,θB) ·G∗(θ ,θB)dθ
=
∫ 2π
0
1
N
N
∑
i=1
e jk∆d(sinθB−sinθ)(i−1)
N
∑
j=1
e− jk∆d(sinθB−sinθ)( j−1) dθ
=
∫ 2π
0
1
N∑i, j
e jk∆d(sinθB−sinθ)(i− j) dθ
=
∫ 2π
0
1
N∑i, j
e jk∆d sinθB(i− j)e− jk∆d sinθ(i− j) dθ
=
1
N∑i, j
e jk∆d sinθB(i− j)
∫ 2π
0
e− jk∆d sinθ(i− j)dθ . (A.7)
According to the integral representation of the Bessel function of the first kind, Jn(x) =
1
2π
∫ π
−π e j(nτ−xsinτ)dτ [127], (A.7) can be further derived,
A0 =
2π
N ∑i, j
J0(k∆d(i− j))e jk∆d(i− j)sinθB, (A.8)
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Fig. A.1 Table for A0,i, j
where A0 is the finite double summation. Next A0 will be simplified from a double
summation to a single summation.
A0 is the summation of N×N terms, each of which is denoted by A0,i, j,
A0,i, j =
2π
N
J0(k∆d(i− j))e jk∆d(i− j)sinθB . (A.9)
Notice that the only variable across all A0,i, j is the difference i− j. So let n = i− j and
it can be derived that
A0,n =
2π
N
J0(k∆dn)e jk∆dnsinθB. (A.10)
Then, all the values of n that are associated with A0,n are mapped into a table shown in
Fig. A.1.
Observing the table in Fig. A.1, it is noticed that i) the terms of A0,n on the diagonal
lines can be combined, because they are the same; ii) becuase Jm(−x) = (−1)mJm(x),
the terms of A0,n that have the same absolute value of n can be added
A0,n+A0,−n =
2π
N
[J0(k∆dn)e jk∆dnsinθB + J0(−k∆dn)e− jk∆dnsinθB]
=
4π
N
J0(k∆dn)cos(k∆dnsinθB). (A.11)
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In addition, when n= 0, J0(0) = 1 and e j0 = 1. Thus, A0,0 = 2πN . Now sum up the terms
of A0,n on each diagonal lines from n = 0 to p = N−1 and obtain
A0 = 2π+4π
N−1
∑
n=1
N−n
N
J0(k∆dn)cos(k∆dnsinθB). (A.12)
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
In the range θB ∈ [0, π2 ], both sinθB and cosθB are in the range [0,1]. First, the zeros of
∂
∂θB
∆θHP are to be found.
∂
∂θB
∆θHP = 0
⇔
√
1− (sinθB− 2.782Nk∆d )
2 = cosθB. (A.13)
Then, take the power of two on both sides,
1− (sinθB− 2.782Nk∆d )
2 = cos2θB
⇔1− cos2θB = (sinθB− 2.782Nk∆d )
2
⇔sin2θB = (sinθB− 2.782Nk∆d )
2.
(A.14)
Because sinθB and 2.782Nk∆d are both non-negative values, the solution of the following
equation is
sinθB =−(sinθB− 2.782Nk∆d )
⇔sinθB = 1.391Nk∆d . (A.15)
For ∆d = 0.5λ , it can be derived that
sinθB =
1.391
Nπ
. (A.16)
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Since 1.391Nπ < 1, in the range θB ∈ [0, π2 ], there is one zero of ∂∂θB∆θHP, which is at
θB = arcsin 1.391Nπ
When θB ∈ [0,arcsin 1.391Nπ ), ∂∂θB∆θHP < 0; when θB ∈ (arcsin
1.391
Nπ ,
π
2 ],
∂
∂θB
∆θHP >
0. The proof is in the following.
Proof: Because the square-root expression in the denominator is positive, it can be
derived that
∂
∂θB
∆θHP ≶ 0
⇔
√
1− (sinθB− 2.782Nπ )
2 ≶ cosθB
⇔1− (sinθB− 2.782Nπ )
2 ≶ cos2θB
⇔1− cos2θB− (sinθB− 2.782Nπ )
2 ≶ 0
⇔sin2θB− (sinθB− 2.782Nπ )
2 ≶ 0
⇔(sinθB+ sinθB− 2.782Nπ )(sinθB− sinθB+
2.782
Nπ
)≶ 0
⇔(2sinθB− 2.782Nπ )(
2.782
Nπ
)≶ 0
⇔sinθB ≶ 1.391Nπ . (A.17)
The proof is completed.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2.2
A similar method to the ULA is adopted to solve A0,C for UCA. For convenience, the
subscript C is omitted.
First, the array factor G(θ ,θB) for UCA is given by,
G(θ ,θB) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e jkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θ−ψi)], (A.18)
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where k = 2πλ and ψi = 2π(i−1)/N. Then, the following derives G(θ ,θB) ·G∗(θ ,θB).
G(θ ,θB) ·G∗(θ ,θB) = 1N
N
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1
e jkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θB−ψ j)+cos(θ−ψ j)]
=
1
N∑i, j
e jkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θB−ψ j)] · e− jkR[cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θ−ψ j)].
(A.19)
So far, the exponential terms that contain θ are separated to solve the integral. In order to
use Jn(x)= 12π
∫ π
−π e j(nτ−xsinτ)dτ , the triangle identity cosa−cosb=−2sin(a+b2 )sin(a−b2 )
is used to simply cos(θ −ψi)− cos(θ −ψ j),
cos(θ −ψi)− cos(θ −ψ j)
=−2sin(θ −ψi+θ −ψ j
2
)sin(
θ −ψi−θ +ψ j
2
)
=2sin(θ − ψi+ψ j
2
)sin(
ψi−ψ j
2
)
=2sin(θ − i+ j−2
N
π)sin(
i− j
N
π). (A.20)
Let Wi, j = 2sin(
i− j
N π) and Zi, j =
i+ j−2
N π . Substituting (A.20) into (A.19), it can be
derived that
G(θ ,θB) ·G∗(θ ,θB) = 1N∑i, j
e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j) · e− jkRWi, j sin(θ−Zi, j). (A.21)
Now, (4.6) can be written as
A0 =
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ ,θB)dθ
=
∫ 2π
0
G(θ ,θB) ·G∗(θ ,θB)dθ
=
1
N∑i, j
e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j)
∫ 2π
0
e− jkRWi, j sin(θ−Zi, j) dθ
=
2π
N ∑i, j
J0(kRWi, j)e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j). (A.22)
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Next A0 will be simplified. Let A0,i, j denote each summation term in (A.22),
A0,i, j =
2π
N
J0(kRWi, j)e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j). (A.23)
It is obvious that Wi, j = −Wj,i and Zi, j = Z j,i. Consider that Jn(−x) = (−1)nJn(x)
and J0(x) is a real number, it can be deduced that A0, j,i = A∗0,i, j. The proof is in the
following.
A0, j,i =
2π
N
J0(kRWj,i)e jkRW j,i sin(θB−Z j,i)
=
2π
N
J0(−kRWi, j)e− jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j)
=
2π
N
J0(kRWi, j)[e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j)]∗
= A∗0,i, j. (A.24)
It is not hard to see that combining A0,i, j and A0, j,i as in Appendix A.2 will not give a
simpler solution. Thus, other method should be used to simply (A.22).
From the expression of Wi, j and Zi, j, it is noticed that Wi, j+N =−Wi, j. The proof is
in the following.
Wi, j+N = 2sin(
i− j−N
N
π)
= 2sin(
i− j
N
π−π)
=−2sin( i− j
N
π)
=−Wi, j. (A.25)
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Similarly, sin(θB−Zi, j+N) =−sin(θB−Zi, j). Thus, A0,i, j+N = A0,i, j. The proof is in
the following.
A0,i, j+N =
2π
N
J0(kRWi, j+N)e jkRWi, j+N sin(θB−Zi, j+N)
=
2π
N
J0(−kRWi, j)e jkR·−1·Wi, j·−1·sin(θB−Zi, j)
=
2π
N
J0(kRWi, j)e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j)
= A0,i, j. (A.26)
According to (A.26), the summation of A0,i, j can be formulated in another way. To
better illustrate the new summation, an extended table is created, as shown in Fig. A.2.
For convenience, let n = i− j. Then, Wn =Wi, j = 2sin( nNπ). The terms A0,i, j on
the red diagonal lines in the table have the same Wn. In the table, Nπ Zi, j is allocated
according to their indice i and j. Given n = i− j, it can be derived that
Zn,i = Zi, j =
i+ j−2
N
π =
2i−n−2
N
π. (A.27)
Thus, it can be derived that
A0,n,i = A0,i, j =
2π
N
J0(kRWn)e jkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i). (A.28)
A0 is the summation of all elements in the original table (i.e., i, j = 1, ...,8). Because
A0,i, j+N = A0,i, j, the calculation of A0 can be executed by replacing the lower triangle
in the original table (i.e., i > j) with the lower triangle in the extended table (i.e.,
i > j−N). In the new formation of A0, which is a parallelogram table, the summation
can be carried out along the diagonal lines from n = 0 to n =−(N−1). For any n, the
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summation of A0,n,i includes N terms with Zn,i. Thus, (A.22) can be converted into
A0 =
N
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1
A0,i, j
=
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
N
∑
i=1
A0,n,i
=
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
N
∑
i=1
2π
N
J0(kRWn)e jkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i)
=
2π
N
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
N
∑
i=1
e jkRWn sin(θB−Zn,i). (A.29)
According to Jacobi-Anger expansion, e jα sinγ = ∑∞m=−∞ Jm(α)e jmγ , (A.29) can be
further derived by
A0 =
2π
N
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
N
∑
i=1
∞
∑
m=−∞
Jm(kRWn)e jm(θB−Zn,i)
=
2π
N
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
m=−∞
Jm(kRWn)e jmθB
N
∑
i=1
e− jmZn,i
=
2π
N
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
m=−∞
Jm(kRWn)e jmθBe jπ
m
N (n+2)
N
∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i. (A.30)
When m = lN, l ∈ Z, e jπ mN (n+2) = e jlnπe j2πl = e jlnπ and
N
∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i =
N
∑
i=1
e− j2πli = N. (A.31)
When m ̸= lN,
N
∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i = e− j2π
m
N
1− e− j2π mN N
1− e− j2π mN = 0. (A.32)
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Thus, it can be derived that
A0 =
2π
N
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
JlN(kRWn)e jlNθBe jlnπN
= 2π
−(N−1)
∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
JlN(kRWn)e jlNθB(−1)ln
= 2π
N−1
∑
n=0
J0(−kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)−lnJlN(−kRWn)e jlNθB
= 2π
N−1
∑
n=0
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lNJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB. (A.33)
When n = 0, kRW0 = 0. Thus, J0(kRW0) = 1 and JlN(kRW0) = 0, l ̸= 0. So
A0 = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lNJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB. (A.34)
A.5 Further Derivation for Pattern Area of UCA
The expression of A0,C for UCA in (A.34) has exponential term e jlNθB . Unlike the
expression of A0,L in (A.12), it is hard to tell A0,C is real or complex. Since A0 is the
pattern area, which should be a real number. This section further derives the expression
of A0,C to get a real-number expression.
The summation term in (A.34), denoted by A0,C,n, can be written by
A0,C,n = 2πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lNJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB, (A.35)
for n= 1, ...,N−1. To simply A0,C,n, the complex component e jlNθB should be converted
into some other form. The simplest one to exploit is e jx+ e− jx = 2cosx. To this end,
imagine to fold the l axis at the middle point l = 0. One problem could be that for
even or odd N, the term (−1)lN makes a big difference. Therefore, to begin with, the
simplification of A0,C,n for even and odd N is discussed separately.
A.5 Further Derivation for Pattern Area of UCA 184
When N is even, (−1)lN = 1 for any l. Thus, it can be derived that
A0,C,n = 2πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB. (A.36)
Then, combine the summation terms regarding to +l and −l,
A0,C,n = 2πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+
−1
∑
l=−∞
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB
+
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB ]
= 2πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)−lnJ−lN(kRWn)e− jlNθB
+
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB ]
= 2πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)ln(−1)lNJlN(kRWn)e− jlNθB
+
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB ]
= 2πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)(e jlNθB + e− jlNθB)]
= 2πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+2
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)cos(lNθB)]
= 2πJ20(kRWn)+4πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)cos(lNθB). (A.37)
Thus,
A0,C = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J20(kRWn)+4π
N−1
∑
n=1
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)cos(lNθB).
(A.38)
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When N is odd, the simplification of A0,C,n is more complex. The property that
Wn =WN−n is needed,
A0,C,N−n = 2πJ0(kRWN−n)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)l(N−n)+lNJlN(kRWN−n)e jlNθB
= 2πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)−ln+2lNJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB
= 2πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)lnJlN(kRWn)e jlNθB . (A.39)
Thus, it can be derived that
A0,C,n+A0,C,N−n = 2πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln[1+(−1)lN ]JlN(kRWn)e jlNθB. (A.40)
Because N is odd, when l is odd, 1+(−1)lN = 0; when l is even, 1+(−1)lN = 2. Then,
it can be derived that
A0,C,n+A0,C,N−n = 4πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
(−1)2lnJ2lN(kRWn)e j2lNθB
= 4πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=−∞
J2lN(kRWn)e j2lNθB
= 4πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+
−1
∑
l=−∞
J2lN(kRWn)e j2lNθB
+
∞
∑
l=1
J2lN(kRWn)e j2lNθB ]
= 4πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+
∞
∑
l=1
J−2lN(kRWn)e− j2lNθB
+
∞
∑
l=1
J2lN(kRWn)e j2lNθB]
= 4πJ0(kRWn)[J0(kRWn)+2
∞
∑
l=1
J2lN(kRWn)cos(2lNθB)]
= 4πJ20(kRWn)+8πJ0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
J2lN(kRWn)cos(2lNθB). (A.41)
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Thus,
A0,C = 2π+
N−1
∑
n=1
A0,C,n = 2π+
N−1
2
∑
n=1
A0,C,n+
N−1
∑
N+1
2
A0,C,n
= 2π+4π
N−1
2
∑
n=1
J20(kRWn)+8π
N−1
2
∑
n=1
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
J2lN(kRWn)cos(2lNθB). (A.42)
To compare with A0,C in (A.38) when N is even, (A.42) can be also written by
A0,C = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J20(kRWn)+4π
N−1
∑
n=1
J0(kRWn)
∞
∑
l=1
J2lN(kRWn)cos(2lNθB). (A.43)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.3.2
In this section, the subscript C is omitted for convenience. The array factor G(θ ,θB) for
UCA is given,
G(θ ,θB) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e jkR[cos(θB−ψi)−cos(θ−ψi)], (A.44)
where k = 2πλ and ψi = 2π(i−1)/N. Then, G(θ ,θB) is derived in form of summation
of Bessel functions.
According to cosa− cosb =−2sin(a+b2 )sin(a−b2 ),
cos(θB−ψi)− cos(θ −ψi)
=−2sin(θB−ψi+θ −ψi
2
)sin(
θB−ψi−θ +ψi
2
)
=2sin(
θB+θ
2
−ψi)sin(θ −θB2 ).
(A.45)
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Then, according to the Jacobi-Anger expansion, e jα sinγ = ∑∞n=−∞ Jn(α)e jnγ , G(θ ,θB)
can be written as
G(θ ,θB) =
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
e j2kRsin(
θB+θ
2 −ψi)sin(
θ−θB
2 )
=
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
∞
∑
n=−∞
Jn(2kRsin
θ −θB
2
)e jn(
θB+θ
2 −ψi)
=
1√
N
∞
∑
n=−∞
Jn(2kRsin
θ −θB
2
)e jn
θB+θ
2
N
∑
i=1
e− jnψi
=
1√
N
∞
∑
n=−∞
Jn(2kRsin
θ −θB
2
)e jn
θB+θ
2
N−1
∑
i=0
e− j2π
n
N i. (A.46)
When n = lN, l ∈ Z, ∑N−1i=0 e− j2π
n
N i = N. When n ̸= lN, ∑N−1i=0 e− j2π
n
N i = 0. Thus, it can
be derived that
G(θ ,θB) =
√
N
∞
∑
l=−∞
JlN(2kRsin
θ −θB
2
)e jlN
θB+θ
2 . (A.47)
Although the above derivation to get (A.47) is similar to [128], (A.47) is simpler than
the expression given in [128].
Next, a (loose) constraint will be derived for N that satisfies that the mainbeam of
the pattern is dominated by the l = 0 term, i.e.,
G(θ ,θB)≈
√
NJ0(2kRsin
θ −θB
2
), θFN,− < θ < θFN,+, (A.48)
where θFN,± are the first nulls of the pattern.
Let x = 2kRsin θ−θB2 . Then G(θ ,θB) is
G(θ ,θB) =
√
N
∞
∑
l=−∞
JlN(x)e jlN
θB+θ
2 . (A.49)
Except J0(x), JN(x) is the dominant term among the rest terms. It is known that the
first zero of J0(x) is 2.4048. Therefore, if JN(2.4048) is small enough, in the range
x ∈ [0,2.4048], then G(θ ,θB)≈
√
NJ0(2kRsin θ−θB2 ) is valid.
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Fig. A.3 JN(x), N = 0,2,4.
Examples of JN(x) is shown in Fig. A.3. It can be seen that J4(2.4048) is already
much less than 1. It can be deduced that for most N ≥ 4, JN(2.4048) is negligible.
When N ≥ 4, the first nulls θFN,± can be approximately calculated by
|2kRsin θFN,±−θB
2
|= 2.4048. (A.50)
Thus,
θFN,± = θB±2arcsin 2.40482kR . (A.51)
It is now easy to calculate the half-power points θ±, because half-power points are
within the range θ ∈ [θFN,−,θFN,+]. Thus, the values of θ± can be calculated from
J0(|2kRsin θ±−θB2 |) = 1/
√
2. (A.52)
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Fig. A.4 arcsin(x) and 2arcsin(x/2).
It is known that J0(1.1264) = 1/
√
2. Therefore, θ± = θB±2arcsin 1.12642kR and
∆θHP,C = θ+−θ− = 4arcsin 1.12642kR . (A.53)
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4.3.4
First, obtain the inverse function of y = arcsin(x), i.e., x = sin(y). It is well known
that when y → 0, x = sin(y) = y. Similarly, sin(y/2) = y/2 = x/2. Thus, it can
be derived that x = 2sin(y/2) and x = sin(y). Now invert the previous equations,
y = 2arcsin(x/2) = arcsin(x). The comparison between these two functions are shown
in Fig. A.4. It can be seen that for |x|< 0.5, 2arcsin(x/2)≈ arcsin(x). Thus, for |x|≪ 1,
2arcsin(x/2)≈ arcsin(x).
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A.8 One-Dimension MMSE Solution
This section solves the problem in (5.21),
Ropt = argmin
R
err(R), (A.54)
where
err(R) = EθB[(p¯C− p¯C,min)2]. (A.55)
Because p¯C− p¯C,min ≥ 0, a simplified, first-order error is used to replace err(R), which
is denoted by err1(R) and is given by
err1(R) = EθB[p¯C− p¯C,min]. (A.56)
Thus, the problem of finding the optimum R can be written as
Ropt = argmin
R
err1(R). (A.57)
Because θB ∼U (0,2π), err1(R) can be calculated by
err1(R) =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
(p¯C− p¯C,min)dθB. (A.58)
To solve (A.57), the zeros of the partial derivative of err1(R) with respect to R are
calculated,
∂
∂R
err1(R) = 0 (A.59)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
(p¯C− p¯C,min)dθB = 0 (A.60)
⇒ 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
(
∂
∂R
p¯C− ∂∂R p¯C,min)dθB = 0. (A.61)
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Because p¯C,min is a fixed value for certain θB and only depends on θB, the partial
derivative ∂∂R p¯C,min = 0. Thus, it can be derived that
∂
∂R
err1(R) = 0 (A.62)
⇒ 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
∂
∂R
p¯C dθB = 0 (A.63)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯C dθB = 0 (A.64)
⇒ ∂
∂R
¯¯pC = 0, (A.65)
where ¯¯pC is the averaged SSOP over Bob’s angle and is defined by
¯¯pC =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯C dθB. (A.66)
Thus, (A.57) can be converted into
Ropt = argmin
R
¯¯pC. (A.67)
A.9 Two-Dimension MMSE Solution
This section solves the problem in (5.25),
Ropt = argmin
R
err2(R), (A.68)
where
err2(R) =
1
S
∫ 2π
0
∫ dmax
0
dB(p¯C− p¯C,min)2 ddB dθB. (A.69)
Because p¯C− p¯C,min ≥ 0, a simplified, first-order error is used to replace err2(R), which
is denoted by err3(R) and is given by
err3(R) =
1
S
∫ 2π
0
∫ dmax
0
dB(p¯C− p¯C,min)ddB dθB. (A.70)
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Thus, the problem of finding the optimum R can be written as
Ropt = argmin
R
err3(R). (A.71)
In this case, p¯C,min is the minimum p¯C in zone k, k = 1,2, ..., at angle θB. For
convenience of mathematical derivation, the example of the coverage zones shown in
Fig. 5.3 is used.
To solve (A.71), the zeros of the partial derivative of err3(R) are calculated. Using
∂
∂R p¯C,min = 0, it can be derived that
∂
∂R
err3(R) = 0 (A.72)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
S
∫ 2π
0
∫ dmax
0
dB p¯C ddB dθB = 0. (A.73)
For any dB, p¯C is the same for the same zone. Let p¯
(k)
C denote the value of p¯C in zone k,
k = 1,2,3. For certain θB, p¯
(k)
C is a constant in zone k. Thus, it can be derived that
∂
∂R
1
S
∫ 2π
0
∫ dmax
0
dB p¯C ddB dθB = 0 (A.74)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
S
∫ 2π
0
(∫ dth,2
0
dB p¯
(1)
C ddB+
∫ dth,4
dth,2
dB p¯
(2)
C ddB+
∫ dmax
dth,4
dB p¯
(3)
C ddB
)
dθB = 0
(A.75)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
S
∫ 2π
0
(
p¯(1)C
∫ dth,2
0
dB ddB+ p¯
(2)
C
∫ dth,4
dth,2
dB ddB+ p¯
(3)
C
∫ dmax
dth,4
dB ddB
)
dθB = 0
(A.76)
⇒ ∂
∂R
1
S
∫ 2π
0
(
p¯(1)C
d2th,2
2
+ p¯(2)C
d4th,2−d2th,2
2
+ p¯(3)C
d4max−d2th,2
2
)
dθB = 0. (A.77)
In addition, let ¯¯p(k)C denote the average value of p¯
(k)
C over θB ∈ [0,2π],
¯¯p(k)C =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯(k)C dθB. (A.78)
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dth,2, dth,4 and dmax are regardless of θB. According to (5.8) to (5.12), (A.77) can be
converted into
∂
∂R
(1
S
2π
d2th,2
2
¯¯p(1)C +2π
d4th,2−d2th,2
2
¯¯p(2)C +2π
d4max−d2th,2
2
¯¯p(3)C
)
= 0 (A.79)
⇒ ∂
∂R
(
q(1) ¯¯p(1)C +q
(2) ¯¯p(2)C +q
(3) ¯¯p(3)C
)
= 0. (A.80)
Thus, (A.71) can be converted into
Ropt = argmin
R
(
q(1) ¯¯p(1)C +q
(2) ¯¯p(2)C +q
(3) ¯¯p(3)C
)
. (A.81)
A.10 Proof of Theorem 5.4.1
There are two methods to obtain the upper bound ¯¯pup,C. Both methods exploit Jensen’s
inequalities in (3.36) and (3.37). In this section, the subscript C is omitted for conve-
nience.
For the convenience of analyzing the tightness of the upper bound, ¯¯pup can be
derived based on p¯≤ p¯up. Using (3.50), it can be derived that
¯¯p = EθB [p¯]≤ EθB[p¯up]
= 1−EθB
[
exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
A0+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}]
. (A.82)
Using (3.36) and (3.37), it can be derived that
1−EθB
[
exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
A0+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}]
(A.83)
<1− exp
{
−λeπEθB
[[ c0K
2π(K+1)
A0+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
]}
(A.84)
≤1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
EθB[A0]+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
. (A.85)
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The equality in (A.84) does not hold because θB is random in this case. Then, ¯¯pup can
be obtained by
¯¯pup = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0KA¯0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
, (A.86)
where A¯0 is the expectation of A0 over θB and is given by
A¯0 = EθB[A0] =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
A0 dθB. (A.87)
In this method, A0 is treated throughout the derivation. Based on the conclusion in
Appendix A.11, the less random A0 is, the tighter the bound is. Because for the UCA,
A0 is much more constant with respect to θB than that of the ULA, as discussed in
Section 4.3.1, the upper bound is tight.
The second method is shown in the following. Substituting (3.24) into (5.23), ¯¯p is
written by
¯¯p = EθB[1−E|h˜|[e−λeA]] = 1−EθB [E|h˜|[e−λeA]]. (A.88)
In fact, due to the similarity between the expressions of ¯¯p in (A.88) and p¯ in (3.24), the
same method in Section 3.3.3 can be reused here to obtain the upper bound for ¯¯p.
Substituting (3.39) into (A.88), it can be derived that
¯¯p = EθB[1−E|h˜|[e−λeA]]
≤ EθB[1− e−λeE|h˜|[A]]
= 1−EθB [e−λeE|h˜|[A]]. (A.89)
The equality holds only for the deterministic channel. Using (3.36), it can be further
derived as
1−EθB [e−λeE|h˜|[A]]< 1− exp{−λeEθB[E|h˜|[A]]}. (A.90)
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The equality does not hold because θB is regarded random in this case. Substituting
E|h˜|[|h˜|2] = KG
2(θ ,θB)+1
K+1 into (3.44), it can be derived that
E|h˜|[A]≤ π
[ c0K
2π(K+1)
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ ,θB)dθ +
c0
K+1
] 2
β
. (A.91)
When β = 2, the equality holds. For convenience, A0 is used to replace
∫ 2π
0 G
2(θ ,θB)dθ .
Then, it can be derived that
EθB[E|h˜|[A]]≤ πEθB
[[ c0KA0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
]
. (A.92)
Using (3.37), it can be derived that
πEθB
[[ c0KA0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
]
≤ π
[
EθB
[ c0KA0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
]] 2
β
. (A.93)
When β = 2, the equality holds. Combining (A.89), (A.90), (A.92) and (A.93), it can
be derived that
¯¯p≤ 1−EθB[e−λeE|h˜|[A]]
< 1− exp{−λeEθB[E|h˜|[A]]}
≤ 1− exp
{
−λeπEθB
[[ c0KA0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
]}
≤ 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[
EθB
[ c0KA0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
]] 2
β
}
. (A.94)
Then, (A.94) can be written as
¯¯p < 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0KA¯0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
. (A.95)
Then, the upper bound ¯¯pup can be written as
¯¯pup = 1− exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0KA¯0
2π(K+1)
+
c0
K+1
] 2
β
}
. (A.96)
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It can be seen that for deterministic channel, the upper bound ¯¯pup is tighter when β = 2
than that when β > 2.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 5.4.2
First, the tightness of (3.36) is examined. Let X be a random variable that is X ∼U (a,b).
Thus, it can be derived that
E[eX ] =
1
b−a
∫ b
a
ex dx =
eb− ea
b−a (A.97)
eE[X ] = e
a+b
2 . (A.98)
Let the ratio η1 define by the tightness of this inequality.
η1 =
E[eX ]
eE[X ]
=
eb− ea
b−a e
− a+b2 =
e
b−a
2 − e− b−a2
b−a . (A.99)
For convenience, let y = b−a > 0.
η1 =
e
y
2 − e− y2
y
. (A.100)
According to the quotient rule of the derivative, the derivative of η1 with respect to y is
dη1
dy
=
(−1+ y2)e
y
2 − (−1− y2)e−
y
2
y2
. (A.101)
Let g(y) = (−1+ y2)e
y
2 . It is obvious that g(y) is a monotonic increasing function for
y ∈ R. Thus, for y > 0, g(y)−g(−y)> 0. As a results, dη1dy > 0.
It can be concluded that the larger y = b−a is, the larger η1 is. In other words, the
larger the range of X is, the less tighter the inequality is.
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Next, the tightness of (3.37) is examined. For convenience, let κ = 2β . For β ≥ 2,
0 < κ ≤ 1.
(E[X ])κ = (
a+b
2
)κ (A.102)
E[Xκ ] =
1
b−a
∫ b
a
xκ dx =
1
κ+1
bκ+1−aκ+1
b−a . (A.103)
Let the ratio η2 define by the tightness of this inequality,
η2 =
(E[X ])κ
E[Xκ ]
=
κ+1
2κ
(b−a)(b+a)κ
bκ+1−aκ+1 . (A.104)
For convenience, let y = b−a > 0, then b = y+a and a+b = y+2a.
η2 =
κ+1
2κ
y(y+2a)κ
(y+a)κ+1−aκ+1 . (A.105)
Then, the partial derivative of η2 with respect to y is examined. According to the product
rule of the derivative, it can be derived that
∂
∂y
[y(y+2a)κ ] = (y+2a)κ−1[(κ+1)y+2a]. (A.106)
Then, it can be derived that
∂
∂y
[(y+a)κ+1−aκ+1] = (κ+1)(y+a)κ . (A.107)
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According to the quotient rule of the derivative,
∂η2
∂y
=
κ+1
2κ
1
[(y+a)κ+1−aκ+1]2
{(y+2a)κ−1[(κ+1)y+2a][(y+a)κ+1−aκ+1]− y(κ+1)(y+a)κ(y+2a)κ}
=
κ+1
2κ
a(y+2a)κ−1
[(y+a)κ+1−aκ+1]2
{y[(1−κ)(y+a)κ − (κ+1)aκ ]+2a[(y+a)κ −aκ ]}
=
κ+1
2κ
a(y+2a)κ−1
[(y+a)κ+1−aκ+1]2{g(y)+2a[(y+a)
κ −aκ ]}, (A.108)
where g(y) is
g(y) = y[(1−κ)(y+a)κ − (κ+1)aκ ]. (A.109)
Because y and (y+a)κ are both monotonic increasing functions for y∈R and 0< κ ≤ 1,
g(y) is also a monotonic increasing functions. Because g(0) = 0, g(y)> 0, for y > 0.
For y > 0, (y+a)κ −aκ > 0. Therefore, for y > 0, ∂η2∂y > 0.
It can be concluded that η2 is a monotonic increasing function with respect to y.
The larger y = b−a is, the larger η2 is. In other words, the larger the range of X is, the
less tighter the inequality is.
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In this section, the aim is to obtain the analytic expression for the following expression,
A¯0,C =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
A0,C dθB. (A.110)
There are two different methods that lead to the same result. First, let’s look at the
first method. According to (A.22), A0,C is
A0,C =
2π
N ∑i, j
J0(kRWi, j)e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j), (A.111)
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where k = 2π/λ and Wi, j = 2sin( i− jN π), i, j = 1, ...,N. Applying the integral rep-
resentation of Bessel function of the first kind, Jn(x) = 12π
∫ π
−π e j(nτ−xsinτ)dτ and
Jn(−x) = (−1)nJn(x), it can be derived that
A¯0,C =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
A0,C dθB
=
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
2π
N ∑i, j
J0(kRWi, j)e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j) dθB
=
1
N∑i, j
J0(kRWi, j)
∫ 2π
0
e jkRWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j) dθB
=
2π
N ∑i, j
J0(kRWi, j)J0(−kRWi, j)
=
2π
N ∑i, j
J20(kRWi, j). (A.112)
For (A.112), let n = i− j. The same method of deriving (A.12) from (A.8) is adopted,
and the simpler expressions for A¯0,C is obtained,
A¯0,C = 2π+
4π
N
N−1
∑
n=1
(N−n)J20(2kRsin(
n
N
π)). (A.113)
For easy of analysis, A¯0,C in (A.113) can be further simplified. Let A¯0,C,n be the n-th
summation term, n = 1, ...,N−1,
A¯0,C,n = 4π
N−n
N
J20(2kRsin(
n
N
π)). (A.114)
Then, it can be derived that
A¯0,C = 2π+
N−1
∑
n=1
A¯0,C,n. (A.115)
Because sin( nNπ) = sin(
N−n
N π), it can be derived that
A¯0,C,N−n = 4π
N− (N−n)
N
J20(2kRsin(
N−n
N
π))
= 4π
n
N
J20(2kRsin(
n
N
π)). (A.116)
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Thus, combine A¯0,C,n and A¯0,C,N−n,
A¯0,C,n+ A¯0,C,N−n = 4πJ20(2kRsin(
n
N
π)). (A.117)
When N is even, N−1 is odd.
A¯0,C = 2π+
N
2−1
∑
n=1
A¯0,C,n+ A¯0,C,N2 +
N−1
∑
n=N2 +1
A¯0,C,n
= 2π+2πJ20(2kR)+4π
N
2−1
∑
n=1
J20(2kRsin(
n
N
π)). (A.118)
When N is odd, N−1 is even.
A¯0,C = 2π+
N−1
2
∑
n=1
A¯0,C,n+
N−1
∑
n=N+12
A¯0,C,n
= 2π+4π
N−1
2
∑
n=1
J20(2kRsin(
n
N
π)). (A.119)
Observe (A.118) and (A.119), these two equations are of similar form. Because
sin( nNπ) = sin(
N−n
N π), the two equations can be uniformly written by
A¯0,C = 2π+2π
N−1
∑
n=1
J20(2kRsin(
n
N
π)), (A.120)
for N is even or odd.
As a matter of fact, the above equation can be calculated from (A.38) and (A.43) by
directly solving the integral, because
∫ 2π
0
cos(lNθB)dθB = 0, (A.121)∫ 2π
0
cos(2lNθB)dθB = 0. (A.122)
Appendix B
Supporting Figures and Graphs
B.1 SSOP and Its Upper Bound for UCA
Comparing the curves for K → ∞ and β = 3 in Fig. B.1 with the plot in Fig. 4.2 when
β = 2, it can be seen that the two curves have very similar fluctuating behavior with
respect to θB. Furthermore, comparing the curves with different K (except for K = 0)
in Fig. B.1, it can be seen that all curves have very similar behavior with respect to θB,
which verifies that the properties of p¯C and p¯up,C with respect to N, R and θB is similar
to those of A0,C.
Similar conclusions can be drawn by comparing the curves for K → ∞ and β = 3 in
Fig. B.2 with the upper plot in Fig. 4.3 when β = 2 as well as by comparing the curves
with different K (except for K = 0) in Fig. B.2.
B.2 Tightness of Upper Bound for UCA
In Fig. B.3, as θB changes, there are some fluctuations for ηC. However, the variation is
in a relatively small compared to the absolute value of ηC. Thus, it can be said that ηC
does not change much with θB.
In Fig. B.3, as N changes, ηC first increase with some fluctuations, then approaches
to certain values. The asymptotic behavior with N converges instead of linearly increas-
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Fig. B.2 p¯C and p¯up,C versus N for different K. β = 3, R = 1.75λ , θB = 0◦. Pt/σ2n =
40 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1×10−4
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Fig. B.3 ηC versus θB for the deterministic for all β , N = 8, R = 1.75λ
ing, which means that the upper bound works well even for large N. Overall, the value
of ηC is smaller than 1.4.
B.3 Averaged SSOP over Bob’s Angles for UCA
As analyzed in Section 5.4.1, ¯¯pup,C in general decreases with some fluctuations as R
increases, the behavior of which is consistent with A¯0,C. Because the upper bound ¯¯pup,C
is tight to ¯¯pC, the behavior of ¯¯pC with respect to R is consistent with that of A¯0,C. In
this section, the numerical results of ¯¯pC are given for the generalized Rician channel.
An example of A¯0,C versus R is shown in Fig. B.5, where N = 8. It can be seen that
the curve for A¯0,C fluctuates as R increases. In addition, A¯0,C decreases in general.
Examples of ¯¯pC and ¯¯pup,C versus R for different K and β = 3 are shown in Fig. B.6.
It can be seen that the behavior of ¯¯pC and ¯¯pup,C are similar and consistent with that of
A¯0,C, which is decreasing with R with some fluctuations. For the Rayleigh channel, ¯¯pC
and ¯¯pup,C are constant. The curves for K = 10 are closer to those for K =∞; The curves
for K = 1 are closer to those for K = 10.
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Fig. B.5 A¯0,C. N = 8, ∆d = 0.5λ .
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Combining Fig. B.5 and B.6, it can be seen that the upper bound ¯¯pup has similar
behavior to A¯0.
Appendix C
Beamformer Calibrations on WARP
CFO is common is all electronic devices and is caused by various factors, e.g., oscillator
frequency fluctuation and temperature changes [129]. Because of the randomness of
CFO, different radio interfaces experience different CFO. In the experiments, this
problem is overcome by sharing the same reference and sampling frequencies between
all radio interfaces.
The second problem is more unique in this case, which is the random initial phase
in each radio interface. Even though all radio interfaces share the same reference
frequency, they have separate transceiver chips to generate the carrier signal. Because
each transceiver’s PLL locks at f0 with some random initial phase when first turned
on power, each carrier signal has different initial phase, which causes extra phase
difference other than w in u, resulting in a random distortion to the designed beam
pattern. As shown in Fig. 4.9, the relative phase offset of the (i+1)-th carrier signal
(i = 1, ...,N−1) compared to the 1st carrier is denoted by ϕi.
In order to form beam patterns at the transmitter, the random initial phase ϕi,
i= 1, ...,N−1, needs to be calibrated. First, the calibration for the phase offset between
two RF interfaces, e.g., RF 1 and RF 3, is introduced.
To measure the phase offset ϕ2 between RF 3 and RF 1, the phase sweeping method
is used. Let Lp be the total length of the packet. A sinusoid with frequency f on RF 1 is
transmitted, and on RF 3, the same sinusoid is transmitted, however, in addition with an
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incremental phase from 0 to 2π ,
u1i =
√
Ptxi =
√
Pte
j2π ffs i, (C.1)
u3i =
√
Ptxie
j2π i−1Lp =
√
Pte
j2π ffs i+ j2π
i−1
Lp , (C.2)
where xi = e j2π f i/ fs i = 1, ...,Lp, where fs is the sampling frequency; in WARPLab, fs
is normally 40 MHz; e j2π
i−1
Lp is the phase increment from 0 to 2π .
Due to the phase offset on RF 3, the received signal on RF 2 is
r2i = h12u1i+h32u3ie jϕ2 =
√
Pte
j2π ffs i
(
h12+h32e
j2π i−1Lp e jϕ2
)
, (C.3)
where h12 and h32 are the complex channel gains between RF 1 and RF 2 and between
RF 3 and RF 2. To be able to detect ϕ2, the receiver RF interface needs to be put the
same distance away from RF 1 and RF 3, so that there is no extra phase offset introduced
by h12 and h32 in (C.3). It is preferable to exploit the array geometry to find the middle
antenna as the receive antenna. This is the reason why RF 2 in Fig. 2.5 is chosen to
estimate ϕ2.
r2i in (C.3) can be written as
r2i =
√
Pth12e
j2π ffs i
(
1+
h32
h12
e j2π
i−1
Lp e jϕ2
)
. (C.4)
The received power is then
r22i = Pt |h12|2
(
1+
h32
h12
e j2π
i−1
Lp e jϕ2
)2
. (C.5)
Because h12 and h32 have the same phase,
h32
h12
in (C.5) has a positive real value. When
2π i−1Lp +ϕ2 = π , r
2
2i takes its minimum value Pt |h12|2(1− h32h12 )2. Thus, the index i that
gives r22i,min can be used to calculate ϕ2,
ϕ2 = π−2π i−1Lp . (C.6)
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While it is straightforward when there is a middle antenna in the array, it requires
more complex processing when there is none, e.g., estimation of ϕ3 between RF 4 and
RF 1. In this case, RF 2 and RF 3 are needed as receive antennas. On RF 1, a normal
sinusoid signal is transmitted, while on RF 4, an additional phase increment is added.
u1i =
√
Pte
j2π ffs i, (C.7)
u4i =
√
Pte
j2π ffs i+ j2π
i−1
Lp−1 . (C.8)
Due to the phase offset on RF 4, the received signals on RF 2 and RF 3 are,
r2i =
√
Pth12e
j2π ffs i
(
1+
h42
h12
e j2π
i−1
Lp e jϕ3
)
, (C.9)
r3i =
√
Pth13e
j2π ffs i
(
1+
h43
h13
e j2π
i−1
Lp e jϕ3
)
, (C.10)
where h12 and h42 are the complex channel gains between RF 1 and RF 2 and between
RF 4 and RF 2; h13 and h43 are the complex channel gains between RF 1 and RF 3 and
between RF 4 and RF 3. As shown in Fig. 2.5, RF 1 is closer to RF 2 than RF 4 by ∆d;
similarly, RF 1 is farther to RF 3 than RF 4 by ∆d. Thus, h12 has the phase advance of
2π ∆dλ than h42; but, h13 has the phase advance of −2π ∆dλ than h43. Let ∆ϕ = e− j2π
∆d
λ .
(C.9) and (C.10) can be written as
r2i =
√
Pth12e
j2π ffs i
[
1+
|h42|
|h12|e
j(2π i−1Lp +ϕ3+∆ϕ)
]
, (C.11)
r3i =
√
Pth13e
j2π ffs i
[
1+
|h43|
|h13|e
j(2π i−1Lp +ϕ3−∆ϕ)]. (C.12)
ϕ3+∆ϕ can be estimated from r2i in (C.11) and ϕ3−∆ϕ can be estimated from r3i
in (C.12). The method is the same as estimating ϕ2. Then ϕ3 can also be estimated.
Take the 8-element UCA in Fig. 2.6 as an example to demonstrate how to estimate
ϕ1, ...,ϕ7. The 8 elements are divided into two groups, i.e., (1,3,5,7) and (2,4,6,8).
For any two antenna in each group, it is easy to find a middle antenna to be the receive
antenna, which allows the calibration inside each group. To calibrate between two
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groups, RF 1 and RF 4 are chosen. Then the two groups, i.e., all RF interfaces, are
calibrated. Now the beamformer is correctly set-up.
Appendix D
Optimization Algorithms
D.1 Algorithm 1
The input of the algorithm requires the first three groups of parameters that are men-
tioned in Section 5.3 as well as the wavelength λ . In addition, the ranges and the
resolutions of R, θB and θ are required as well as the limit value Q. The limit of the
integral is set to Q =±3 according to Section 3.3.2. The output is Ropt .
There are two main sections of the algorithm. After the numbers of iterations
regarding to R, θB and Q and θ are calculated from line 1 to 5, the first main section is
from line 6 to 27, where ¯¯p for different R is calculated. The second main section is from
line 28 to 35, where the minimum value in the vector ¯¯p is searched to find Ropt .
INPUT: RB, Rs, σ2n , λe
INPUT: β , K
INPUT: λ , Pt , N, R1, R2, ∆R
INPUT: θB1 = 0, ∆θB
INPUT: θ1 = 0, θ2 = 2π , ∆θ
INPUT: Q, ∆Q
OUTPUT: Ropt
1: NR = ⌊R2−R1∆R ⌋+1
2: θB2 = πN
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3: NθB = ⌊θB2−θB1∆θB ⌋+1
4: NQ = ⌊ 2Q∆Q⌋+1
5: Nθ = ⌊θ2−θ1∆θ ⌋+1
6: ¯¯p = zeros(1,NR) % preallocate memory for ¯¯p
7: for idxR ← 1 to NR do % loop over R ∈ [R1,R2]
8: R = R1+(idxR−1)∆R % current radius
9: for idxθB ← 1 to NθB do % loop over θB ∈ [θB1,θB2]
10: θB = θB1+(idxθB −1)∆θB % current Bob’s angle
11: S1 = 0
12: for m← 1 to NQ do % loop over x
13: x =−Q+(m−1)∆Q % current x
14: for n← 1 to NQ do % loop over y
15: y =−Q+(n−1)∆Q % current y
16: S2 = 0
17: for idxθ ← 1 to Nθ do % loop over θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]
18: θ = θ1+(idxθ −1)∆θ % current angle θ
19: S2 = S2+
[
KG2C(θ ,θB)
K+1 +
x2+y2
K+1 +
2
√
KGC(θ ,θB)
K+1 x
] 2
β ∆θ
20: end for
21: S1 = S1+ exp{−λe2 [ Ptσ2n (2RB−Rs−1) ]
2
β S2} e−(x
2+y2)
π ∆Q
2
22: end for
23: end for
24: ¯¯p(idxR) = ¯¯p(idxR)+1−S1
25: end for
26: ¯¯p(idxR) = ¯¯p(idxR)/NθB % average over all Bob’s angle
27: end for
28: Ropt = R1
29: ¯¯pmin = ¯¯p(1)
30: for idxR ← 2 to NR do % loop over R ∈ [R1,R2]
31: if ¯¯pmin > ¯¯p(idxR) then
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32: Ropt = R1+(idxR−1)∆R
33: ¯¯pmin = ¯¯p(idxR)
34: end if
35: end for
Notice that in line 2, ¯¯p is calculated in the range θB ∈ [0,π/N] instead of [0,2π],
as mentioned in Proposition 4.2.1, in order to reduce the computational complexity. It
is also worth noticing that in line 19, 21, 24, 26, the integral in (5.28) is calculated via
summation.
D.2 Algorithm 2
The first three groups of parameters that are mentioned in Section 5.3 as well as λ are
required as input; while the output is the look-up tables T (k).
There are two main sections of Algorithm 2. After the numbers of iterations regard-
ing to θB, θ and Q are calculated from line 1 to 3, the first main section is from line 4
to 33, where p¯C is calculated for all Mi j and θB, regardless of Bob’s zone. The second
main section is from line 34 to 51, where the look-up table T (k) for zone k, k = 1, ...,K,
is calculated.
In line 6, |N_vec| is the cardinality of the set N_vec, which is K. Similarly, |{Mi j}|
is the number of array modes in {Mi j}. From line 16 to 29, p¯C is calculated according
to (5.14), for which the integral is calculated via summation. Notice that in line 15,
for the j-th array mode in {Mi}, there is a rotation in the DoE angle. For example, in
Fig. 5.2, when θB = 5◦, θdoe = 5◦ for M21; but θdoe =−40◦ for M22.
From line 36 to 39, the number of available array modes for zone k is decided. From
line 40 to 50, T (k) is calculated for all possible Bob’s angle θB ∈ [0,2π]. Notice that the
method to find the minimum value in a vector is the same as Algorithm 1.
INPUT: RB, Rs, σ2n , λe
INPUT: β , K
INPUT: λ , Pt , Nmax, R
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INPUT: θB1 = 0, θB2 = 2π , ∆θB
INPUT: θ1 = 0, θ2 = 2π , ∆θ
INPUT: Q, ∆Q
OUTPUT: T (k)
1: NθB = ⌊θB2−θB1∆θB ⌋+1
2: Nθ = ⌊θ2−θ1∆θ ⌋+1
3: NQ = ⌊ 2Q∆Q⌋+1
4: N_vec = [N1 > N2 > · · ·> NK] % N_vec contains all possible numbers of
active elements, N1 = Nmax
5: NMi j = 0 % total number of array modes
6: for i← 1 to |N_vec| do % loop over N_vec
7: NMi j = NMi j + |{Mi}|
8: end for
9: p¯ = zeros(NMi j ,NθB) % pre-allocate memory
10: idx = 1 % row index for matrix p¯
11: for i← 1 to |N_vec| do % loop over N_vec
12: N = N_vec(i) % current number of elements
13: for j ← 1 to |{Mi}| do % loop over |{Mi}|
14: for idxθB ← 1 to NθB do % loop over θB ∈ [θB1,θB2]
15: θdoe = θB1+(idxθB−1)∆θB− ( j−1) πNmax % current DoE angle
16: S1 = 0
17: for m← 1 to NQ do % loop over x
18: x =−Q+(m−1)∆Q
19: for n← 1 to NQ do % loop over y
20: y =−Q+(n−1)∆Q
21: S2 = 0
22: for idxθ ← 1 to Nθ do % loop over θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]
23: θ = θ1+(idxθ −1)∆θ
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24: S2 = S2+
[
KG2C(θ ,θdoe)
K+1 +
x2+y2
K+1 +
2
√
KGC(θ ,θdoe)
K+1 x
] 2
β ∆θ
25: end for
26: S1 = S1+ exp{−λe2 [ Ptσ2n (2RB−Rs−1) ]
2
β S2} e−(x
2+y2)
π ∆Q
2
27: end for
28: end for
29: p¯(idx, idxθB) = 1−S1
30: end for
31: idx = idx+1
32: end for
33: end for
34: for k ← 1 to K do % zone 1 to zone K
35: T (k) = zeros(1,NθB)
36: Ntemp = 0 % number of available array modes
37: for i← 1 to K− k+1 do
38: Ntemp = Ntemp+ |{Mi}|
39: end for
40: for idxθB ← 1 to NθB do
41: idxmin = 1
42: p¯min = p¯(1, idxθB)
43: for idx← 2 to Ntemp do
44: if p¯min > p¯(idx, idxθB) then
45: idxmin = idx
46: p¯min = p¯(idx, idxθB)
47: end if
48: end for
49: T (k)(idxθB) = idxmin
50: end for
51: end for
